
Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2008

The Impact of Governance

By:

Ricardo Córdova Macías,
Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo

José Miguel Cruz,
Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública
Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Scientific Coordinator and Editor of the Series
Vanderbilt University



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY



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Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. The 2008 country reports contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez
AmericasBarometer Grant Manager at USAID

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson
Centennial Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the *AmericasBarometer* series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The *AmericasBarometer* is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website www.AmericasBarometer.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political

tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common Graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in Graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting² in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the *AmericasBarometer*. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the

² All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador.

2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Mexico and Central America Group		
Mexico		
Guatemala		
El Salvador		
Honduras		
Nicaragua		
Costa Rica		
Panama		

Andean/Southern cone Group		
Colombia	 Universidad de los Andes	 observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Bolivia	 Ciudadania Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	
Paraguay		
Chile		
Uruguay		 UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Brazil	 Universidade de Brasília	
Venezuela		

Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	 <p>Gallup República Dominicana, I.S.I.</p> 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

Aknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Elizabeth Ramirez, Eric Kite and Sharon Carter assisted us in all aspects of the project. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt's Provost, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center for the Americas supported us with funding for various aspects of the study. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico, Central America, North America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala ● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director, FundaUngo, El Salvador ● Prof. Miguel Cruz, Researcher, IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Researcher and Senior Analyst, Study Director, Market Strategies, Inc. ● Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Luís Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica. ● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University

Country	Researchers
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University • Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University • Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University • Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University • Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor, University of Delaware in the United States, and Research at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. • Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University • Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública • Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública • Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública • Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Lucio Renno, Professor in the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas, University of Brasilia
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Dr. Damaris Canache, CISOR and University of Illinois • Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University

Country	Researchers
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee • Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and director of surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies • Balford Lewis, Professor of Research Methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2008

Executive Summary

This report is the result of research regarding the political culture of Salvadorans, based on a public opinion poll carried out in February 2008. The survey was conducted by the Public Opinion University Institute of the UCA in conjunction with the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation, under the aegis of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University, supported largely by the United States Agency for International Development and also by the PNUD and the BID. This report is part of a series of studies about El Salvador, including surveys done in 1991, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2006 and the present one, in 2008. The research was based on a representative sample of 1,549 adult Salvadorans, aged 18 and older, residing in El Salvador. This investigation was performed with 95% confidence level and a sample error of more/less 2.4%. The survey is part of a broader study concerning the political culture in the American continent's countries: the *AmericasBarometer* coordinated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University, directed by Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson.

The study: "Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador: 2008: The Impact of Governance," is structured in three parts and consists of seven chapters. The first part (Comparative Theory and Analysis) introduces the preface and the First Chapter: "Building Support for Stable Democracy." The second part (Governance) presents the study's results focusing on the impact of support for stable democracy on the various analyzed subject matters.

The second chapter analyzes the impact of corruption. The results indicate that 14.8% of Salvadorans have been victims of commonplace acts of corruption or of bribery in the last year. The data position El Salvador among the countries with average levels of corruption in comparison to the rest of the countries in the region. Besides, a comparison of this data with that obtained in previous measurements shows that there have not been substantial changes in terms of incidence of bribery. The most frequent types of bribery are those engaged in by the police (7.6%), court staff members (6.4%), at public health facilities (6.3%), and in schools (5.5%).

However, regarding the perception of corruption, the data indicate that the majority of citizens perceive corruption as widespread among government employees. Among Salvadorans, 43.9% consider corruption as very common, 30.1% believe that it is "somewhat" widespread, and 26% think that corruption is not very widespread or not widespread at all. Though the level of perception of corruption in El Salvador is not the highest among the countries of the region, the data suggest that the majority of citizens do view corruption as widespread.

The probability of being a victim of solicitation of bribes is higher among men, among persons within the ages of 26 and 45 years old--the most financially active age group-- and among those who live in large cities and the metropolitan area of San Salvador.

Data from the study show that corruption has a direct impact on institutional trust and on interpersonal trust. Individuals who have been the victims of corruption tend to trust less fundamental institutions of the political system and tend to be more distrustful of their neighbors

and fellow citizens. Furthermore, persons who perceive that corruption is widespread tend also to show less trust in persons and institutions.

The report also explores the attitude of the citizens who have experienced acts of corruption. More than half of those surveyed responded that acts of corruption are not justified, but close to 40% of them did justify acts of corruption such as paying extra to obtain an identity document or using family contacts to obtain employment in the public sector. Despite this, results indicate that compared to the past, Salvadorans justify corruption less than in previous years.

The third chapter focuses on the issue of crime and its impact on democracy. The data indicate that 19% of Salvadorans were victims of a criminal act during the year before the survey. Though this data imply a rise of almost three percentage points compared to previous years, the increase is not statistically significant. Therefore, it could be said that there have not been substantial changes in the levels of crime victimization, at least in the manner in which crime is measured using surveys. Men, the young adults, and those who live in the metropolitan area of San Salvador showed the highest levels of probability of being the victims of criminality.

In terms of insecurity due to crime, the data indicate that 41.5% of Salvadorans feel unsafe. This places El Salvador at intermediate levels of insecurity due to criminality in comparison with other countries of America. Nevertheless, the data also indicate a significant drop in the levels of insecurity in comparison with previous years. In other words, Salvadorean citizens seem to feel somewhat safer in 2008 than they did in 2004 and 2006. Insecurity seems to be associated with four conditions. Firstly, women tend to feel more unsafe than men; secondly, having been the victim of violence increases the perception of insecurity as well. However, two variables in this context shown to have a particularly strong effect on Salvadorans' perception of insecurity: the presence of gangs and the perception that the local police are involved with crime.

The results also show that the majority of persons who were the victims of crime in the last year did not report it to the authorities. Only 27.2% of the people who were victims of a criminal act approached public institutions to press charges. This percentage, however, is lower than in previous years although the drop is not statistically significant. The most common reasons offered for not reporting criminal offenses are the belief that pressing charges is futile and that filing a complaint with the authorities could provoke retaliation by the perpetrators. This reflects the lack of trust of Salvadorans in their institutions. Violence and insecurity have created a vicious cycle in which the separation between citizens and institutions only deepens.

A particularly worrisome result of the survey revealed that Salvadorans who think that the police are involved in criminal activities express a higher sense of insecurity (45.9) while those who think that the police protect in the communities express a lower sense of insecurity (36). Moreover, those who feel that the police are not involved with crime but that the police do not protect them either, show an intermediate level of insecurity (41). These opinions about the police are strongly tied to the people's appraisals of the legitimacy of the political system: persons who perceive the police as involved with crime, generally indicate lower levels of trust not only in the police but also in national political institutions.

Victimization as well as insecurity affect important aspects of democratic political culture. People who have been victimized and citizens whose perceptions of insecurity are high, tend to trust less in the institutions and in persons who surround them. Moreover, persons who feel unsafe are less supportive of democracy as a form of government.

The fourth chapter refers to the performance of local governments. The study identified a closer relationship of the citizenry to local government, in terms of having requested help or cooperation to solve their problems, and of greater trust in the municipal government (57.1) compared to the national government (46.9). Furthermore, the municipal government is the institution which, in the opinion of those surveyed, has best responded to resolve the problems of the community.

Survey data show relatively low levels of citizen participation in the operation of municipal governments through the two considered mechanisms: attendance to an open town council meeting or a municipal session during the last twelve months (12), or through the presentation of requests for help or petitions (15.6).

With regard to satisfaction with the services provided by the municipalities, 4% considered such services very good, 32.7% good, 41.4% neither good nor bad, 17.3% bad, and 4.6% very bad.

Those surveyed expressed satisfaction with the treatment received at the mayor's office: 7.6% thinks they were treated very well, 50% well, 30.9% neither well nor badly, 9.5% badly and 1.9% very badly.

Opinions are divided regarding the government level to which more resources and responsibilities should be assigned: 47.2% mention the national government and 46.7% the municipal government, while 6.1% prefers to not change anything.

Institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust appear to be impacted by satisfaction with municipal services: the higher the levels of satisfaction, the higher the levels of institutional legitimacy, and the greater the trust among the people.

The fifth chapter presents the results of the perceptions of the national economy. Almost two thirds of the citizens think that the main problem of the country is financial in nature: poverty, unemployment, inflation, among other conditions. In this sense, Salvadoran citizens are critical of the government's performance on financial matters. More than 55% of Salvadorans evaluated the government's performance negatively in combatting poverty and unemployment. Compared to the results from other countries included in this study, this places the Salvadorean government in an intermediate-low position. The factors influencing these opinions are educational level (people with more schooling were more critical of the government's performance), and wealth (people with more resources were also more critical); but above all else, the perceptions about the state of personal finances and of the national economy. Citizens who perceive their personal finances and the country's economy to be in bad shape tend to be more critical of the government's work in the financial area.

The aforementioned affects institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust. The perception that the government is working insufficiently in the financial area reduces support for the political system and interpersonal trust.

The third part of this study, *Beyond Governance*, is the sixth chapter, which examines the matter of political legitimacy. The scale of system support seeks to measure the level of support that citizens grant their government system, without focusing on a particular administration in power. In Political Science literature this is called “diffuse support” or “system support.” This scale has been built from the average obtained for each of the five questions used. So that these results were more comprehensible, they were later converted to a range of 0-100. The average obtained for each of these questions is: courts (43.9), basic rights (42.7), support (56.2), and institutions (68.3), and average of the scale of system support is 51.8.

Since data from the 2004 and 2006 surveys was available, it is possible to see the evolution of the levels of system support for the period between 2004 and 2008. System support declines from 59.5 in 2004 to 55.4 in 2006, and further declines in 2008 to 51.8.

When comparing trust in specific institutions in the surveys of 2004, 2006 and 2008, one can observe a generalized drop in the trust of Salvadorans in their institutions. The diminishing of trust between 2004 and 2008 is higher in the case of the Legislative Assembly (12.2 points), the national government (13.7 points), the Supreme Electoral Court (15.3 points), the National Police (16 points) and trust in the elections (16.4 points).

The scale of political tolerance is based on four questions that refer to four basic liberties: the right to vote, the right to demonstrate peacefully, the right to run for public office and the right to freedom of expression. This scale has been built at a range of 0-100. The average obtained for each of these questions has been: to run for public office (48.8), freedom of expression (49.4), the right to vote (59.9) and protest peacefully (60.7); the average on the scale of political tolerance is 54.2.

The available data from the 2004 and 2006 surveys, makes it possible to see the evolution of political tolerance levels for the period 2004-2008. Political tolerance increases from 51.3 in 2004 to 55.8 in 2006, to later diminish to 54.2 in 2008.

For the analysis of the support for stable democracy, the relationship between the support system scale and the tolerance scale has been explored. Each one was divided into a low and high level, which created four different possible combinations. The distributions of those surveyed in 2008 in these four cells are as follows: 23% self-locates in the stable democracy cell, 29% in the authoritarian stability cell, 27% in unstable democracy and, 21% in the cell of democracy at risk.

With regards to the assessments of democracy, 10.5% thinks that the country is very democratic, 39.3% somewhat democratic, 39.3% not very democratic and 10.8% not democratic at all.

The study found that Salvadorans exhibit strong support for democracy as a form of government: 84.5% prefers electoral democracy versus 15.5% who would support a strong leader; and 78.4% prefer democracy as a form of government versus 9.7% who prefer an authoritarian government, and 12% for whom a democratic government is the same as an authoritarian one.

Paradoxically, this survey found significant levels of dissatisfaction with democracy's performance: 3.2% feels very satisfied, 39% feels satisfied, 45.19% dissatisfied and 11.99% very dissatisfied with democracy's performance. A comparison with the data of 2004 shows that levels of dissatisfaction democracy's performance have risen.

The seventh chapter analyzes electoral behavior and political parties. The six deciding factors of voting intention are 1) personal in the presidential campaign of 2004, 2) sympathy for a particular political party, 3) interest in politics, 4) size of residence, 5) age, and 6) educational level.

The study has identified low levels of citizen trust in political parties; moreover, this trust has diminished in the past years, decreasing from 39.9 in 2004 to 35.6 in 2008 (on a scale of 0-100).

Of those surveyed, 9.1% consider that political parties are very democratic in their internal operations, 36.8% somewhat democratic, 42.8% not very democratic and 11/3% not democratic at all.

Furthermore, 40.9% expressed sympathy towards a political party. Of this group, 25.1% expressed that the intensity of that tie is very strong, 42.3% strong, 25.1% neither weak nor strong, 6.5% weak and 1% weak.

Regarding interest in politics, 15.7% expressed much interest, 13.9% some, 39.3% little, and 31.1% none.

Concerning the political participation of women, 83.8% agreed that women should participate in politics as much as men do, 10% expressed that women should only participate in politics when family obligations allow it, and 6.2% thought that it was not a good idea that women participate in politics.

Trust in elections has diminished during the last years, dropping on a scale of 0-100, from 65.1 in 2004 to 51.3 in 2006 and then to 48.7 in 2008.

Introduction

This report is the result of research concerning the political culture of democracy of El Salvador in 2008. Political culture is understood in general terms as the values, norms, and attitudes of citizens in the processes of constructing a democracy in a country. This research is framed in a regional effort coordinated by the Latin American Project of Public Opinion of Vanderbilt University, directed by Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson, and financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with the purpose of studying the political culture in the countries of Latin America. Additionally, the study was funded this year in part by the PNUD.

In El Salvador, the research was conducted by the “Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation” (FUNDAUNGO) and the University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) of the Central American University “José Simeón Cañas” (UCA). Locally, the effort is also framed in a series of studies concerning political culture initiated in 1991 with the publication of *Perspectives for a Stable Democracy* and continued with the publication of four more studies: *El Salvador: from War to Peace. A political culture in transition*, in 1995, *Auditing of Democracy, El Salvador 1999*, published in 2000, *The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2004*, published in 2005, provides continuity to the previous studies and helps visualize the advancements and the roadblocks in the construction of a political culture favorable to the democratic regime in the country. The Latin American Project of Public Opinion (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University coordinated the development of the studies conducted in 2004, 2006 and now in 2008. Several questions in the surveys taken allow for the possibility of analyzing the evolution of the opinions and attitudes during the period 2004-2008.

The present report is structured in three parts and consists of seven chapters. The first part (Comparative and Theoretical Analysis) presents the preface and the first chapter: “Building support for a stable democracy,” prepared by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr. The second part, “Governance,” presents the results of the study which focus on the impact of support for stable democracy from various perspectives: The second chapter tackles the impact of corruption, the third analyzes crime, the fourth refers to local government’s performance, and the fifth chapter is devoted to citizens’ perception of national government’s performance in financial matters. The third part, “Beyond Governance“, addresses the issue of political legitimacy in the sixth chapter, and the seventh chapter analyzes electoral behavior and political parties.

The efforts of several individuals from IUDOP, and FUNDAUNGO made possible the present publication. IUDOP’s, Bessy Morán, Roxana Argueta, and Carla Artiga were the anchors for the preparation and development of the research process. Jeannette Aguilar, director of IUDOP was in charge of the new project and facilitated its development. FUNDAUNGO’s Leslie Quiñónez contributed to the section on economics. Patricio Amaya provided technical assistance for the utilization of the Stata software, and Loida Pineda was in charge of editing the document. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude for the comments and suggestions of Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson as well as the support of Rubí Arana from LAPOP.

Ricardo Córdova Macías
José Miguel Cruz



PART ONE:
THEORY &
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS

Preface: Political and economic context in El Salvador and sample description of 2008

1. Political and economic context

Elections for members to the Legislative Assembly and Municipal Councils took place on March 16, 2006; 2,060,889 voters participated out of a total of 3,801,040 registered voters from the electoral rolls, an electoral participation rate of 54.2%. Six political parties participated in these elections: Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), Frente Farabundo Martí Front para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN), Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), Cambio Democrático (CD) and Partido Nacional Liberal (PNL).³

Insofar as the electoral results are concerned, the following table displays for each of the elections the totality of valid votes received by each one of the contending parties, the percentage that the totality of these valid votes represents, and the number of Assembly members and municipal councils obtained.

Table P-1. Results of the 2006 Legislative and Municipal elections.

Parties	Legislative Elections			Municipal Elections		
	Votos válidos	% sobre votos válidos	No. de diputados electos	Votos válidos	% sobre votos válidos	No. de alcaldías obtenidas por partido
ARENA	783,230	39.2	34	791,361	39.5	147
FMLN	785,072	39.3	32	670,711	33.5	59 ^b
PCN	228,196	11.4	10	307,330	15.4	39
PDC	138,538	6.9	6	173,982	8.7	14
CD	61,022	3.1	2	30,778	1.5	3 ^a
PNL	1,956	0.1	0	2,637	0.1	0
Otros				24,101 ^c	1.3	
TOTAL	1,998,014	100	84	2,000,900	100	262

^a Includes one in coalition with PNL.

^b Includes 4 in coalition with CD and 1 in coalition with PDC.

^c Includes coalition votes: FMLN-CD, PDC-CD, FMLN-PNL, PDC-FMLN, FMLN-CD-PNL, PDC-FMLN-CD, PNL-CD-Fuerzas Democráticas.

Source: Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Memoria Especial Elecciones 2006.

³ For a vision of the 2006 electoral process, see: CIDAI, “Las elecciones legislativas y municipales de 2006: polarización sociopolítica y erosión institucional”; IUDOP, “Los determinantes de las preferencias políticas en 2006”; y Álvaro Artiga-González, “Las elecciones 2006 en perspectiva.” All three articles published in the Magazine *ECA*, No. 688-689, February-March, 2006.

In past legislative elections, the FMLN obtained 39.3% of the votes, ARENA 39.2%, the PCN 11.4%, the PDC 6.9%, CD 3.1% and the PNL 0.1%. In municipal elections, ARENA obtained 39.5%, the FMLN 33.5%, the PCN 15.4%, the PDC 8.7%, CD 1.5%, PNL 0.1% and others 1.3%.

After the legislative and municipal elections of March, 2006, the parties started to prepare for the general elections to take place in 2009, with which the political-electoral cycle initiated in 1994 would close –the first postwar elections-.⁴ In this context, the Legislative Assembly approved a decree through which the 2009 election dates would take place separately--legislative and municipal elections in January, and presidential elections in March.

At the end of 2007, the parties began the selection process for their candidates.. In November, 2007, the FMLN announced the the nomination of Mauricio Funes y Salvador Sánchez Cerén as its presidential candidates.. In March, 2008, the ARENA party, elected Rodrigo Ávila as its presidential candidate.

Although Salvadoran electoral law does not allow the carrying out of election propaganda, the country has experienced an intense pre-election period which likely will continue until the elections take place next year. In September, 2008, the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) will officially initiate election processes for January and March of 2009.

Regarding El Salvador's economic situation, the following table presents a basic set of economic indicators for the period 2004-2008. The economy's behavior during this period shows a slight recovery in national economic growth, as well as in per capita growth. In this framework, the debate revolves around the structural and situational factors both internal and external that explain the economy's evolution.

In 2005, inflation dropped slightly, increased in 2006 and 2007, and presented a significant rise of 9.6% in July, 2008. This increase is mainly attributable to the impact of the rise of international prices of petroleum (US\$ 105.00 per barrel at March, 2008), and a rise in food prices, which has increased the cost of living.

⁴ For a vision of the postwar electoral system, see: Álvaro-Artiga-González. El sistema electoral salvadoreño de posguerra (1994-2007). San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, Temas de Actualidad No.6, 2008.

Table P-2. El Salvador: Main Economic Indicators, 2004-2008.

Indicators	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Tasa crecimiento económico (PIB real) (1)	1.8	2.8	4.2	4.7	ND
Tasa de crecimiento PIB real per cápita (1)	0.1	1.3	2.5	3	ND
Tasa de inflación (1)	5.4	4.3	4.9	4.9	9.6 (5) (a julio 2008)
Nivel de pobreza nacional (2)	40.9	42.1	36.8	ND	ND
Remesas Familiares como % PIB (2)	16.1	16.6	18.6	18.1	ND
Index of Human Development (3)	0.729 (posición mundial 101 de 177países)	0.735 (posición mundial 103 de 177 países)	0.742 (2)	ND	ND
Precios Internacional de petróleo Dólares por Barril (4)	41.2	57.6	62.0	91.4	105.5 (a marzo 2008)

1 Own elaboration based on: CEPAL-México. "Istmo Centroamericano y República Dominicana: Evolución Económica durante 2007 y perspectivas para 2008. (Evaluación preliminar), 22 de abril de 2008.

2 Own elaboration based on: PNUD. "Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador 2007-2008."

3 Own elaboration based on: PNUD. "Informes Mundiales de Desarrollo Humano, 2006 y 2007."

4 Own elaboration based on: Datos del Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador.

5 "Inflación llega a 9.6% en julio." Según la Dirección General de Estadística y Censos. La Prensa Gráfica, 14 de agosto de 2008. pág.32.

ND: Information Not Available.

As can be observed in Table P-2, the Index of Human Development (IDH) has continued to show a growth tendency during the period at a national level, moving from 0.729 in 2004 to 0.742 in 2006, placing El Salvador in 103rd position among 177 countries.

In their own right, remittances from family members living abroad continue to be an important factor in the livelihood of the Salvadorean economy, showing a growth tendency similar to the GDP, increasing from 16.1% in 2004 to 18.1% in 2007.

Data on poverty at a national level indicates that from 2004-2006 there was a drop of 4.1 percentage points, dropping from 40.9% of the population in 2004 to a 36.8% in 2006. In this framework, the "Report concerning Sustainable Development in El Salvador 2007-2008" suggests that the eradication of poverty requires combined efforts, from the economic, social and cultural spheres, but considers that "... the strongest blow... would be the eradication of the labor precariousness rates prevailing in the country"⁵.

⁵ PNUD. "Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador 2007-2008." P 71.

2. Sample Description


Between the 6th and 26th of February, 2008, the Univeristy Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) of the Central American University “José Simeón Cañas” (UCA) conducted the fieldwork of the study “Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2008: The impact of Governance.” The data gathering of this survey, which was effected by sampling points that covered the entire national territory, was accomplished using PDAs (an acronym from the English Personal Digital Assistant), commonly known in the market by the brand name: “Palm.”

The 2008 survey in El Salvador constitutes the sixth measurement performed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University (formerly in the University of Pittsburgh). The previous measurements were carried out in 1991, (only in the urban areas of El Salvador), 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2006. Starting in 1995, all the surveys were conducted on a national level, including urban and rural areas. This section describes the characteristics of the final sample obtained for the present study and carries out the comparisons with the characteristics of the samples from 2004 and 2006.

Characteristics of the final sample


The final sample obtained was of 1,549 valid interviews and is representative of the Salvadorean adult population 18 years and older. The margin of error estimated for the entire sample is of +/- .024 (more/less 2.4%). Of the sample, 52.1% are female; the remaining 47.9% are male. The average age of the surveyed population is 38.4 years old, with a standard deviation of 16.5 years. Following the general distribution of the Salvadorean population in terms of age, more than half of those surveyed (52.4%) are younger than 36 years old. On the other hand, the average of years of schooling of those surveyed was 8.4 years with a standard deviation of 5.3 years. In terms of income, almost two thirds of the surveyed population live in homes where the family income is less than 300 dollars a month. Of those polled, 62% live in cities or urban areas in the country and slightly over a third of the surveyed population live in rural areas.

The following graphs present the sample distributions according to the variables of the population stratum, gender, age, geographical area within the country, and education. All these are compared to the sample distribution of previous years to show the evolution of these factors throughout this period. Graph P-1 displays the distribution of the population according to the population size where the surveyed person resides. This classification was used to stratify the population and to select the municipalities which would be included in the sample (see the Methodological Description of Study in El Salvador in Appendix A). As one can observe, 40.1% of the sample was selected from cities with more than 100 thousand inhabitants, 18.1% from cities with 50 thousand to 100 thousand inhabitants and the rest of the sample was selected from cities with populations smaller than 50 thousand inhabitants. The increase in the selection of the sample in large cities compared to previous years is due to population growth in metropolitan areas.




Graph P-1. Sample Distribution according to Population Stratum, 2004, 2006 y 2008.

Graph P-2, on the other hand, shows the sample distribution in the last three surveys by gender. According to this graph, the ratio between men and women in the surveys has remained almost constant.




Graph P-2. Sample Distribution by Gender, 2004, 2006, 2008.

In terms of age, Graph P-3 reveals the distribution of those surveyed in the last three measurements of the *AmericasBarometer* in El Salvador. As previously mentioned, most of the Salvadorean population is young, and the sample distribution reflects that distribution.




Graph P-3. Sample Distribution by Age Cohorts, 2004, 2006, 2008.

In the same manner, Graph P-4 shows the sample distribution according to urban or rural area.



Graph P-4. Sample Distribution by Urban or Rural Area, 2004, 2006, 2008.

Finally, Graph P-5 shows the sample distribution according to educational level. An examination of the same suggests a gradual rise in the average years of schooling of those surveyed in recent samples.. According to the graph, the percentage of people without schooling dropped three percentage points in the last four years, while the rate of individuals with higher education increased by five per cent.



Graph P-5. Sample Distribution by Educational Level, 2004, 2006, 2008.

Comparison of some characteristics of the sample with those of the country’s population

The following chart presents a comparison of the sample characteristics with those of the country’s population in order to corroborate that the obtained sample is truly representative of the population universe. For this purpose, the data obtained through the Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM)⁶ of 2006 are used, which are the most recent we have gathered, and the Proyección de Población de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos [Population Projection of the General Office of Statistics and Census] (DIGESTYC).

⁶ General Office of Statistics and Census / Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos [DIGESTYC]. (2004). *Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 2004 (EHPM)*. San Salvador: Ministry of Finance.

Table P-3. Characteristics of the Sample obtained and of the Population according to the projection data of DIGESTYC for 2006.*

Variable	Population	Sample
Sexo (%)		
Hombre	49.2	47.9
Mujer	50.8	52.1
Edad (%)		
18-34 años	50.4	50.6
35 años y más	49.6	49.4
Área (%)		
Urbana	60.3	62.3
Rural	39.7	37.7
Departamento (%)		
Ahuachapán	5.3	6.3
Santa Ana	8.9	11.9
Sonsonate	7.5	11.1
Chalatenango	2.9	2.8
La Libertad	11.6	8.1
San Salvador	31.9	31.1
Cuscatlán	3.1	2.5
La Paz	4.6	2.3
Cabañas	2.2	2.5
San Vicente	2.5	1.3
Usulután	4.9	4.3
San Miguel	7.9	9.0
Morazán	2.6	2.2
La Unión	4.3	5.5
* We used Population Data from 2006 because these are the last available disaggregated by the pertinent variables.		

Capítulo I . Building Support for Stable Democracy⁷

1.1. Theoretical framework

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, et al. 1996; Przeworski, et al. 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, et al. 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term, they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).⁸ Yet, generating national wealth, is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place over night. Can governments, international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, *et al.* 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is really no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the *AmericasBarometer* survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasingly, attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago.

⁷ This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

⁸ This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *gobernabilidad*, or more accurately, *gobernanza*⁹).¹⁰ Good governance may well be essential for the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House web site), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy, but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

1.2. Working hypothesis

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.¹¹ Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which *AmericasBarometer* data exist for some countries,

⁹ Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “gobernabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “gobernabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “gobernabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

¹⁰ According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

¹¹ We emphasize *support for* stable democracy, recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).¹² Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly what forms of governance matters for what aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP *AmericasBarometer* data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy practitioners want determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.¹³ The *AmericasBarometer* data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the values and experiences of citizens that

¹² Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

¹³ For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999) :

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn¹⁴:

1.3. Support for the idea of democracy per se (ING4)

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillian concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”


In the *AmericasBarometer*, we tap this concept with the following item:

(ING4): Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno.

The results for the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 are shown in Graph I-1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.¹⁵ At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchillian notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

¹⁴ We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

¹⁵ Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.



Graph I-1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 *AmericasBarometer* it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries (see www.AmericasBarometer.org to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

1.4. Support for core values on which democracy depends

In Robert Dahl's classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. An recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured them with a series of items from the *AmericasBarometer* as follows:

- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP these three items have been found to form a reliable scale.¹⁶

La escala está basada en los siguientes tres ítems de LAPOP:


E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

The results from the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 for this scale are shown in the Graph I-2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen's right to contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with real difference among these countries.

¹⁶ Cronbach alpa coefficients are amost always above .7



Graph I-2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective


B. Support for Right of Citizen Inclusiveness (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no

chance that those in power could lose power, and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:

- D1.** Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del [país], no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas?
- D2.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.
- D3.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?
- D4.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

The results from the *AmericasBarometer 2008* are shown in Graph I-3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only four countries are above 60, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depend in part upon one's position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (d5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country 6th lowest in tolerance.



Graph I-3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

1.5. Belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than are alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in (Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and

Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index¹⁷ based on five items from the *AmericasBarometer* survey:


- B14.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?
- B10A.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?
- B31.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?
- B13.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?
- B21.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

The results from the *AmericasBarometer* survey, 2008 are as shown in Graph I-4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g. Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation on these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation on that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.


The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative size. Indeed, only one country, Mexico, just barely has a score above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about “crisis of legitimacy” in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.

¹⁷ This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.



Graph I-4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime institutions in Comparative Perspective. Controlled for approval of chief executive performance).

The impact of excluding the measuring trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Graph I-5. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S. which at the time of the survey had an administration that suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings with the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.



Graph I-5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance).


1.6. Social capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herreros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein

and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, o nada confiable?

The results from the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 are shown in Graph I-6. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1.



Graph I-6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

Conclusion

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.

PART TWO:
GOVERNANCE

Capítulo II . Corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy

This chapter presents results regarding corruption in the public institutions of El Salvador, and its impact on democracy. The chapter is divided in five sections. The first presents a brief theoretical framework about corruption; then, it describes the items that will be used in this chapter. The third presents the results of victimization by corruption, and the impact of corruption on the variables of stable democracy; in addition, it focuses on the perceptions of corruption and, again, its impact on democracy. The fourth presents some data that indicate to what degree citizens justify corruption. Finally, conclusions are presented.

2.1. Theoretical framework¹⁸

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues in the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, reporting of and discussion of corruption has become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD plus representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February 1999 the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational

¹⁸ This section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.” This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.”¹⁹ Thus, effective initiatives should rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”

How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Do we really know that corruption is greater in some places than others? If we do not know this, then we cannot really say much about variations in its causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.²⁰ And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Those who are victims could lower their belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy. It is far less likely, however to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow man/woman.

¹⁹ USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance (www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaidd/indexpg.html) February.

²⁰ The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

2.2. The measurement of corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption victimization items is as follows:

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...				
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (coima) en el último año?	9	0	1	8
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima) en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8

Additionally, the survey includes the following question regarding the perception of corruption among citizens:

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la Corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está:
[LEER]
(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada


2.2.1. Corruption victimization in comparative perspective

In this section, we focus on three variables: victimization by corruption (corvic), a dichotomous variable that measures if people has been victimized by corruption or not; the total number of victimization forms by corruption (summarized in the variable exctot); and the perceptions people have about corruption (exc7r). These three conditions summarize an important aspect of the lack of transparency within the country, namely how people experience and perceive corruption. The following pages present the results of the questions that detail the problem of corruption. In this

section, the perception of corruption in El Salvador is placed in a comparative perspective with the rest of the countries of the area.

What is the percentage of Salvadorans who have been victims of corruption in the course of a year? It must be taken into account that in this study not all types of corruption suffered by citizens are being measured. We are measuring only those behaviors common in the public sphere; for instance, being asked by a police officer for bribe or having to pay an additional amount to gain access to a government controlled service.. Other types of more complex corruption, such as diversion of funds by civil servants, influence peddling in public administration, or the appropriation of funds without requisite bidding, usually escape the direct knowledge of the common citizen, and as such, its measurement through the surveys is limited.

Considering these aspects of the issue, the results of the survey show that 14.8% of Salvadorans said that they had been victims of corruption in the last year. That is, fifteen of each one-hundred Salvadorans faced at least one case of bribery or of illegal payment in the course of the last year before the survey. This result places El Salvador in the lower part of the intermediate group of countries, ordered according to victimization by corruption. As shown in Graph II-1, El Salvador is below countries like Perú, Ecuador or Jamaica, and far below the most troublesome--Haití, México and Bolivia-- which have percentages of victimization by corruption above the 20% level; yet above countries such as Panamá, Colombia and Uruguay. In a certain way, El Salvador is part of the group of countries which like Costa Rica, República Dominicana, Nicaragua and Honduras, face “lower-middle” levels of everyday corruption.



Graph II-1. Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

However, as pointed out before, objective events of corruption do not always tally with perceptions. Many of these perceptions, apart from being influenced by a more ample range of corruption events than those which are measured in this survey, are the product of other factors, such as the access to information and exposure to the media. In terms of perception, the percentage of Salvadorans who point out the presence of corruption is much higher. The results of the answers to the question about how widespread corruption is show that 43.9% of Salvadorans said that corruption is very widespread, 30.1% said it is somewhat widespread, and the remaining 26% said that it is not very widespread or not widespread at all.


Comparing the results about perception of corruption with those obtained in the surveys of 2004 and 2006, we see that perceptions about corruption among civil servants have continued to rise. As one can see in Table II-1, in 2008, the percentage of people whose opinion was that corruption was very widespread was 43.9%, nearly 7 percentage points more than in 2004 and almost a full point more than in 2006. Likewise, in 2006, the percentage of people who thought that there was no corruption was almost 6.9%, almost two points more than in 2008. Although the results of 2008 are not statistically

significant with regard to those of 2006, they are with regard to those of 2004, and show a rise in the tendency to perceive corruption as more widespread.

Table II-1. Opinion about Corruption of Civil Servants by year, 2004-2008.

Year	Corruption of Civil Servants is...?				Total
	Very widespread	Somewhat widespread	Little widespread	Not at all widespread	
2004	36.0%	31.6%	26.5%	6.0%	100.0%
2006	43.1%	28.6%	21.4%	6.9%	100.0%
2008	43.9%	30.1%	21.0%	5.0%	100.0%
Promedio 2004-2008	41.0%	30.1%	23.0%	6.0%	100.0%


With the purpose of comparing this data with the rest of the region, the results were transformed to a scale of 0-100, in which 100 represents the highest perception level of lack of transparency, while 0 represents the lowest level. The figures show that El Salvador has an average of 70.7 on 100 point scale, confirming that most citizens perceive that there is much corruption among Salvadorean civil servants. Nevertheless, this tendency does not seem to be exclusive to El Salvador. In the majority of the countries covered by the 2008 round of the *AmericasBarometer*, the perception level of corruption far exceeded direct victimization. For this, El Salvador does not appear as one of the countries in which corruption is perceived as generally prevalent. As one can see in Graph II-2, the country finds itself in the low-middle group of countries in terms of perception of corruption, below countries like Nicaragua, Mexico or Honduras; but above Chile, Uruguay or Haiti. In short, although the majority of Salvadorean citizens think that corruption is widespread in the country, its perception does not seem to be as high as in other countries of the region. Rather than pointing out that in El Salvador there is not a problem of corruption, this data suggest that in the rest of the region, the problem tends to be more serious and urgent.



Graph II-2. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective, 2008.


2.3. Victimization by corruption

Despite the fact that almost 15% of Salvadorans have been victims of general corruption, the results of the current LAPOP survey allows us to establish if persons had been victims on more than one occasion. Graph II-3 shows the frequency with which people have suffered events of corruption in the course of one year. As one can observe, only 3.1% of the population has faced two or more events of corruption in El Salvador; the majority of those who have been asked to pay bribes and *mordidas* (“bites”) have only done so once throughout the course of the year.




Graph II-3. Total Index of Corruption by Victimization, 2008.

Nonetheless, given that we have asked about different types of bribery and everyday corruption, it is worthwhile to review the results of the inquiry considering these different types of victimization by corruption. Graph II-4 shows the percentages of victimization according to the types of bribes that were asked about in the survey. The results indicate that the most frequent type of victimization has been at the hands of the police, with an incidence of 7.6%; followed by bribery in the courts, with 6.4%; in public health facilities, with 6.3%; and in the school system, with 5.5%. The ample confidence interval shown in the case of bribery in the courts is due to the low number of persons who have paid bribes; thus, the population of which the percentage of incidence is estimated is significantly lower than in the rest of the cases. Despite this, it is clear that Salvadorans have been victims more frequently of bribery while dealing with the police, justice courts, public health centers and schools, than in the municipal offices (mayoralty), at work, or in public offices in general.




Graph II-4. Acts of Corruption suffered in the last year by Type, 2008.

How can the incidence of corruption over the last six years in El Salvador be compared? Data gathered by the Latin American Project of Public Opinion of Vanderbilt University in its last three surveys provides the basis for this comparison.. Although the results show some variations in the specific percentages of persons who have been victims of corruption in the three measurements of the *AmericasBarometer*, the confidence intervals shown in Graph II-5 indicate that the variations do not constitute a statistically significant difference between the results of each of the years. In 2004, the percentage of persons who were victims of corruption was 15.7%; in 2006 this percentage dropped to 13.4%, not a substantial decrease.



Graph II-5. Percentage of the Population victimized by year.

This is true even for those types of corruption for which there seems to be an increased incidence. For example, if one compares the percentages of victimization by bribery at the hands of the police (EXC2) between 2004 and 2008, one can notice a rise in the percentage of persons who said that they have been victims of corruption. The percentage rose from 5.5 in 2004 to 7.5 in 2008. Nevertheless, in light of the confidence intervals submitted by the statistical program, the difference noted in the percentages is not enough to ascertain that the proportion of citizens affected by police corruption is significantly different than the proportion reached in previous years. Thus, it cannot be said that there has been a substantial increase in the corruption of El Salvador, at least not in terms of common incidents of bribery.




Graph II-6. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Bribery of Police by year.

2.3.1. The victims of corruption

Who are the most frequent victims of corruption? To answer this question, a binary logistic regression was carried out, which allows the identification of the conditions that predict who becomes a victim of corruption or not. The dependent variable utilized was the variable which integrated the different types of corruption and which reflects the percentage of persons who suffered at least one instance of corruption in the course of one year (CORVIC). Therefore, the variable in question differentiated between those persons who did not experience corruption (represented as 0), and those who experienced at least one instance of corruption (represented as 100). As independent variables, that is, conditions or characteristics that can determine victimization, are gender (being female), age, years of schooling, family income, receipt of remittances from abroad, wealth (measured as the number of goods in the home), the size of place of residence, the area in which the interviewee resides (urban or rural), and the number of children of the person surveyed.


Graph II-7 shows the results of the binary logistic regression to establish the characteristics of the most frequent victims. Appendix II-1 (at the end of the chapter) presents the coefficients. This graph shows the probabilities of becoming a victim of bribery or another corrupt act in the last year in El Salvador for each of the variables considered in the regression. The variables that turned out to be significant were those whose confidence intervals (at 95%), do not intersect with the value of the 0. These variables are: number of children, size of the place where the interviewee resides, age, and gender.

The remaining conditions tested-- rural or urban area, wealth level of the home, family income, and the education of the interviewee--were not shown to be associated with victimization by corruption when the other variables are controlled.




Graph II-7. Probability of being a Victim of Bribery, 2008.

The following graphs show the bivariate relationships between the levels of victimization by corruption and the variables that proved to be significant. In the case of gender, 19.1% of men were victims of bribery; on the other hand, only 10.9% of victims were women. This as measured in this survey, almost twice as many men as women have been victimized by bribery. The resulting probabilities of the regression in Graph II-7 indicates a confidence interval on the negative side of the distribution because women had a higher value in the gender variable.




Graph II-8. Victimization by Corruption according to Gender, 2008.

Graph II-9 shows the relationship between age and victimization by bribery. Individuals between 26 and 45 years old, were surveyed because this is the most active group financially and the most likely to deal with diverse agents of the public sector. In this age group, the percentage of victimization is higher than 16. Moreover, with exception of the youngest adults (from 18 to 25 years old), the graph reveals that the rate of victimization due to corruption diminishes substantially as age rises until it reaches 7% among individuals over age 66 years. It seems clear then that the probability of being a victim of corruption in El Salvador is in a certain way tied to the capacity of establishing relations with public agents, which is strongly linked to age. However, it would be an error to attribute this to wealth or income, since, as we have already seen in the regression results, these variables do not seem to be statistically associated to victimization by corruption.




Graph II-9. Victimization by Corruption according to age in years, 2008.

The size of the place in which the surveyed person resides was also found to be associated with the probability of being the victim of bribery or of corruption in everyday life. Persons living in larger populations are more likely to be victimized by corruption. According to Graph II-10, the incidence of corruption is slightly less than 10% among the inhabitants of small cities but jumps to more than 20% in the metropolitan area of San Salvador, with growing intermediate percentages in medium and large cities. The only exception to this tendency is found in rural areas which display a bit more victimization than in the small cities. Again, the reasons for these general tendencies are associated with the likelihood of dealing with public agents, which is higher in the metropolitan area and in the larger cities than in small cities or rural areas.



Graph II-10. Victimization by Corruption according to Size of City, 2008.

Finally, the results show that the number of children a person has makes a difference in the probabilities of being a victim, although the differences shown in Graph II-11 are slight. The percentage of victimization rises as the number of children up to a total of four; starting from 5 children, the percentage drops significantly, even below those who have no children. It is possible that this relation is affected by other variables, for example, the age of the person surveyed, in such a way that individuals who have a larger number of children also tend to be older. This implies that the incidence of corruption may be related to the age of the children, a factor not measured in the survey. The children's age may make a difference because persons with young school-age children, who frequently access medical services for them deal more often with the public system (health, school, registry office) than those individuals who have older children.



Graph II-11. Victimization by Corruption according to Number of Children, 2008.

2.3.2. Impact of corruption on support for stable democracy


One of the fundamental purposes of this chapter—as well as of this report—is to determine the impact of corruption on democracy. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, corruption can play a role in eroding support for democracy’s fundamental institutions. This erosion can be the direct outcome of victimization experiences but can also be the result of perceptions concerning the lack of transparency on the part of civil servants. This section will measure the impact of victimization experiences and the perception of corruption on five variables considered fundamental to democracy: the idea that democracy is the best form of government (ING4), support for the right of contestation, political tolerance, the legitimacy of institutions, and interpersonal trust. We first examine the impact of victimization by corruption (EXCTOT) and afterwards we perform the same exercise regarding the perception of corruption by civil servants (EXC7).

2.3.2.1. The impact of victimization by corruption

In order to establish a connection between victimization by bribery and the fundamental variables of democracy, a regression analysis was carried out to estimate the impact of victimization and of other control variables including support of democracy, support for the right to participate, institutional legitimacy, tolerance, and interpersonal trust. Appendix II-2, at the end of the chapter, shows the results of the regressions. According to these, having been the direct victim of a bribery affects the levels of institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust, but does not seem to have an impact


on the support for democracy, on the support for the people's right of participation, nor on political tolerance.

The impact of corruption on institutional legitimacy was found as expected; that is, the more people have been more victimized by bribery, the more their trust in the fundamental institutions of the political system diminishes. In fact, persons who have not been victimized by corruption show a level of legitimacy of the institutions of 44 (on a scale of 0 to 100), decreasing to 37 among those who have been victimized once, and drops to 33 among those who have been victimized more than three times (see Graph II-12).



Graph II-12. Impact of Victimization by Corruption on Institutional Legitimacy, 2008.

The same trend occurs with interpersonal trust. Graph II-13 shows the results of the bivariate relationship; persons who have suffered more events of victimization by bribery tend to trust less in their fellow citizens than persons who have not been victimized by civil servants' corruption. The latter scored 66 (on the scale of 0-100) on interpersonal trust in contrast with a score of 47 among those who have been repeatedly the victims of corruption.



Graph II-13. Impact of Victimization by Corruption on Interpersonal Trust, 2008.


In short, victimization by corruption remarkably erodes citizens' trust in political institutions and in everyone else. In El Salvador, this means that the government agents who repeatedly victimize the populace by corruption, namely the police, civil servants or agents invested with power; not only deprive the country's inhabitants of their goods in an illegal manner but also destroy two aspects fundamental of democratic governance.

That El Salvador ranks in the lower-middle level of victimization by corruption seems more than sufficient motive to strengthen the institutions in charge of the public comptroller's office as a way to advance to the consolidation of democracy in El Salvador. These results show that combating corruption is not only a problem of deviation of financial resources, it is also a problem of erosion of fundamental trust in democracy.

2.3.2.2. The impact of the perception of corruption

Since victimization by corruption and the perception of victimization by corruption may not be the same, the *AmericasBarometer* of Vanderbilt University seeks also to measure the impact of perceptions of these fundamental variables of support for democracy. Following the same steps used in the assessment of victimization by corruption, statistical regressions were carried out to establish the impact of perceptions of corruption on support for democracy, support for political contestation, political tolerance, the legitimacy of institutions, and interpersonal trust. Appendix II-3 at the end of the chapter shows the results of these regressions. It should be emphasized that the results of measuring the impact of perceptions of corruption on political legitimacy, that is, on the trust in fundamental institutions of the political system reflected expected results in the regression coefficient

(see Appendix II-3 at the end of the chapter), as well as in the bivariate relationship shown in Graph II-14. Persons who see corruption as very widespread within government show a lower level of political legitimacy (35 on a scale of 0 to 100) than persons who perceive corruption less or not widespread at all (almost 50 on a scale of 0 to 100). This result is consistent with the results obtained with victimization and suggests that corruption, both real and perceived, has a strong impact on the legitimacy of El Salvador's political system.



Graph II-14. Institutional Legitimacy according to Perception of Corruption, 2008.

2.4. The justification of corruption

Civil servants are not the only participants in the problem of corruption. In reality, the lack of transparency, the incidents of corruption, and the bribery occurring in everyday life are many times promoted and led by the citizens. Obviously, not all Salvadorans participate or encourage corruption, in the same way as not all civil servants commit acts of corruption. Nonetheless, any evaluation of corruption in the country would be incomplete if we did not consider how the inhabitants evaluate acts of corruption. That is, beyond their perceiving corruption to exist or not, the question in this case is whether the citizens themselves justify and thus promote corruption in the public sphere. To be able to measure the justification of corruption of common citizens, the *AmericasBarometer* asked two questions in the three last surveys conducted in El Salvador. These questions establish hypothetical scenes of corruption and those surveyed must decide if that act is corruption or not and if the same deserves a sanction. The questions are detailed below.

Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones (1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; (2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o (3) no corruptas.

DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 5 dólares de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora...? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada
- (2) Es corrupto pero se justifica
- (3) No es corrupto
- (8) NS/NR

DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? **[Leer alternativas]**


- (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado
- (2) Es corrupto pero justificado
- (3) No es corrupto
- (8) NS/NR

The following table shows the results, revealing that for the majority of Salvadorans, acts of corruption are duly identified. Only a minimal percentage of persons do not qualify these acts as corrupt. Nevertheless, there seems to be some disagreement among the population about whether or not an act of corruption is justified. According to the results, 36.6% of those surveyed consider that payment of bribes is a corrupt practice but justifiable because it saves time and should not be punished. The same position is held by 33.7% of those surveyed regarding the use of personal influence to obtain employment in the public sector. This data offers into the justification of certain practices of corruption. Although it is not possible to generalize from these two items, these results suggest that lack of transparency and practices of corruption are not uniformly or solidly rejected by the citizens.

Table II-2. Opinions about Situations of Corruption (In percentages).

Situation	Corrupt and must be punished	Corrupt but justified	Not corrupt
Pagar extra para sacar partida de nacimiento	52.5	36.6	10.9
Usar influencias de familiar para conseguir empleo	51.9	33.7	14.4

The different rounds of the *AmericasBarometer* allow us to compare the evolution of these types of opinions. To make a comparison comprehensible, we convert each of these questions to a scale of 0 to 100, in which 100 represents the highest level of justification of corruption; that is, persons who respond by saying that the act does not represent an event of corruption, and 0 represents the position of persons who respond by saying that the event is a case of corruption and should be punished. Graph II-15 shows that the justification of corruption decreased noticeably in the last year compared to previous years. In 2004 and 2006, Salvadorans had averaged about 38 points (on the 0 to 100 scale) in the justification for lack of transparency; in 2008, this score dropped to 30.3, a statistically significant result. This is encouraging news, for it suggests that some Salvadorans have adopted a more critical attitude regarding acts of corruption. While it is not possible to make broader generalizations due to a lack of a more ample and diverse range of situations, this can be an indicator of a possible change in the public opinion concerning corruption.



Graph II-15. Justification of Corruption in Perspective, 2008.

2.5. Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined the results of the *AmericaBarometer's* survey regarding corruption. These are based on a battery of questions that explore victimization by corruption, perceptions concerning lack of transparency in the public sector, and opinions indicating attitudes of justification of corruption among the citizens. The data show that although the perception of corruption is widespread in El Salvador, it does not reach the levels found in other countries of the region, in which perceptions reach higher levels..

Regarding the objective data about corruption, that is, victimization itself, almost 15% of Salvadorean citizens have offered some type of bribery or illegal payment in 2007. This percentage places El Salvador at an intermediate level of corruption, below the majority of its Central American neighbors, but above several other countries. In spite of that, the comparison of these results with those obtained in previous years does not reveal a significant change in levels of victimization by corruption since 2004. Neither do the data reveal significant changes in the different types of bribery or in the measured acts of corruption. Police officers' requests for bribe continue to be the most frequent acts of corruption. Everyday corruption seems to affect more men more individuals between the ages of 26 and 45, those who live in the metropolitan area of San Salvador, and those who have between one child and four children, than the rest of the population.

Victimization by corruption has a particularly corrosive effect on trust in the system's basic institutions, that is, it affects the political legitimacy of the institutions, and it also affects interpersonal

trust. The perception of corruption also affects the legitimacy of institutions. These results show the need to continue exploring more in depth the issue of corruption. All in all, the present study reaffirms the evidence which shows that corruption, above all victimization, is a problem for the democratic governance of the country.

Appendixes

Appendix II-1. Predictors of Victimization by Corruption, 2008.

	Population victimized by Corruption	
	Coefficientes	(t)
Género (mujer)	-0.305*	(-4.27)
Edad	-0.271*	(-2.45)
ED	0.088	(0.84)
Ingreso familiar	0.175	(1.55)
¿Recibe su familia remesas (dinero) del exterior?,	-0.081	(-1.02)
Riqueza medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	0.186	(1.86)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.335*	(-2.19)
Urbano-rural	0.275	(1.81)
¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	0.291*	(3.56)
Constante	-1.854*	(-20.12)
F	6.09	
N. de casos	1464	
* p<0.05		

Appendix II-2. Impact of Victimization by Corruption on Support for Democracy, Support for the Right of Public Contestation, Political Tolerance, Institutional Legitimacy and Trust in the Institutions, 2008.

Variables independientes	Support a la Democracy (ING4)		Support al derecho de Participation (CONTEST=		Tolerancia política (TOL)		Legitimacy de las instituciones (LEGIT)		Confianza interpersonal (IT1R)	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Total de maneras de ser victimizado	-0.890	(2.01)	0.772	(1.01)	1.476	(1.89)	-4.005*	(1.32)	-6.582*	(1.51)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.054*	(0.03)	-0.179*	(0.03)	-0.253*	(0.02)				
Interés en la política	0.026	(0.02)	0.099*	(0.01)	0.119*	(0.02)	0.029	(0.02)		
Educación	0.258	(0.23)	0.648*	(0.13)	0.700*	(0.15)	-0.529*	(0.18)	0.062	(0.21)
Mujer	-3.472*	(1.32)	-4.219*	(1.04)	-6.982*	(1.07)	0.707	(1.27)	-6.088*	(1.71)
Edad	0.779*	(0.32)	0.371	(0.20)	0.274	(0.21)	-0.422*	(0.17)	0.697*	(0.29)
q2sq	-0.007*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.004*	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.711	(0.54)	0.249	(0.47)	0.665	(0.44)	-1.312*	(0.43)	1.341*	(0.66)
Perception economía familiar	0.338	(0.90)	-1.814*	(0.75)	-1.117	(0.80)	3.593*	(1.00)	2.637*	(1.10)
Tamaño del lugar	0.779	(0.54)	0.221	(0.38)	-0.819	(0.53)	1.032*	(0.51)	1.963*	(0.71)
Constante	41.057*	(7.94)	67.092*	(5.05)	56.156*	(5.84)	49.595*	(5.82)	34.691*	(8.15)
R-cuadrado	0.021		0.129		0.187		0.060		0.047	
N. de casos	1472		1502		1497		1503		1501	
* p<0.05										

Appendix II-3. Impact of Perception of Corruption on Support for Democracy, Support for the Right of Public Contestation, Political Tolerance, Institutional Legitimacy and Trust in the Institutions, 2008.

Variables independientes	Support a la Democracy (ING4)		Support al derecho de Participation (CONTEST)		Tolerancia política (TOL)		Legitimacy de las instituciones (LEGIT)		Confianza interpersonal (IT1R)	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Perception de la Corruption	0.066*	(0.03)	0.092*	(0.02)	0.078*	(0.03)	-0.172*	(0.03)	0.019	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.066*	(0.03)	-0.165*	(0.02)	-0.244*	(0.02)				
Interés en la política	0.023	(0.02)	0.094*	(0.01)	0.116*	(0.02)	0.038*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.196	(0.23)	0.533*	(0.13)	0.581*	(0.15)	-0.356*	(0.17)	0.026	(0.21)
Mujer	-3.382*	(1.38)	-4.056*	(1.03)	-6.808*	(1.06)	0.925	(1.28)	-5.556*	(1.67)
Edad	0.715*	(0.31)	0.317	(0.19)	0.256	(0.21)	-0.429*	(0.17)	0.610*	(0.29)
q2sq	-0.006	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.004*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.864	(0.53)	0.315	(0.49)	0.628	(0.44)	-1.273*	(0.38)	1.337	(0.67)
Perception economía familiar	0.274	(0.88)	-1.773*	(0.74)	-0.955	(0.79)	3.531*	(0.94)	2.456*	(1.08)
Tamaño del lugar	1.048	(0.55)	0.309	(0.38)	-0.726	(0.56)	0.806	(0.52)	2.137*	(0.74)
Constante	36.210*	(8.10)	61.726*	(4.95)	51.570*	(5.89)	59.365*	(5.64)	33.797*	(8.81)
R-cuadrado	0.026		0.143		0.192		0.099		0.037	
N. de casos	1458		1482		1479		1483		1476	
* p<0.05										

Capítulo III . Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

This chapter examines crime and its impact on the support for a stable democracy. The first section presents a discussion about the problem of measuring victimization by crime; the second section examines victimization by crime and perceptions of insecurity. The third tackles the probabilities of being the victim of crime; the fourth analyzes the impact of crime on the fundamental variables of democracy. The fifth section investigates the reporting of crime; the sixth examines the role of the police, and the seventh deals with adherence to rule of law. This chapter ends with some conclusions which summarize the main findings.

3.1. Theoretical framework²¹

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4) , states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among those respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the crime to the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study goes on to stress that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. That is because: “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where

²¹ Esta sección fue preparada por LAPOP.

the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, make it is difficult to know what to make of reports of this kind of crime.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be crime. One noteworthy example is that in Guatemala, those who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if those who die in car accidents would be included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rate of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in part because the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and in part because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can determine if an assault ends up in a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims often do not die, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would, if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is variation in its concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, there was an increasing level of crime, but that increase was large an urban phenomenon linked to gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. did not suffer the increases found in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, the cities increased their weight in determining national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America, in a number of countries the same phenomenon has emerged. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same

phenomenon is also observed when it comes to corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.

For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future studies will report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting, those who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime, have attitudes toward democracy significantly different from those who have not been victims or who express little fear. (Cruz 2003).

While it is an aphorism that there are no victimless crimes, we normally think of their impact on the individual victims or their immediate families. Economists see wider impacts and talk of lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the “social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Those perspectives come from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times that for a number of years, and in some regions, like the one around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm (Leyva 2001).

Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.²² According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States, and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,²³ says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”²⁴ In the region there are 140,000 homicides each year.²⁵ According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world

²²In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

²³According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

²⁴Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 (www.paho.org/english/DPI/ri970717.htm).

²⁵Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA” (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996; mimeographed).

(Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the gap with the rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.²⁶

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region's political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the *AmericasBarometer* survey data.

How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation.

Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about it in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our four dimensions of support for stable democracy.

3.2. The Measurement of Crime Victimization

In this chapter we will focus on two fundamental variables: victimization by crime, as measured through the *AmericasBarometer* survey, and the perceptions of personal safety. The idea of measuring the impact of crime not only through victimization, but also through the perceptions of personal safety emerged because crime and common violence usually generate insecurity among the population. This

²⁶The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

insecurity oftentimes becomes a social force that is stimulated by media agendas, political programs, and circumstances not always directly related to actual levels of crime. Hence, insecurity impacts politics and private actions which have to do with the application of laws, the administration of justice, and the promotion of the Rule of Law, the bases for the sustainability of democracy.

The questions which measure victimization by crime and perceptions of personal safety are the following:

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?


AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo **inseguro**, o muy **inseguro**?

(1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR

The general results of these questions show that nineteen percent (19%) of Salvadorans reported having been victims of some act of violence in the previous twelve months. On the other hand, 57.1% of those surveyed expressed feeling very safe or somewhat safe, while the remaining almost 43% responded that they felt somewhat or very **unsafe**. Inasmuch as this data appears to be a red flag, because of El Salvador's elevated levels of violence and criminality, it seems that not all Salvadorans feel equally unsafe. This can be seen more clearly when the results of each of these previous questions are put in a comparative perspective.


Graph III-1 presents the percentages of victimization for all the countries included in the 2008 round of the *AmericasBarometer*. El Salvador is part of a group of countries with the highest percentages of victimization, as measured by the survey. However, we must carefully consider these results because, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, the measurement of victimization through surveys only manages to capture one aspect of the complex phenomenon of crime.

level. As the graph shows, in countries like Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador there is a higher perception of insecurity than in El Salvador. On the other hand, in countries like Panama, Nicaragua or Jamaica, perceptions of insecurity are lower.




Graph III-2. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

How do these levels of victimization and of insecurity compare through time in El Salvador? The *AmericasBarometer* allows us to perform a systematic comparison of these variables. The results regarding victimization point to an apparent increment in the percentages of victimization by crime in the last two years. The percentage of persons who have experienced some type of criminal act rose from 15.6 in 2006 to 19 in 2008. Nevertheless, these differences cannot be considered significant in statistical terms since the confidence intervals in the graph overlap each other. In other words, despite the difference in the percentages, it is not possible to affirm that the level of victimization in 2008 is substantially different to those obtained in 2006 and 2004.



Graph III-3. Victimization by Crime in El Salvador: 2006-2008.

On the other hand there is an appreciable difference in the perceptions of insecurity. According to the results displayed in Graph III-4, the level of insecurity shown by Salvadorean citizens in 2008 is significantly lower than the level of insecurity reached in 2006. In other words, in 2008 Salvadorans felt somewhat safer than they did in 2006, when insecurity reached the highest levels.




Graph III-4. Perception of Insecurity in El Salvador: 2006-2008.


Which variables determine these perceptions of insecurity among Salvadorans and make them feel unsafe? To answer this question, a lineal regression was carried out (OLS) to determine some of the conditions that are associated with perceptions of insecurity. The variables are gender, age, and education level, as personal characteristics; wealth, measured according to goods of the home, and size of the city in which the surveyed reside (TAMANO) as variables of a socio-economic level; exposure to the news on television (A2), as a variable that can shape perceptions; the presence of gangs in the neighborhood (AOJ17) and opinions about whether the police protect citizens or are themselves involved in crime (AOJ18); and finally, the characteristics of the neighborhood which can be associated with the perception of safety. Graph III-5 shows the results of this regression exercise. Appendix III-1 (at the end of the chapter) presents the coefficients.

Gender, the victimization by crime, the presence of gangs in the neighborhood, and the perception of the police's role in the neighborhood partially determine the levels of insecurity among Salvadorans. As the regression graph shows, the confidence interval of the gender variable does not

intersect with the probability of zero, therefore it can be said that women tend to feel more unsafe. Yet the conditions which most increase the levels of insecurity are the victimization by crime, the heightened perception of gangs in the neighborhoods, and the opinion that the police assigned to provide neighborhood safety do not provide it, and instead are involved with crime. This issue will be further developed later on in this chapter. Graphs III-6, III-7, and III-8 show the magnitude of impact of these variables on Salvadorans' perceptions of insecurity (see Graph III-6). The victims of crime exhibit a score of 52.1 in the scale of insecurity compared to non-victims, who exhibit a score of only 39. However, as the data shown in the regression graph indicate, not only does victimization seem to have a notable effect on insecurity but also on certain specific conditions of the neighborhood in which the surveyed reside.




Graph III-5. Determinants of the Perception of Insecurity, 2008.




Graph III-6. Perceptions of Insecurity according to Victimization by Crime, 2008.

Graph III-7 shows that perceptions of insecurity jump from 34 (on a scale of 0 to 100) among persons who do not see any gang related problem in their neighborhoods, to almost 65 among persons who see a very serious problem concerning gangs.



Graph III-7. Perceptions of Insecurity according to the Opinion of Gang related Problems, 2008.

In the same manner, those interviewed think that the police of their neighborhood are tied to its delinquency problem show a much higher level of insecurity (45.9) than those surveyed who consider that the police protect their neighborhoods against crime (36).




Graph III-8. Perceptions of Insecurity according to the Perceived Role of the Police in the Neighborhood, 2008.

In short, insecurity has much to do with the conditions of the environment in which the citizens live. Not only do direct events of violence generate insecurity but also the perception of the immediate environment. The presence of gangs and of corrupt police, perceived as associated with crime, have a direct impact how safe or unsafe people feel.


3.3. Who is more likely to be the victim of a crime?

The discussion about the reasons for the insecurity of Salvadorans requires the exploration of equal importance in order to understand the phenomenon of crime in El Salvador: Who are the most frequent victims of crime in El Salvador? To answer this question, a regression was performed to identify the variables which point to the probabilities of being a victim of crime in the country. Five variables were considered for this calculation: gender, age, education, wealth, and the population size of the place where the surveyed person lives. Previous studies have suggested that these variables are systematically related to victimization. For example, men are usually the victims of common crime more frequently than women; young people are more frequently victimized than older persons; also those who have more years of schooling have more resources and live in more highly populated urban areas are usually the more frequent victims (see, for example, Cruz 1999). The results of the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 in El Salvador confirm some of these findings.




Graph III-9. Probability of being a Victim of Crime, 2008.

Graph III-9 reveals that the confidence interval of the population size of place, age in years and gender variables do not intersect with the probability zero. Appendix III-2 (see end of the chapter) presents the coefficients. This indicates that these variables are significantly related to victimization. The confidence interval of the age in years variable for example, is found in the negative quadrant of the graph, which indicates an inverse relationship: the lower the age, the higher the probability of being a victim of crime. This can be seen clearly in Graph III-10: almost 27% of Salvadorans under age 25 reported having been victims of crime; this percentage drops at a consistent rate until it reaches 8% among senior citizens. Thus, it appears that the probability of becoming the victim of crime diminishes with age.




Graph III-10. Victimization by Crime according to Age, 2008.

Gender was also found to be an important variable in the probabilities of being the victim of crime. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, women are not the most frequent victims of street violence, at least not of the type measured through our victimization surveys. According to the *AmericasBarometer* results and consistent with the results of other studies, men are usually the most frequent victims of violent acts. In Graph III-9 this is shown in the placement of the confidence interval within the negative quadrant of the figure; it can be seen more clearly when one compares directly the percentage of men and women who have been victims of crime in the last year (Graph III-11). Twenty-two percent (22%) of men have been victims of criminal violence while case only 16% of victims were women. Although the differences are less pronounced than with the age variable, in statistical terms, an important difference does exist. Although men are more victimized, women also suffer a considerable level of victimization in El Salvador. Violence affects substantially affects both men and women, especially if they are young.



Graph III-11. Victimization by Crime according to Gender, 2008.

The size of the place of residence of those surveyed also determines victimization by crime in an important manner. Almost a third of the inhabitants of the metropolitan area of San Salvador (31%), the largest urban area of the country, were victims of crime in the course of one year. A similar percentage (28.5%) is also found among the inhabitants of large cities. Yet the fundamental difference is found in the medium-sized cities; for example, 15.2% of the inhabitants have been the victims of crime while in rural areas, this percentage drops to slightly under 10%.



Graph III-12. Victimization by Crime according to Size of Place of Residence, 2008.

In short, we can state that young men have more probabilities of being victims of crime in El Salvador, and that living in the greater San Salvador area, just as residing in the larger cities (Santa Ana, San Miguel, Usulután and Sonsonate), increases the probabilities of becoming a crime victim.

3.4. The impact of criminal violence on the support for stable democracy


There is no doubt that crime and violence affect different spheres of the social and economic life of a nation, especially when these reach epidemic levels, as occurs in Central America, particularly in El Salvador. As detailed in the introduction to this chapter, one of the purposes of this report as well as previous studies, is to explore the impact of violence on the political culture of support for stable democracy in the country. One of the reasons to continue with this exploration is that El Salvador has been in the midst of a period of violence for several years now. It is expected that this prolonged problem will show a substantial negative effect on the attitudes which lend support to democracy.

To measure this impact, we examined both the effects of victimization by crime and the effects of insecurity as associated with the fundamental variables of democratic political culture: the idea that democracy is the best political system, support for right of political participation, political tolerance, political legitimacy, and interpersonal trust. The analysis will be performed in two steps. First, the impact of victimization on the mentioned variables will be analyzed, and later the impact of the perception of insecurity. In each analysis a group of statistical regressions will be carried out.

3.4.1. The impact of perception of unsafety

The analysis of the data reveals (see Appendix III-3 at the end of the chapter) that victimization by crime affects, on the one hand, the political legitimacy of the system's institutions and, on the other hand, interpersonal trust. However, the data did not show that crime has a direct impact on support for democracy, political tolerance, nor on support for political participation.

Regarding the political legitimacy of institutions, the data indicate that persons who have been victims of crime usually have a lower level of trust in the system's political institutions. On the other hand, persons who were not victimized by any criminal act in 2007 exhibit higher levels of political legitimacy. This result is coherent with those obtained in other studies that explore the same relation (Pérez 2003; Cruz 2003) which point to a relationship observable not only in El Salvador, but also in other Central American countries affected by high crime rates—the higher the level of victimization, the higher the distrust in the political system.




Graph III-13. Institutional Legitimacy according to Victimization by Crime, 2008.

The same type of effect is found when the impact of victimization on interpersonal trust is analyzed. As Graph III-14 shows, persons who have not been the victims of a criminal act usually show more interpersonal trust in their fellow citizens than persons who have been victims of crime.

These results confirm what the recent literature in the field reflects about crime: namely, that crime erodes social capital. If both political legitimacy and interpersonal trust constitute important elements of social capital, that is, of a society's capacity to build networks and reach proposed

objectives as a group, the findings which show that victimization reduces both aspects, also suggest that victimization affects social capital as well.




Graph III-14. Interpersonal Trust according to Victimization by Crime, 2008.

3.4.2. The impact of perception of insecurity


The perception of insecurity also has an impact on democratic political culture. The *AmericasBarometer 2008* reveals that in El Salvador, the perception of insecurity devalues the idea that democracy is the best political system and, as with victimization, it also diminishes political legitimacy and interpersonal trust. However, data do not offer evidence that insecurity is related to tolerance or to the idea that citizens have the right to participate in politics regardless of their political inclinations. The impact of insecurity, therefore negatively influences support for democracy and the variables of social capital--trust in institutions and fellow citizens.

Data reveals (see Appendix III-4 at the end of the chapter) expected results—the greater the level of insecurity, the lower the support for democracy, institutional legitimacy, and interpersonal trust. To wit, support for democracy drops from about 70 points among those who feel safe, to 65 points among those who feel very unsafe (see Graph III-15).



Graph III-15. Support for Democracy according to Perception of Insecurity, 2008.


The same effect is observed regarding political legitimacy and trust among citizens. However, the relation between these two factors seems much stronger, and the impact of insecurity is shown to be even more important. This can be seen clearly in Graphs III-16 and III-17, which indicate that persons who feel very unsafe rate themselves at 47 in the political legitimacy measurement while those who feel extremely unsafe are over ten scalar points lower at 36.5.



Graph III-16. Institutional Legitimacy according to Perception of Insecurity, 2008.

Yet in the case of interpersonal trust, insecurity significantly dampens the feeling of mutual trust among citizens. In this case, the difference between those who feel very safe and those who perceive much insecurity is greater than twenty points; interpersonal trust drops significantly from 75 points (in the scale of 0 to 100) among those who feel safe, to 54.5 points among those who perceive much insecurity caused by criminal violence.

This data confirm the findings of other studies in that insecurity erodes some of the fundamental variables of democratic political culture. The wave of criminality that El Salvador has experienced in the postwar years has increased mortality rates; has negatively affected economic development due to diversion of resources towards combatting crime and protecting the citizenry; and has affected fundamental aspects of democratic political culture due to erosion of trust in democracy, institutions and fellow citizens. Lack of security makes it difficult to support and defend a democratic system of government because people stop believing in the value of democracy, stop trusting and turning to the institutions that are fundamental for the proper functioning of the same and, when articulating collective proposals to solve social and community problems, they mistrust their neighbors and fellow citizens.



Graph III-17. Interpersonal Trust according to Perception of Insecurity, 2008.

3.5. The reporting of crime


As we have already seen in previous reports of this series (see Córdova y Cruz 2005; Córdova y Cruz 2007), not all crime victims go to the authorities. The *AmericasBarometer* 2008 included two questions which explored the issue of reporting acts of crime. The questions are the following:

- AOJ1.** ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?
 (1) Sí [pasar a VIC20] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir]
 (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a VIC20]
- AOJ1B.** ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas]
 (1) No sirve de nada
 (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias
 (3) No tenía pruebas
 (4) No fue grave
 (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar
 (8) NS/NR
 (9) INAP

The results of the survey show that only 27.2% of citizens who were victims of crimes in 2007 turned to institutions of justice and security to report the incident. This means that less than a third of the victims go to the authorities for help after being the victim of violence. This number is the lowest registered figure in the last measurements of the *AmericasBarometer*: in 1999, the percentage of reporting was of 35%²⁷; in 2004 the percentage dropped to 32.7%, while in 2006 it decreased to 30.9%. Although notable, this drop nonetheless, does not represent a significant difference in statistical terms


²⁷ The figure of 1999 does not appear in the Graph. For a detail on the results of this measurement, see: Seligson, Cruz y Córdova (2000).

in the three last measurements. As can be observed in Graph III-18, the confidence intervals for each one of the years overlap. The only noteworthy difference occurs among the data of 1999 and 2008, suggesting that in 2008 Salvadorans are reporting crime incidents less in comparison with the past decade.



Graph III-18. Crime Reporting Rates in 2004, 2006 y 2008.

The aforementioned poses the problem of citizens' not reporting crimes and why they are reluctant to approach the police or the authorities to report the crimes. The results of the question AOJ1B offer the reasons (see Graph III-19). As can be observed, close to half the citizens said that they did not report the incidents because they think that it is useless to do so (41.8%); followed by 24.4% who said that they were afraid to press charges, and 16.4% who said that the incident was not serious enough to be reported. This means that the majority of Salvadorans who were victims of violence did not report the crime because they did not trust the institutions of security and justice. Both opinions of "It's useless" or "Fear of retaliation," suggest that Salvadorans are not convinced that the institutions are capable of fulfilling their mandates to investigate the crime and protect citizens.



Graph III-19. Reasons why Crime was not Reported, 2008.


3.6. The role of the police

Low rates of reporting crime perhaps can be attributed in part to the perception of the actions of neighborhood police. In the *AmericasBarometer* survey we asked how people perceived of the police. Concretely, the question was formulated in the following manner:

AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? **[Leer alternativas]**


- (1) La policía protege, o
- (2) La policía está involucrada con delincuencia
- (3) **[No leer]** No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada
- (8) NS/NR

Interestingly, almost half of Salvadorans (48.8%) feel that the police are involved in criminal activity; 34.1% think that the police protect the citizens from crime, and, 17.1% believe that the police neither protect them against crime nor are they involved in crime. As we saw above, these attitudes influence the feelings of insecurity of many Salvadorans. In addition, they can also generally affect the system's political legitimacy and citizens' interpersonal trust.



Graph III-20. Perceived Role of the Police, 2008.

A regression analysis was done to establish whether the perception of the role of the police in the community has any impact on the fundamental variables of democratic political culture (see Appendix III-5 at the end of the chapter). This analysis showed among other things that the more people perceive that the police protect citizens from crime, the more they tend to trust their institutions and their fellow citizens. Graph III-21 presents the results of the relationship between the perceived role of the police and the legitimacy of institutions. As can be observed, the score on the scale of political legitimacy rises from 37.5 among those who perceive that the police are involved in crime to 51.2 among those who see the police as an institution protective of its citizens. Thus, the manner in which the citizens perceive the police force weighs heavily on the perception of the political system's legitimacy. The same type of impact is found regarding interpersonal trust, although in this case, the relationship is less statistically substantive.



Graph III-21. Political Legitimacy according to Perception of Police's Role, 2008.

3.7. Respect for the Rule of Law

One of the most frequent concerns about waves of violence is that they usually generate public pressure on the authorities to bend the current legal framework as long as they can more efficiently combat crime. This is particularly acute in situations in which violence is perceived as uncontrollable and the sense of insecurity is very widespread among the population. Given that the attitudes in favor of extralegal responses violate the Rule of Law, it is important to examine the manner in which the Salvadorean citizens opine about the issue. Two questions make reference to this matter:

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR

AOJ9. ¿Cree usted que la policía debe esperar la orden de un juzgado para entrar a la casa de un sospechoso o la policía puede entrar sin una orden judicial?


(1) Se debería esperar a la orden judicial (2) La policía puede entrar sin orden judicial

(8) NS/NR

The results indicate that the majority of Salvadorans are in favor of the authorities respecting the established legal framework. A little over half of Salvadorans (55.2%) affirmed that the authorities should always respect the law while 44.6% said that the authorities could act outside the confines of the law occasionally. When asked specifically about entering a home without a search warrant, opinions in

favor of the Rule of Law were more numerous: 67.9% said that the police should always wait for a search warrant to enter a home; on the other hand, the remaining 32.1% stated the contrary.

Despite the fact that the majority of Salvadorans are in favor of demanding that authorities respect the law, a comparison of the results from the question about whether the authorities should respect the law or not as long as they capture criminals (AOJ8) produced a worrisome tendency when compared data from the 2004-2008 period. According to Graph III-22, the percentage of persons who say the authorities should always respect the law has dropped in the last four years. In 2004, the percentage of persons in favor of respecting the law was of 65%;, in 2006 only 56% felt this way, and in 2008 the result was about the same.



Graph III-22. Opinion that the Authorities should respect the Law, by year.

In short, the majority of Salvadorans are against the authorities' disregard for the established legal framework as long as this may combat crime. However, a rather remarkable percentage of citizens seems to be in favor of breaking the law as long as this combats criminality. This proportion of citizens has increased in recent years in all likelihood due to the persistently high rates of violence in El Salvador.

3.8. Conclusions

This chapter has examined the results regarding crime and its impact on democratic political culture. Although the data of victimization should be interpreted with caution, given the limitations of measuring crime through surveys, the results indicate that 19% of the population has been a direct victim of crime during the year before the survey. Men, young people and inhabitants of the metropolitan area of San Salvador and other large cities have been the most frequent victims of crime according to the survey. On the other hand, the 2008 survey reveals that almost half of Salvadorans feel unsafe because of violence, particularly women, victims, and people living in gang-ridden communities infested whose police are involved in crime.

Both victimization and insecurity affect some important aspects of political democratic culture. Moreover, the perception of the presence of corrupt officers within the police force usually diminishes the system's legitimacy. Political legitimacy and interpersonal trust are the attitudes most affected by violence in general, but it seems to affect the willingness of some citizens to demand that the authorities respect the established legal framework in the fight against crime.

Appendixes

Appendix III-1. Perception of Insecurity Predictors, 2008.

	Perception de inseguridad	
	Coef.	(t)
Género	0.079*	(2.99)
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? Años	0.039	(1.55)
ED	0.044	(1.21)
Riqueza medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	-0.053	(-1.62)
Mira noticias TV	0.004	(0.16)
Tamaño	0.019	(0.53)
Victimization por crimen	0.113*	(5.45)
Maras en barrio	0.243*	(11.68)
Policía protege	-0.089*	(-3.75)
Constante	-0.006	(-0.21)
R-cuadrado	0.103	
N. de casos	1372	
* p<0.05		

Appendix III-2. Predictors of Victimization by Crime, 2008.

	Victimization por crimen	
	Coefficientes	(t)
Educación	0.068	(0.64)
Mujer	-0.219*	(-3.14)
Edad	-0.481*	(-6.72)
Riqueza	0.055	(0.55)
Tamaño	0.606*	(4.98)
Constante	-1.669*	(-17.23)
F	23.68	
N. de casos	1520	
* p<0.05		

Appendix III-3. Impact of Victimization by Crime on Support for Democracy, the Right to Public Contestation, Political Tolerance, Political Legitimacy and Interpersonal Trust, 2008.

Variables independientes	Support a la Democracy (ING4)		Support al derecho de Participation (CONTEST)		Tolerancia política (TOL)		Legitimacy de las instituciones (LEGIT)		Confianza interpersonal (IT1r)	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Victimization por crimen	-0.020	(0.02)	0.008	(0.01)	0.008	(0.01)	-0.041*	(0.01)	-0.061*	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.051	(0.03)	-0.178*	(0.03)	-0.254*	(0.02)				
Interés en la política	0.027	(0.02)	0.099*	(0.01)	0.121*	(0.02)	0.027	(0.02)		
Educación	0.255	(0.23)	0.649*	(0.13)	0.697*	(0.15)	-0.527*	(0.19)	0.054	(0.21)
Mujer	-3.484*	(1.31)	-4.249*	(1.04)	-7.032*	(1.06)	0.787	(1.27)	-5.830*	(1.68)
Edad	0.747*	(0.31)	0.389	(0.20)	0.300	(0.21)	-0.511*	(0.17)	0.558	(0.30)
q2sq	-0.007	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	0.005*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.708	(0.54)	0.259	(0.47)	0.707	(0.42)	-1.390*	(0.41)	1.241	(0.67)
Perception economía familiar	0.317	(0.90)	-1.804*	(0.75)	-1.082	(0.79)	3.503*	(0.99)	2.556*	(1.06)
TAMANO	0.690	(0.55)	0.253	(0.39)	-0.782	(0.55)	0.852	(0.52)	1.733*	(0.79)
Constante	42.443*	(7.87)	66.544*	(5.05)	55.390*	(6.06)	52.613*	(5.99)	38.770*	(8.99)
R-cuadrado	0.021		0.129		0.187		0.057		0.042	
N. de casos	1472		1501		1496		1502		1500	
* p<0.05										

Appendix III-4. Impact of the Perception of Insecurity on Support for Democracy, the Right to Public Contestation, Political Tolerance, Political Legitimacy and Interpersonal Trust, 2008.

Variables independientes	Support a la Democracy (ING4)		Support al derecho de Participation (CONTEST)		Tolerancia política (TOL)		Legitimacy de las instituciones (LEGIT)		Confianza interpersonal (IT1r)	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Perception de inseguridad	-0.049*	(0.02)	0.004	(0.02)	-0.003	(0.02)	-0.088*	(0.02)	-0.195*	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.050	(0.03)	-0.181*	(0.03)	-0.257*	(0.02)				
Interés en la política	0.026	(0.02)	0.100*	(0.01)	0.121*	(0.02)	0.026	(0.02)		
Educación	0.259	(0.23)	0.656*	(0.12)	0.707*	(0.15)	-0.517*	(0.19)	0.096	(0.21)
Mujer	-3.345*	(1.33)	-4.277*	(1.02)	-7.098*	(1.07)	1.409	(1.31)	-4.816*	(1.72)
Edad	0.813*	(0.31)	0.365	(0.20)	0.293	(0.21)	-0.444*	(0.17)	0.661*	(0.29)
q2sq	-0.008*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.004*	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.716	(0.53)	0.222	(0.46)	0.680	(0.42)	-1.434*	(0.43)	1.148	(0.62)
Perception economía familiar	0.234	(0.89)	-1.810*	(0.77)	-1.131	(0.80)	3.282*	(0.99)	1.879*	(0.94)
TAMANO	0.633	(0.56)	0.237	(0.38)	-0.828	(0.54)	0.880	(0.54)	1.664*	(0.70)
Constante	43.366*	(8.17)	67.186*	(5.16)	56.316*	(6.25)	54.229*	(6.04)	44.670*	(8.76)
R-cuadrado	0.025		0.129		0.187		0.067		0.076	
N. de casos	1466		1496		1491		1497		1495	
* p<0.05										

Appendix III-5. Impact of the Perception of the Police on Support for Democracy, the Right to Public Contestation, Political Tolerance, Political Legitimacy and Interpersonal Trust, 2008.

Variables independientes	Support a la Democracy (ING4)		Support al derecho de Participation (CONTEST)		Tolerancia política (TOL)		Legitimacy de las instituciones (LEGIT)		Confianza interpersonal (IT1r)	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Policía protege	0.022	(0.02)	-0.019	(0.01)	-0.034*	(0.02)	0.125*	(0.01)	0.056*	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.049	(0.03)	-0.160*	(0.03)	-0.228*	(0.02)				
Interés en la política	0.037	(0.02)	0.104*	(0.01)	0.125*	(0.02)	0.030	(0.02)		
Educación	0.151	(0.24)	0.583*	(0.14)	0.653*	(0.15)	-0.449*	(0.19)	-0.022	(0.22)
Mujer	-3.777*	(1.52)	-4.188*	(1.03)	-7.310*	(1.09)	0.322	(1.22)	-5.441*	(1.75)
Edad	0.783*	(0.33)	0.258	(0.19)	0.322	(0.22)	-0.417*	(0.16)	0.639*	(0.30)
q2sq	-0.007*	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	0.004*	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.759	(0.59)	0.503	(0.49)	0.639	(0.44)	-1.248*	(0.42)	1.304	(0.67)
Perception economía familiar	0.676	(0.91)	-1.693*	(0.66)	-0.598	(0.75)	2.981*	(0.92)	2.405*	(1.17)
TAMANO	0.800	(0.60)	0.133	(0.41)	-0.887	(0.51)	0.893	(0.50)	1.832*	(0.69)
Constante	39.961*	(8.02)	68.567*	(4.73)	54.931*	(5.93)	44.997*	(5.47)	34.241*	(7.77)
R-cuadrado	0.023		0.129		0.189		0.102		0.038	
N. de casos	1350		1369		1368		1371		1365	
* p<0.05										

Capítulo IV . The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on Support for Stable Democracy

This chapter examines the attitudes and valuations of Salvadorans regarding local government in general terms; at a more specific level, it examines the impact of the evaluations of local government on support for a stable democracy. The first section presents a brief theoretical framework as a reference; the second presents four graphs which allow to compare El Salvador with other countries considered in this study. The third examines citizens' relations with the different levels of government; the fourth analyzes participation in the management of municipal government. The fifth examines citizen requests for help; the sixth analyzes satisfaction with municipal services, and the seventh explores satisfaction with the treatment received at the municipalities. The eighth examines support for decentralization, the ninth tackles the impact of satisfaction with local governments on support for stable democracy, the tenth examines the level and effects of local civic participation, and the eleventh section examines the impact of local civic participation on support for a stable democracy. The twelfth section closes the chapter with some conclusions.

4.1 Theoretical framework²⁸

What role, if any, do local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. Moreover, while in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in their local parent-teacher associations, and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas (with the exception of perhaps of Uruguay), access to their national legislators, cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from

²⁸ This section was elaborated by LAPOP, and parts of the same were written by Daniel Montalvo.

that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments, with many of them controlling and determining key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services that powerfully determine the quality of life that many citizens experience.

In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America, Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, most local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has traditionally been with local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments, and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. In a similar way, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond the national capitals. Yet, citizens have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling the advanced industrial democracies (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Paxton 1999; Paxton 2002).

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been pressing, in the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falletti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007).

Delegation of authority to a centralized party in the international arena is often believed to provide a better way to design and implement rules in an anarchic world. In contrast, one of the most important advantages of decentralization at the national level consists in bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Albuquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).²⁹

Is decentralization a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase on the competence for resources and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cálix and Alcázar forthcoming). What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does that influence their views on democracy? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

²⁹ There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level; namely, fiscal, political and administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).

Equally important in the democracy equation can be civil society participation level. For many years it was thought that only in the advanced industrial democracies was there an active civil society. This thinking was crystallized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963). That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies (Booth and Seligson 1978; Verba, *et al.* 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979; Almond and Verba 1980). Citizens played an active role in civil society, even during the period of dictatorship that ruled in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

When governance is very restrictive, citizens can be discouraged from joining associations and thus civil society can atrophy. On the other hand, does participation in civil society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy (Putnam 1993). The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work with and eventually trust each other. This should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society (Edwards and Foley 1997; Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999a; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Richard and Booth 2000; Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Hawkins and Hansen 2006). It may also mean that civil society participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life come to deal with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity (Armony 2004). In recent work, it has been shown cross nationally for 31 nations, that citizens active in multiple associations express higher levels of interpersonal trust (Paxton 2007).

How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various *AmericasBarometer* countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of "outsiders." There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy.

Measuring Local Government Participation and Perceptions

In this chapter, we will focus on five variables: trust in the local government (**b32r**), support of decentralization of national government's responsibilities (**lg12a**), support for decentralization of economic resources (**lg12b**), satisfaction with the services provided by the municipal government (**sg11r**), and civic participation at the local level (**civpart**). The ultimate goal is to assess the effect of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government (**sg11r**) and local civic participation, our two governance variables in this chapter on support for stable democracy.

The questions utilized to investigate these issues were the following:

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su (municipalidad)?

LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar *más responsabilidades*? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Mucho más al gobierno central
- (2) Algo más al gobierno central
- (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad
- (4) Algo más a la municipalidad
- (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad
- (88) NS/NR

LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería *administrar más dinero*? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Mucho más el gobierno central
- (2) Algo más el gobierno central
- (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad
- (4) Algo más la municipalidad
- (5) Mucho más la municipalidad
- (88) NS/NR

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR

Measuring civil society participation

For many years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with a standard battery of questions. This series, known as the CP (as in “community participation”) is shown below. In order to provide a comprehensive scale of these items, LAPOP has created an overall scale of civil society participation that incorporates the community-level civil society organizations in our survey.³⁰ The overall index is based on the degree of participation each respondent has in the organizations listed below.³¹

³⁰ This analysis does not include civil society participation in political parties, which are examined in the chapter on elections. It also does not include non-locally based organizations, such as professional organizations.

³¹ The scale is computed by converting the four response categories into a 0-100 basis, and to take the average of the four. If a respondent provides a “don’t know to more than two of the four items, the respondent is given a missing score for the series.


Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de las siguientes organizaciones por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8

4.2 Comparative Graphs


This section presents four graphs which allow us to compare El Salvador with other countries considered in this study concerning four questions: trust in municipal government, support for decentralization of responsibilities, support for decentralization of economic resources, and satisfaction with municipal services.

Analyzing the data obtained in El Salvador, we have found that our country is among countries with a high level of trust in their municipal governments under the Dominican Republic, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.




Graph IV-1. Trust in Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

Regarding support for decentralization of responsibilities, El Salvador places in the lower-middle group of countries, above Honduras, Haiti, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Ecuador.




Graph IV-2. Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

El Salvador is in the lower-middle level of support for decentralization of economic resources, above Honduras, Haiti, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Panama, Argentina, and Brazil.



Graph IV-3. Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

In comparison with the other countries considered in this study, El Salvador places in the group of countries with a higher-middle level of satisfaction with municipal services, below Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Colombia, Guatemala, Uruguay, and the United States.



Graph IV-4. Satisfaction with Municipal Services in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

4.3 Citizens' relations with different levels of government

In this section we will explore the hypothesis of local government's relationship to the citizenry beginning with a battery of queries included in the questionnaire. With the purpose of exploring the relation or eventual contact of those interviewed with local government, legislative assembly representatives, and mayoralties, we asked:


“¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...

CP2. ¿A algún diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa?

CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad)?

CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretaría, institución pública u oficina del estado?”


To simplify the analysis we recodified response options into a format 0-100. These questions were included in the surveys of 2004 and 2006; hence, the following graph presents the results for the three years. In general terms, for the period 2004-2008 we observed a decreasing tendency of requests for help to representatives, municipalities, and national government institutions. On the other hand, for the three years, the municipal government was the authority to which those interviewed mainly turned to in order to request help, followed in second place by an institution of the national government, and lastly the representatives. This data reinforce the hypothesis of a closer bond between the citizenry and local governments in terms of having requested aid or cooperation to solve their problems. In 2008, an average of 18.8% requested aid from the municipal government, 6.2% from an agency of the national government, and 4.7% from the representatives.



Graph IV-5. From who have you requested help or cooperation?, 2004–2008.


The survey included questions to measure trust level in different institutions. The responses were recodified into a format 0-100. The following graph presents the average of trust in national

government (46.9), and municipal government (57.1) for 2008; the finding of a higher level of trust in the latter makes this difference statistically significant.




Graph IV-6. Comparison between Trust in Municipal and National Government, 2008.

With the purpose of exploring citizens' relations with different institutional actors, this question was included: "LGL1. In your opinion, between the national government, the representatives and the municipal government, who has responded in a better manner to help or resolve the problems of your community or neighborhood? The national government, the representatives, or the municipal government?" Graph IV-7 shows that municipal government (53.8%) is the institution which has best responded, followed by national government (12.9%) and the representatives (2.7%); 29.5% manifested that none of them responded, and 1.1% answered that all of them responded.



Graph IV-7. Who has best responded to help solve the problems in your community or neighborhood?, 2008.


This question was part of the 2004 survey, hence this graph presents the results for both years. Graph IV-8 shows a drop in the valuation interviewees placed on their relations with institutional actors. Although this drop is not statistically significant, we also observed an important increase among those who mention that none of them had responded.



Graph IV-8. Who has best responded to help solve the problems in your community or neighborhood?, 2004-2008.


4.4 Participation in management of the municipal government

The survey asked: “NP1. Have you attended an open town council meeting or a municipal session in the last 12 months?.” Graph IV-9 shows that 12% attended a municipal meeting in 2008.




Graph IV-9. Attendance to Municipal Meetings, 2008.

This question was included in the surveys of 2004 and 2006, making it possible to compare the data of 2008 with previous measurements. Graph IV-10 shows an average of 12.6% of attendance to municipal meetings in 2004, which drops to 10.7% in 2006 and rises to 12% in 2008. However, these differences are not statistically significant.




Graph IV-10. Attendance to Municipal Meetings, 2004-2008.

The questionnaire also included the query: “NP1B. To what degree do you believe that municipal government employees heed what the people ask for in these meetings? Do they heed: (1) Much, (2) Somewhat, (3) Little, (4) Not at all (8) Does not know/Did not respond.” Graph IV-11 shows a degree of skepticism in response to this item; according to the data of 2008, only 9% feel that much attention is paid to citizen requests at these meetings; 23.8% somewhat, 38.9% little and 28.4% not at all.




Graph IV-11. To what degree do you think civil servants of the Municipal Government heed what the people ask for in these meetings?, 2008.

In Graph IV-12 one can observe that this valuation has varied relatively little in the measurements of 2004, 2006 and 2008, and also how these differences are not statistically significant.




Graph IV-12. To what degree do you think civil servants of the Municipal Government heed what the people ask for in these meetings?, 2004-2008.

The survey included a question designed to explore another dimension of the citizenry's participation in the management of the local governments: "MUNI5. Have you participated in the preparation of the municipal government's budget? (1) Yes I have participated, (2) No I have not participated, (8) Do not know/Did not respond." In Graph IV-13 one can observe that only 3.3% said that they had participated in the preparation of the municipal budget.




Graph IV-13. Participation in the elaboration of the Municipal Budget, 2008.

Another query included in the questionnaire explores the perception of the mayor's interest in promoting citizen participation: "MUNI15. How interested do you think the mayor is in the participation of the people in the work of the municipal government? (3) Very interested, (2) Somewhat interested, (1) Not very interested, (0) Not interested at all, (8) Does not know/Did not respond." In 2008, 18.2% said that the mayor was not interested at all, 33.5% little, 29.1% somewhat and 19.2% very interested.



Graph IV-14. Perception of the Mayor's interest in promoting Citizen Participation, 2008.


Another aspect explored in the survey refers to trust in the proper handling of funds: “MUNI6. What degree of trust do you have in the proper handling of funds by the municipal government? (3) Much trust, (2) Some trust, (1) Little trust (0) No trust, (8) Does not know/Did not respond.” In 2008, 32.6% had no trust, 34% little, 23% some and 10.5% much trust.



Graph IV-15. Trust in the handling of Municipal Funds, 2008.


4.5 Presentation of requests for help or petitions

Since attending meetings can be considered a passive form of political participation, the questionnaire included a query oriented to measure a more direct form of participation: “NP2. Have you requested help or have you presented a petition to any municipal government office, employee, town councilor or trustee during the last 12 months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Do not know/Did not respond.” In 2008, 15.6% had requested help from the municipal government.



Graph IV-16. Request for Help to the Municipal Government in the last year, 2008.


This question was included in the 2004 and 2006 surveys; hence a comparison of the three years is possible. In Graph IV-17 there is an observable increase in the presentation of requests or petitions to the municipal government in 2006 (20), compared with 2004 (12.2), but in 2008 they decrease (15.6). These differences are statistically significant.



Graph IV-17. Request for Help to the Municipal Government, 2004 – 2008.


4.6 Satisfaction with municipal services

In order to measure citizens' satisfaction with municipal services in general, the questionnaire included the following query: "SGL1. Would you say that the services provided by the municipal government to the people are? (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very bad, (8) Does not know/did not respond." This question was a part of the surveys of 2004 and 2006, hence the following graph presents inclusive results. In 2006 and 2008 a less positive valuation is observed in relation to 2004.




Graph IV-18. Would you say the services provided by the Municipal Government are, 2004-2008.

To simplify the comparison, the response options to this question were recodified into a scale 0-100; Graph IV-19 presents the results which indicate that the mean satisfaction with municipal services in 2004 was 57.3, dropping to 54.5 in 2006 and then to 53.5 in 2008.




Graph IV-19. Average Comparison of Satisfaction with Municipal Services, 2004-2008.

Graph IV-20 presents the multiple regression analysis results with the satisfaction predictors of services provided by the municipal government when each of the other variables is kept constant. Appendix IV.1 (see end of the chapter) presents the coefficients. There are four statistically significant predictors presented here in their bivariate relationship: the treatment received in the municipalities, the representativeness of citizens' interests in local government, the valuation of whether government employees heed citizens' petitions, and educational level.




Graph IV-20. Regression of Satisfaction with Municipal Services, 2008.

The relation between satisfaction with municipal services and the treatment received at the time of engaging in bureaucratic procedures at the municipal government is shown in Graph IV-21. As the perception of a good treatment received in the municipalities diminishes (from very good to very bad), satisfaction with municipal services decreases.




Graph IV-21. Relationship between Satisfaction with Municipal Services and the Treatment received when engaging in bureaucratic procedures, 2008.

Graph IV-22 shows the relation between the satisfaction with municipal services and perception of the representativeness of citizens' interests in local government. As perception concerning the representation of civic interests within local government diminishes (from much to none), satisfaction with municipal services decreases.




Graph IV-22. Relationship between Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Representativeness of Citizen Interests within Local Government, 2008.

The relation between satisfaction with municipal services and valuation on whether municipal employees heed citizens' petitions is shown in Graph IV-23. As the perception of if employees respond to citizens' requests diminishes (from much to not at all), satisfaction with municipal services decreases.



Graph IV-23. Relationship between Satisfaction with the Municipal Services and whether Municipal Employees heed Citizens' Petitions, 2008.


In Graph IV-24 one can observe the relation between the satisfaction with municipal services and educational level of those surveyed. As the schooling level rises, satisfaction with municipal services increases; however, the relationship is not very strong.



Graph IV-24. Relationship between Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Educational Level, 2008.

4.7 Satisfaction with treatment received at the municipalities

In order to measure citizens' satisfaction with treatment received at the municipal government, the questionnaire included the following query: "SGL2. How have you or your neighbors been treated when you have gone to the municipal government to engage in administrative procedures? Have you been treated very well, well, neither well nor badly, badly, or very badly? (1) Very well, (2) Well, (3) Neither well nor badly, (4) Badly, (5) Very badly, (8) Don't know/Did not respond." Graph IV-25 presents the results: 7.6% thought that they had been treated very well, 50% well, 30.9% neither well nor badly, 9.5% badly, and 1.9% very badly.




Graph IV-25. Treatment received on behalf of the Municipal Government, 2008.

4.8 Support for decentralization

The questionnaire included queries designed to explore various aspects related to the level of support for decentralization. First, it included a question asking whether more resources and responsibilities should be assigned at the national or at the local level of government. "LGL2. In your opinion, should more money and obligations be given to the municipal government, or should the national government assume more obligations and municipal services? (1) More to the municipal government, (2) That national government assume more obligations and services, (3) Do not change anything, (4) More to municipal government if it provides better services, (8) Doesn't know/Did not respond." Data from 2008 show that 47.2% of those interviewed feel that national government should assume more obligations and services, while 44.2% thought municipal government should be given more resources and obligations; only 2.5% said that more resources and obligations should be given to

the municipal government but on condition that they provide better services. Together these total a 46.7% favorable opinion towards the municipal government. Thus, opinion is divided among the national government’s supporters (47.2%) and those for local government (46.7%). There is 6.1% who are inclined to change nothing.



Graph IV-26. Who should be given more money and obligations?, 2008.

A hypothesis emerging from the 2008 survey is that this opinion may be connected to Salvadorans’ political attitudes in that favoring national government or local government is probably closely related to the political preferences of those surveyed, as it has been indicated in previous studies.³² To determine political preferences, we asked a question about the party for which they voted in the 2004 presidential elections, which was later was recodified to three options: ARENA, FMLN, and other parties. In Table IV-1 we can observe that supporters of ARENA favored national government in the first place (46.51%), followed closely by municipal government (44.58%); while supporters of FMLN favored municipalities (51.95%), and in second place the national government (43.18%) sSympathizers of other parties are distributed equally among national government (46.75%) and local (45.45%). Compared to the 2006 data,³³ the gap has been halved among the followers of ARENAwho favored the level of national and local government.


³² Regarding this, see Córdova y Cruz (2007) y Córdova y Cruz (2005).

³³ Córdova y Cruz (2007).

Table IV-1. Who should be given more money and obligations?, According to Political Preference, 2008.

	According to Political Preference in 2004 Elections		
	ARENA	Otros	FMLN
Más al municipio	44.58	45.45	51.95
Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios	46.51	46.75	43.18
No cambiar nada	6.02	7.79	2.92
Más al municipio si da mejores servicios	2.89	0	1.95
Total	100	100	100


Using data gathered in the 2004 and 2006 national, it is possible to see the evolution in levels of support for national government and local government. In 2004 higher support for national government was reported (51.6%), which increased in 2006 (53%). However, in 2008 support for national government dropped (47.2%) and an increase for local government (dropping from 41.4% in 2004, to 38.4% in 2006 to 44.2% in 2008). As has been previously pointed out, in 2008 a divided opinion is registered among the supporters of national government (47.2%) and those of local government (46.7%).



Graph IV-27. Who should be given more money and obligations?, 2004-2008.


Secondly, with the purpose of going into more depth, two questions were included to explore which level of government should be given more responsibilities and more economic resources. The first question was: “LGL2A. Considering the public services existent in the country, to whom should more responsibilities be given? (1) Much more to the central government, (2) Somewhat more to the central government, (3) The same amount to central government and municipal governments, (4)

Somewhat more to the community, (5) Much more to the municipal government, (8) Doesn't know/Did not respond.” The findings in Graph IV-28 show that 19.5% said that much more should be assigned to national government; 10.7% somewhat more to national government; 35.6% the same amount to national government and municipal governments; 21.3% somewhat more to municipal governments; and 12.8% much more to municipal governments.




Graph IV-28. Who should be given more responsibilities?, 2008.

Graph IV-29 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the predictors of support for decentralization of responsibilities when each of the other variables remain constant. Appendix IV-2 (see end of the chapter) presents the coefficients. The two statistically significant predictors in their bivariate relationship are presented as follows: interpersonal trust and schooling level.




Graph IV-29. Decentralization of Responsibilities Regression, 2008.

In Graph IV-30 one can observe the relationship between support for decentralization of responsibilities and interpersonal trust. As interpersonal trust diminishes (from very trustworthy to not trustworthy at all), support for decentralization of responsibilities lessens.




Graph IV-30. Relationship between Decentralization of Responsibilities and Interpersonal Trust, 2008.

In Graph IV-31 the relation between support for decentralization of responsibilities and educational level of those surveyed can be seen. As schooling level rises, support for decentralization of responsibilities increases, although support decreases among those with high school education but not college education.




Graph IV-31. Relationship between Decentralization of Responsibilities and Educational Level, 2008.

With regard to the second issue, the following was asked: “LGL2B. Considering the current economic resources of the country, Who should manage more money? (1) Much more to central government, (2) Somewhat more to central government, (3) The same amount to central government and to municipal government, (4) Somewhat more to the community, (5) Much more to municipal government, (8) Doesn’t know/Did not answer.” Graph IV-32 shows the results: 21.6% said that much more should go to national government, 11.7% somewhat more to national government, 34.6% the same amount to national government and to municipalities, 17% somewhat more to municipal government and 15.1% much more to municipal governments.



Graph IV-32. What entity should administrate more money?, 2008.

Graph IV-33 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the predictors of support for decentralization of economic resources when each one of the other variables remains constant. There are four statistically significant predictors, and in their bivariate relationship are presented as follows: ideology, age, representativeness of citizens' interests within local government, and valuation of whether municipal employees heed citizens' petitions.




Graph IV-33. Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources Regression , 2008.

The relationship between support for decentralization of economic resources and ideology is shown in Graph IV-34. In a continuous left-right, as the the positions move towards the right, support for decentralization of economic resources decreases.




Graph IV-34. Relationship between Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources and Ideology, 2008.

The relationship between support for decentralization of economic resources and age is given in Graph IV-35. In the age group of 18 to 55, as age increases, support for decentralization of economic resources rises after age 55, support decreases.




Graph IV-35. Relationship between Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources and Age, 2008.

The relationship between support for decentralization of economic resources and representativeness of the citizens' interests within local government is shown in Graph IV-36. As the perception about whether the representation of interests in local government diminishes (from much to none) the support for decentralization of economic resources also diminishes.



Graph IV-36. Relationship between Support for Decentralization of Resources and Representativeness of Citizens’ Interests in Local Government, 2008.

Graph IV-37 shows the relationship between the support for decentralization of economic resources and the valuation regarding whether municipal government employees heed citizens’ petitions. Support for the decentralization of economic resources decreases as the perception of how strongly municipal government’s employees respond to citizens’ moves from much to not at all.




Graph IV-37. Relationship between Support for Decentralization of Resources and how much Civil Servants heed Citizens’ Requests, 2008.

4.9 Impact of satisfaction with local governments on support for stable democracy


Appendix IV-4 (see end of the chapter) presents the impact of support predictors for stable democracy: support for democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, legitimacy of institutions, and interpersonal trust; satisfaction with municipal services is included in the model. Satisfaction with municipal services only turned out to be statistically significant with the variables of institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

In Graph IV-38 shows the relationship between satisfaction with municipal services and legitimacy of political institutions. As satisfaction with municipal services diminishes (from very good to very bad), legitimacy of institutions lessens.



Graph IV-38. Relationship between Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Institutional Legitimacy, 2008.


In Graph IV-39 one can observe the relationship between satisfaction with municipal services and interpersonal trust. As satisfaction with municipal services diminishes (from very good to bad), interpersonal trust lessens and later increases for those who consider them very bad.




Graph IV-39. Relationship between Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Interpersonal Trust, 2008.

4.10 The level and effect of civil society participation


This section presents four graphs which compare El Salvador with other countries considered in this study regarding four questions which measure civil society participation: participation in religious organizations, parent associations, meetings of improvement committees, and meetings of womens' organizations.



Graph IV-40. Participation in Religious Organizations' Meetings in Comparative Perspective, 2008.




Graph IV-41. Participation in Parents' Associations in Comparative Perspective, 2008.




Graph IV-42. Participation in Improvement Committees in Comparative Perspective, 2008.


interpersonal trust. Appendices IV-5, IV-6, IV-7, IV-8, and IV-9 at the end of the chapter present the coefficients. Only two questions of civil society participation were found to be statistically significant regarding support for stable democracy: the participation on improvement committees that support the right of public contestation; and participation in religious organizations supporting political tolerance, a relationship's direction that was found to be, that is, that participation in religious organizations reduces political tolerance.




Graph IV-44. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for Democracy, 2008.




Graph IV-45. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for Right of Public Contestation, 2008.



Graph IV-46. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Political Tolerance, 2008.



Graph IV-47. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Institutional Legitimacy, 2008.



Graph IV-48. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust, 2008.

4.12. Conclusions

This chapter has examined the attitudes and valuations that Salvadorans have about their local governments. The data supply evidence of a stronger bond between the citizenry and local government, in terms of having requested help or cooperation to solve their problems, and of a deeper trust in municipal government compared to national government. Furthermore, according to those surveyed, municipal government is the institution that has best responded to solve community problems.

Relatively low levels of citizen participation were reported around two issues considered in the survey: attendance to an open town hall meeting or municipal session (12%) and the presentation of requests for help or petitions (15.6%).

We have found a divided opinion regarding which level of government should be assigned more resources and responsibilities: 47.2% pointed towards national government and 46.7% to municipal government, while 6.1% expressed not wanting to change anything.

There are four predictors of satisfaction with municipal services: treatment received at the municipalities, representativeness of citizens' interests within local government, valuation of whether municipal employees heed citizens' petitions, and educational level.

Insofar as the impact of civil society participation on support for stable democracy is concerned, only two questions turned out to be relevant: participation in improvement committees that support the

right of public contestation, and participation in religious organizations that support political tolerance, in which the direction of the relationship was found to be negative.

In this chapter we have examined the impact of satisfaction with municipal services on democratic political culture. Insitutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust are the affected attitudes: the higher the level of satisfaction with municipal services, the higher the levels of insitutional legitimacy and trust among people. Considering that both institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust are key elements of social capital, the findings reported here show that satisfaction with municipal services contributes to the creation of social capital and at the same time to the building of a stable democracy.

Appendixes

Appendix IV-1. Predictors of Satisfaction with Municipal Services, 2008.

	Coef.	t
Educación	0.083*	(2.44)
Mujer	0.001	(0.06)
Edad	-0.086	(-0.61)
Edad al cuadrado	0.072	(0.51)
Riqueza	-0.028	(-0.80)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.007	(-0.31)
Index de conocimiento político	-0.039	(-1.30)
Ideología	0.036	(1.39)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.016	(0.80)
Hasta que punto los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso	0.331*	(11.82)
Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal	0.047	(2.00)
Representatividad de intereses a nivel local	0.163*	(6.11)
Confianza interpersonal	0.021	(0.84)
Trato recibido en la municipalidad	0.280*	(9.86)
Constante	-0.007	(-0.31)
R-cuadrado	0.387	
N. de casos	1251	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-2. Predictors of Decentralization of Responsibilities, 2008.

	Coef.	t
Trato recibido en la municipalidad	0.021	(0.56)
Confianza interpersonal	0.060*	(2.57)
Representatividad de intereses a nivel local	0.044	(1.22)
Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal	0.035	(1.25)
Hasta que punto los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso	-0.030	(-1.04)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.041	(1.35)
Educación	0.086*	(2.61)
Mujer	0.005	(0.15)
Edad	0.078	(0.53)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.046	(-0.32)
Riqueza	-0.010	(-0.30)
Tamaño del lugar	0.029	(0.77)
Index de conocimiento político	0.028	(0.85)
Ideología	0.007	(0.22)
Satisfaction con servicios locales	0.039	(1.16)
Constante	-0.005	(-0.18)
R-cuadrado	0.023	
N. de casos	1233	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-3. Predictors of Decentralization of Economic Resources, 2008.

	Coef.	t
Trato recibido en la municipalidad	0.017	(0.43)
Confianza interpersonal	-0.040	(-1.50)
Representatividad de intereses a nivel local	0.089*	(2.82)
Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal	-0.008	(-0.25)
Hasta que punto los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso	0.074*	(2.16)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.007	(0.24)
Educación	0.008	(0.22)
Mujer	0.011	(0.35)
Edad	0.376*	(2.42)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.395*	(-2.41)
Riqueza	-0.032	(-1.16)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.035	(-0.97)
Index de conocimiento político	-0.052	(-1.33)
ideología	-0.110*	(-3.37)
Satisfaction con servicios locales	-0.002	(-0.04)
Constante	-0.009	(-0.37)
R-cuadrado	0.041	
N. de casos	1218	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-4. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy, 2008.

Variables independientes	Support a la Democracy		Support al derecho de Participation		Tolerancia política		Legitimacy de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfaction con servicios locales	0.021	(0.03)	0.031	(0.02)	0.032	(0.03)	0.170*	(0.03)	0.134*	(0.04)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.031	(0.03)	-0.150*	(0.03)	-0.202*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.022	(0.02)	0.096*	(0.02)	0.111*	(0.02)	0.054*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.271	(0.24)	0.424*	(0.15)	0.550*	(0.14)	-0.252	(0.19)	-0.061	(0.22)
Mujer	-3.779*	(1.40)	-3.484*	(1.00)	-5.339*	(1.23)	-1.871	(1.25)	-4.533*	(1.94)
Edad	0.832*	(0.33)	0.418*	(0.21)	0.300	(0.23)	-0.539*	(0.18)	0.634*	(0.30)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.008*	(0.00)	-0.005*	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	0.006*	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.936	(0.60)	0.252	(0.47)	0.621	(0.49)	-1.052*	(0.42)	1.512*	(0.75)
Perception economía familiar	0.013	(0.91)	-1.541*	(0.73)	-0.361	(0.74)	1.865*	(0.92)	2.523*	(1.19)
Tamaño del lugar	1.031	(0.57)	0.387	(0.39)	-0.635	(0.49)	0.579	(0.50)	2.345*	(0.76)
Ideología	0.471	(0.33)	-0.843*	(0.22)	-1.465*	(0.27)	3.143*	(0.24)	0.182	(0.36)
Index de conocimiento político	1.091	(1.01)	1.746*	(0.79)	0.761	(0.75)	-2.091*	(0.85)	0.737	(0.90)
Constante	34.130*	(8.85)	64.902*	(5.75)	56.197*	(6.09)	32.690*	(6.47)	23.721*	(8.88)
R-cuadrado	0.030		0.162		0.220		0.234		0.045	
N. de casos	1341		1362		1361		1366		1361	
* p<0.05										

Appendix IV-5. Predictors of Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for Democracy, 2008.

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.007	(0.25)
Asociación padres de familia	-0.026	(-0.71)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.010	(0.44)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.051*	(2.15)
Interés en la política	0.025	(0.94)
Educación	0.052	(1.30)
Mujer	-0.057*	(-2.40)
Edad	0.474*	(2.48)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.389*	(-2.09)
Riqueza	0.043	(1.15)
Percepción economía familiar	0.007	(0.26)
Tamaño del lugar	0.047	(1.45)
Constante	-0.001	(-0.04)
R-cuadrado	0.022	
N. de casos	1465	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-6. Predictors of Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the Right of Public Contestation 2008.

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	-0.010	(-0.31)
Asociación padres de familia	-0.012	(-0.40)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.053*	(2.38)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.205*	(-7.04)
Interés en la política	0.138*	(6.46)
Educación	0.147*	(5.15)
Mujer	-0.083*	(-3.71)
Edad	0.257	(1.86)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.235	(-1.70)
Riqueza	0.028	(0.69)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.070*	(-2.50)
Tamaño del lugar	0.011	(0.41)
Constante	-0.005	(-0.22)
R-cuadrado	0.133	
N. de casos	1495	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-7. Predictors of Impact of Local Civic Participation on Political Tolerance, 2008.

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	-0.074*	(-2.96)
Asociación padres de familia	0.009	(0.32)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.041	(1.86)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.244*	(-11.65)
Interés en la política	0.144*	(5.52)
Educación	0.142*	(4.94)
Mujer	-0.119*	(-5.54)
Edad	0.147	(1.08)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.100	(-0.72)
Riqueza	0.054	(1.86)
Perception economía familiar	-0.038	(-1.54)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.056	(-1.76)
Constante	-0.000	(-0.02)
R-cuadrado	0.194	
N. de casos	1490	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-8. Predictors of Impact of Local Civic on Institutional Legitimacy, 2008.

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.020	(0.90)
Asociación padres de familia	0.017	(0.80)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.029	(1.04)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.511*	(23.56)
Interés en la política	0.090*	(4.72)
Educación	-0.081*	(-2.26)
Mujer	-0.014	(-0.56)
Edad	-0.174	(-1.44)
Edad al cuadrado	0.155	(1.35)
Riqueza	-0.065*	(-2.28)
Perception economía familiar	0.031	(1.23)
Tamaño del lugar	0.039	(1.18)
Constante	0.002	(0.08)
R-cuadrado	0.300	
N. de casos	1492	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-9. Predictors of Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust, 2008.

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.036	(1.33)
Asociación padres de familia	-0.036	(-1.53)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.014	(0.62)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.037	(1.41)
Interés en la política	-0.012	(-0.44)
Educación	0.007	(0.19)
Mujer	-0.084*	(-3.30)
Edad	0.394*	(2.58)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.283	(-1.87)
Riqueza	0.075	(1.81)
Percepción economía familiar	0.069*	(2.40)
Tamaño del lugar	0.104*	(2.75)
Constante	0.006	(0.20)
R-cuadrado	0.041	
N. de casos	1486	
* p<0.05		

Capítulo V . Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

This chapter studies the opinions Salvadorans have about the country's economic situation and its impact on variables of support for stable democracy. The chapter opens with a section devoted to the theory which covers these results, then it presents the results of the questions which measured citizens' perceptions of government economic performance. Then, the chapter presents the results concerning the country's main problem and emphasizes the role that economic problems have over citizens' worries; afterwards it determines the variables behind the opinions about the government's economic management, and it concludes by presenting the impact of perception of government's performance on the support for stable democracy.

5.1. Theoretical framework³⁴

The final chapter in Part II of this study deals with the question of the impact of the perception of government performance on support for stable government. It has become commonplace in the field of democratic governance, and talking about election outcomes, to comment: "It's the economy, stupid." That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Citizens do directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the central state. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perception of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges, and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s when researchers began to take note. During this time in mostly the developed world, especially the United States, survey research began to see a large drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events, but, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were tending to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion—as perceptions of economic

³⁴ This theoretical framework was prepared by Brian Faughnan.

conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so to did one's opinion of their political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton's (1965) three tier categorization of political support, being political community, the regime and political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson (1982) can be defined "as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person's conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere" (241) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system

Despite the fact that early research focused on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made between either Easton's three tiers or diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, bad economic outlooks and perceptions affected "peoples' feelings about their leaders and institutions" (2) and that "the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions" (5).

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat into doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance which according to Dalton "offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies" (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society's economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observed a moderate correlation with a person's financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, those citizens who were more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tended to be more trustful of government, however according to Dalton, "perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition is weaker. In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government for the state of the national economy, they are less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall" (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton's conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones, that "the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous" (127) within the OECD nations.

Turning now toward a government's economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions which according

to them have been “fragmentary and inconsistent.” In accordance with previous literature, the authors preliminary conclusion is that a country’s “level of economic development is less important than economic performance” (Power and Jamison 2005, 58), however they caution that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed.

Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, one’s individual assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system, those citizens who hold higher evaluations of both the national as well as their personal economic situations will be more likely to support the political system than those citizens who hold lower perceptions.

Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using *AmericasBarometer* survey data will be used to examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?

Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic performance, may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however, that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital, but we do not see the relationship as being particularly strong. In the pages below we test these hypotheses with the *AmericasBarometer* data.

Measuring perception of government economic performance


A new index (**econperf**), which stands for “Perception of Government Economic Performance” was created using N1, how well does the government fight poverty, and N12, how well does the government fight unemployment. The syntax can be found in the appendix.

N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?

N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?

5.2. Comparative Graphs


The result of the index comparing the countries of the region are shown in Graph V-1. As can be observed, the majority of the region's countries are below the midpoint of the scale (50), which means that in most of these countries people tend to evaluate the governments' economic performance negatively. Only Uruguay, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Chile are above the midpoint. El Salvador, at 36 on a scale of 0 to 100, is close to countries like Panamá, Jamaica and Argentina in terms of economic performance yet under countries like Dominican Republic, Colombia, México or Ecuador. It is important to remember here that this index measures the population's perceptions and, as we have already seen with the case of violence and insecurity, perceptions do not always correspond with what the more objective economic data express. In any event, the relevance of perception of the economy lies in that support for the political system and democracy many times are based more on these perceptions than on the figures of growth published by the central banks.



Graph V-1. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

5.3. The main problem of the country

The results of the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 for El Salvador indicate that the main worry for the majority of Salvadorans is the economy.³⁵ Asked about the main problem of the country, more than half the citizens (61.2%) pointed to problems such as poverty, unemployment and inflation; a third (34.2%) mentioned problems of security such as crime in general, gangs, or kidnappings. Economy and security, particularly the former, constitute almost 96% of Salvadorean citizens' opinions (see Graph V-2); other problems such as basic services, politics and others are mentioned by no more than 4% of those surveyed.



Graph V-2. The Economy as the Country's Most Important Problem.

The aforementioned evidences the importance that citizens place on economic problems over other types of problems, even those which are clearly urgent such as crime. Therefore, the exploration of the perceptions of government's performance becomes fundamental to understanding the support of democratic political culture in El Salvador.

In the research done by surveys, two important variables are used to measure perceptions of the economic situation. One measures the citizens' perception about the state of the country's

³⁵ The survey included the following question: "A4. To start off, in your opinion, Which is the **most serious** problem facing the country?." The various results were regrouped in five different categories: economy, security, politics, basic services, and others. Details of this re-categorization can be consulted in Appendix V.1 at the end of the chapter.


economy in general, while the other measures the perception of one’s personal or family economic performance. These have been called “sociotropic” and “ideotropic” perceptions of the economy. At the *AmericasBarometer* we proposed to measure the first with the question SOCT1 and the second with IDIO1. The wording of the questions is detailed as follows:

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país ? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	
Muy buena.....	1
Buena.....	2
Ni buena, ni mala.....	3
Mala.....	4
Muy mala.....	5
NS/NR.....	8
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	
Muy buena.....	1
Buena.....	2
Ni buena, ni mala.....	3
Mala.....	4
Muy mala.....	5
NS/NR.....	8

It is important to note again that these items measure the citizens’ perception of the *state of the economy* and do not tie this perception directly to the role that government could have in economic performance. In general terms, people tend to blame or value the government in office for the national economy’s performance (sociotropic performance). This is more common than attributing one’s personal economic situation to the government (ideotropic perception). However, the aforesaid does not always happen in this way and hence, we find it appropriate to use these items as predictors of citizens’ evaluation on government’s economic performance.

Therefore, to establish if perceptions about the country’s economic situation and one’s own have some impact on the evaluation on government for its performance in the financial area, we carried out a new regression analysis. The regression included not only the variables described earlier, but also certain control variables such as gender, age, educational level, and wealth. Graph V-3 present the results. Appendix V-2 (see end of the chapter) presents the coefficients and standard errors. Four variables were found to be statistically significant, suggesting an impact on the evaluations of the government’s performance. These are: years of schooling, wealth measured in terms of goods in the home, perception of the country’s economic situation, and perception of one’s own economic situation.

Judging by the distance between the error intervals and the axis of probability zero shown in the graph, the variables which seem to have a more significant effect over perception of the regime’s economic performance are precisely the variables which gather perceptions of the economic situation. Before examining the impact of these variables, we will review first the effect of the socio-demographic variables (education and wealth).




Graph V-3. Predictors of Government's Economic Performance, 2008.


An interesting relationship exists between years of schooling and perception of the government's economic performance. According to the results, persons who have studied beyond high school have a much more negative perception of the government than any individuals grouped by educational level. Furthermore, according to the findings presented in Graph V-4, there are no significant differences in the perceptions of the Salvadorans with high school education; however, once we move onto the group of citizens with higher education, the perception of the regime drops substantially.

In terms of personal wealth, the results indicate a relationship with a tendency that is much clearer linearly. Wealthier individuals tend to be more critical of the government's performance. The evaluation of the government drops from 39 among persons with a low level of wealth to less than 32 among those with a high level of wealth. Thus, Salvadorans with more resources evaluate the government more critically for its work in the financial area.

In short, the higher the socioeconomic position in Salvadorean society, the higher the tendency to be critical of the government's job in the economic sphere. The reasons for this are predictable: Better educated, wealthier individuals usually also have more access to information and are better able to grasp the economic policies of the government. They are also persons who, given their access to information, usually have very strong opinions about economic policies and their implementation..




Graph V-4. Government's Economic Performance according to Educational Level, 2008.




Graph V-5. Government's Economic Performance according to Wealth, 2008.

According to Graphs V-6 and V-7, the more negatively persons perceive the economic situation, the more negatively they assess the government's performance in the financial area.

However, regarding perceptions of the status of national economy,, this tendency is less linear, yet the general relationship among both variables is clear in general terms.



Graph V-6. Government's Economic Performance according to Perception of the National Financial Situation, 2008.



Graph V-7. Government's Economic Performance according to Perception of Personal Financial Situation, 2008.

The aforementioned means that the manner in which Salvadorans both their personal and national economic situations, has an important impact on their vision of the government's work in that area. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to say that valuations about the regime's performance depend in good measure on how the economy is perceived, including personal or family situations. In other words, these results coincide with the findings of other studies which suggest that government is frequently seen as responsible for the economic situation.

5.4. The impact of perception of government's performance on the support for stable democracy.


If the regime is seen as responsible for the economy, the how do the opinions about government's performance in the area of economics affect the fundamental variables of democratic political culture? The question that has motivated many studies in political sciences needs to be asked: Does the economy affect support for a democratic political system? It must be kept in mind that neither the direct work of the government nor the country's economic performance itself are being measured but rather Salvadorans' perception about this performance.

To determine if government's performance has an effect on support for stable democracy, we carried out several regression analyses in which, together with the perception about government's economic performance, which have included other variables such as approval of the president's job, interest in politics, in addition to the traditional control variables of gender, age, education, income and size of place. The dependent variables (or over which the impact of the previous were measured) were: support for democracy (ING4), support for right of public contestation (CONTEST), political tolerance (TOL), political legitimacy (LEGIT) and interpersonal trust (IT1). Appendix V-3 at the end of the chapter shows in detail the results of each of these regressions. This section displays only the bivariate relationships graphs found to be statistically significant.

According to the regressions, perception of government's performance impacts almost all variables of political culture except for the variable of support for the idea that democracy is the best political system (ING4). Data evince that the evaluation on the regime's work concerning economics is related to the right of political contestation (CONTEST), to political tolerance (TOL), to institutional legitimacy, and interpersonal trust. We should add, however, that these relationships did not always develop in the manner which was expected. A review of each one will shed light on why this is so.


First, to better persons evaluate government's economic performance. the lower the support for the right of public contestation. Graph V-8 indicates that support for the right of political contestation drops from 76 among those who evaluate the government's economic performance as poor, to 63 among those who evaluate it positively. In other words, the government's perceived good performance diminishes support for the right of public contestation. This relationship moves in the direction opposite to what we expected, yet we cannot explain this

newfound tendency from the available data. Nevertheless, this is an issue that should be explored in more depth in future analyses.



Graph V-8. Support for the Right of Public Contestation according to Government's Economic Performance, 2008.


Second, the perception of government's economic performance also affects levels of political tolerance; yet, as the the prior case, in a direction contrary to what was expected. According to Graph V-9, persons who perceived good economic performance from the regime tend to show less tolerance than persons who are critical of the government's economic performance. In other words, this relation is linear yet inversed. As evaluations of the government in this area improve, the levels of political tolerance diminish. Thus, we could hypothesize that this occurs because tolerance is measured as a function of the rights of those who oppose the government: a supporter of the government can evaluate the economy's performance positively and at the same time show little tolerance towards the rights of persons who are against the government. In any event, this relationship requires a more detailed exploration in future analyses.



Graph V-9. Political Tolerance according to Government's Economic Performance, 2008.

Third, the perception of government’s management in relation to the economy was found to have a positive impact on the legitimacy of political institutions. As Graph V-10 shows, to the extent that positive perception of government’s economic work increases, so does trust rise in the political system’s fundamental institutions. The score of legitimacy rises from 26 (on a scale of 0 to 100) among those who evaluate the government’s job negatively, to more than 70 points among those who qualify the administration’s management of the economy as very positive. These results confirm the importance of perceptions of government’s work regarding the system’s legitimacy and suggest that economic performance constitutes an important aspect for building trust in the political system in general.


In light of this data we can state that long periods of crisis or of financial difficulty in El Salvador can turn a negative evaluation on the government’s economic capacity into a problem of political legitimacy. Many Salvadorans hope that their government is capable of providing the conditions for a healthy economy both in national and personal terms; the difficulties of fulfilling these expectations could erode citizens’ commitment to the system which down the road could generate problems for democratic governance.



Graph V-10. Political Legitimacy according to Government’s Economic Performance, 2008.

Finally, perception of the government’s economic performance also impacts interpersonal trust in a positive and significant manner. Persons who think that the government is doing a good job combatting poverty and unemployment show more trust in others than persons who grade the

regime's management as poor. This means that the government's work not only affects trust in its institutions but also also determines in a certain way the capacity to establish social networks which promote or destroy citizens' horizontal trust. Solid economic management generates social synergies, and these attitudes translate into political stability, which, as we have consistently stated throughout this report, is usually important for the construction of democracy.



Graph V-11. Interpersonal Trust according to Government's Economic Performance, 2008.

5.5 Conclusions

In this chapter we have shown that perceptions of the country's economic situation and one's own, significantly influence the way in which citizens evaluate government's management. Moreover, we have shown also that evaluation on government's economic performance has an important impact on the variables of social capital and system legitimacy. A positive evaluation of government's performance usually results in more trust in institutions and in other citizens. These findings are of utmost importance if one considers that economic problems (poverty, unemployment, inflation, and others) constitute one of the greatest sources of citizens' worries, even above problems concerning security.

The findings presented in this chapter, however, leave open several questions. The perception of the government's economic management usually affects tolerance and support for citizens' rights in a contradictory manner. It seems that persons who are more satisfied with the government's work in that area tend to be more intolerant and more opposed to allowing the participation of others. These are aspects that need to be analyzed in more depth in future analyses.

Appendixes

Appendix V-1. Country's Main Problem according to the Citizens (A4) recodified in categories

Economía	Seguridad	Servicios Básicos	Política	Otros
Crédito, falta de (09)	Delincuencia, crimen (05)	Agua, falta de (19)	Conflicto armado (30)	Desigualdad (58)
Desempleo/falta de empleo (03)	Pandillas (14)	Caminos/vías en mal estado (18)	Corruption (13)	Desplazamiento forzado (32)
Economía, problemas con, crisis de (01)	Secuestro (31)	Educación, falta de, mala calidad (21)	Derechos humanos, violaciones de (56)	Discriminación (25)
Inflación, altos precios (02)	Seguridad (falta de) (27)	Electricidad, falta de (24)	Los políticos (59)	Drogadicción (11)
Pobreza (04)	Guerra contra terrorismo (17)	Salud, falta de servicio (22)	Mal gobierno (15)	Explosión demográfica (20)
Tierra para cultivar, falta de (07)	Terrorismo (33)	Transporte, problemas con el (60)		Medio ambiente (10)
Deuda Externa (26)	Violencia (57)	Vivienda (55)		Migración (16)
		Desnutrición (23)		Narcotráfico (12)
				Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (06)
				Narcoterrorismo (65)
				Otro (70)

Appendix V-2. Predictors of Perception of the Government's Economic Performance, 2008.

	Desempeño económico del gobierno	
	Coef.	t
Educación	-0.095*	(-3.58)
Mujer	0.045	(1.64)
Edad	0.026	(0.88)
Riqueza	-0.098*	(-3.78)
Tamaño	0.026	(1.12)
Situación económica nacional	0.291*	(10.49)
Situación económica personal	0.229*	(8.33)
Constante	0.003	(0.14)
R-cuadrado	0.194	
N. de casos	1515	
* p<0.05		

Appendix V-3. Impact of Government's Economic Performance on Support for Democracy, Right of Public Contestation, Political Tolerance, Political Legitimacy of Institutions, and Interpersonal Trust, 2008.

Variables independientes	Support a la Democracy (ING4)		Support al derecho de Participation (CONTEST)		Tolerancia política (TOL)		Legitimacy de las instituciones (LEGIT)		Confianza interpersonal (IT1r)	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Desempeño económico del gobierno	0.030	(0.04)	-0.091*	(0.03)	-0.099*	(0.03)	0.569*	(0.02)	0.063*	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.036	(0.04)	-0.121*	(0.03)	-0.192*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.025	(0.02)	0.102*	(0.01)	0.124*	(0.02)	0.039*	(0.01)		
Educación	0.263	(0.22)	0.625*	(0.13)	0.677*	(0.14)	-0.276*	(0.13)	0.068	(0.22)
Mujer	-3.391*	(1.36)	-4.278*	(1.00)	-7.112*	(1.06)	-0.223	(0.83)	-5.650*	(1.74)
Edad	0.768*	(0.32)	0.380	(0.20)	0.292	(0.21)	-0.259	(0.14)	0.649*	(0.29)
q2sq	-0.007*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.718	(0.55)	0.190	(0.47)	0.615	(0.43)	-0.491	(0.33)	1.308	(0.67)
Perception economía familiar	0.264	(0.91)	-1.578*	(0.73)	-0.865	(0.81)	0.177	(0.77)	2.295*	(1.10)
TAMANO	0.780	(0.55)	0.232	(0.39)	-0.808	(0.54)	0.604	(0.36)	1.977*	(0.73)
Constante	40.994*	(7.95)	67.249*	(5.01)	56.337*	(5.90)	27.916*	(4.47)	32.433*	(8.41)
R-cuadrado	0.021		0.137		0.194		0.485		0.040	
N. de casos	1472		1502		1497		1503		1500	
* p<0.05										

PART THREE:
BEYOND
GOVERNANCE

Capítulo VI . Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy

This chapter addresses the issue of how Salvadorans' political attitudes support democratic political stability. The first section presents a theoretical framework, the second examines the level of support for the political system, the third tackles the issue of political tolerance, the fourth support for a stable democracy. The fifth section examines satisfaction with democracy, the sixth analyzes support for democracy as political regime, and the seventh presents conclusions.

6.1 Theoretical framework³⁶

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.³⁷ New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter, we have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are used in that approach, or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

The legitimacy/tolerance equation

In *AmericasBarometer* studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). The framework shown in **Error! Reference source not**

³⁶ This section was created by LAPOP.

³⁷ Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

found. represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following:

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de El Salvador garantizan un juicio justo? <i>(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)</i>
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de El Salvador?
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político salvadoreño?
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político salvadoreño?
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político salvadoreño?

The items used for creating the “political tolerance” index are the same we used before for creating the support for rights of citizens’ inclusiveness.

Table VI-1. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance

	Tolerance	
System Support (i.e., Legitimacy)	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

From the theoretical point of view, we propose to analyze the interrelation between support for the system and tolerance, for which it has been necessary to dichotomize both scales in “low” and “high.”³⁸ Table VI-1 presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance. The political systems highly populated by citizens who show a high level of support for the system and a high political tolerance are the political systems predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the assumption that in non-coercive contexts a high level of legitimacy is needed for the system be stable. If citizens did not support their political system and had the freedom to act, a change of system could eventually be an inevitable result. However, stable systems are not necessarily democratic unless the rights of minorities are assured. These assurances could be constitutionally guaranteed, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be scarce opportunities for these minorities to compete and access positions of power. Under such conditions, obviously majorities can always suppress minorities’ rights. Politically legitimate systems, such as those which have shown support for a positive system in which citizens are reasonably tolerant towards the rights of minorities, are those which will most likely enjoy a stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

³⁸ Each of these scales go from 0-100, in such a manner that the middle point which has been selected is 50.

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule may ultimately be jeopardized. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is shown in the lower two cells on the table and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties since the instability could serve to force the system to strengthen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, under conditions of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict whether the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown since so many other factors-- including the role of elites, the position of the military, and the support/opposition of international players--are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the public supports neither the basic institutions of the nation nor the rights of minorities are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.


It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, the relationships discussed here apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that in the long term, attitudes of both elites and the general public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for Nicaragua, in which incongruence may have helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian, and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

6.2 Support for stable democracy

To analyze the belief in the legitimacy of the Salvadorean political system, we use a legitimacy scale called “Political Support/Alienation,” developed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University. This scale seeks to measure the level of support that citizens have for their system of government without focusing on the government in office. In political science literature this phenomenon is called “diffuse support” or “system support.” The questions used were those indicated in the previous section: B1, B2, B3, B4 and B6.

The codification system of these variables was originally based on a scale of 1-7 points (from “none” to “much”). To make these results easier to understand, they have been converted to the more familiar metric scale with a range of 0-100.³⁹


Graph VI-1 presents the means obtained for each of the questions: basic rights (42.7), courts (43.9), and pride (47.8) exhibit the lowest levels; at an intermediate level is support (56.2), and at the highest level are institutions (68.3).



Graph VI-1. Average of the questions which compose the Support System Scale, 2008.


³⁹ A measure of 1 point was subtracted from each variable to give all of them a range of 0-6, and then the final number was divided by 6, to give the scale a range of 0-1, which was then multiplied by 100 to give it a range of 0-100.

With data from the 2004 and 2006, it is possible to observe the evolution of the levels of system support for the period 2004-2008. In the following graph the evolution of the five questions can be observed. In general terms, two aspects stand out: (a) a decreasing tendency for four questions (courts, rights, pride and support) in the period, and (b) while insitutions increases from 2004 to 2006, it later diminishes in 2008.



Graph VI-2. Average of the questions which compose the Support System Scale, 2004-2008.

Using the five survey questions, a scale with which to measure systems support was constructed. The scale is an average of the five items shown previously.⁴⁰ Graph VI-3 presents the results of the surveys conducted for the period 2004-2008. As can be observed, system support decreased in a sustained manner for the period: an average of 59.5 in 2004, 55.4 in 2006 and 51.8 in 2008.⁴¹




Graph VI-3. System Support in El Salvador, 2004-2008.

When analyzing the data obtained for El Salvador in comparison with the other countries considered in this study, we find that our country is situated in an intermediate position, underneath Canada, Costa Rica, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, Dominican Republic, the United States, Chile and Jamaica.


⁴⁰ In order to not lose a significant number of interviewees in the counting system, if three or more of the five items are answered by the interviewee, we obtain an average of his/her responses to those items. If the interviewee answers less than three items, he/she is eliminated from the analysis.

⁴¹ For the 2008 interview, the confidence coefficient for the System Support scale is of .777.



Graph VI-4. Support System in Comparative Perspective, 2008.


Due to the weight of the variable which measures the evaluation on work performed by the president in office (M1), it was decided to control for this variable for the comparison among the countries. The changes are apparent in the following graph.



Graph VI-5. Support System in Comparative Perspective, controlled by Approval of President's job, 2008.

An important political variable used to explain these differences in the levels of system support is the political preferences of those interviewed. We have used the question about which party those surveyed voted for in the presidential elections of 2004. The answer options were recodified to leave three choices: ARENA (a right-leaning party), the FMLN (a left leaning party); the remaining candidates/parties were grouped in the option “others.” Graph VI-6 shows that those who voted for ARENA exhibit a higher level of system support (59.4), while those sympathizing


with other parties exhibit an intermediate level (47.4);the supporters of FMLN exhibit the lowest level of system support (40)



Graph VI-6. Support System according to Political Preference, 2008.


6.2.1 Group of items of extended system support

A series of additional items were included as part of the extended series of system support. In Graph VI-7 one can observe the results for the survey conducted in 2008. First, it must be mentioned that the Catholic Church is included among the institutions, despite the fact that it is not a component of the democratic political system. This was done so that the comparison of the different political institutions could have the Catholic Church as a referent, which has high levels of trust among Latin American populations. The group of institutions which hold the highest levels of trust are the Catholic Church (63.6), followed by the Attorney’s Office for the Defense of Human Rights (63). They are followed by the Republic’s Attorney General’s Office (58.3) and the media (55.7). In a third group is confidence in elections (48.7), the National Civil Police (48.6), the Republic’s District Attorney’s Office (47.4), the National Government (46.9), the justice system (45.9), the Supreme Court of Justice (45.7), the president (45.2), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (44.6), the Republic Court of Accounts (43.8) and the Legislative Assembly (40.3). Political parties had the lowest level of support with 35.6.



Graph VI-7. Trust in the Institutions, 2008.

Graph VI-8 shows trust in institutions for the period of 2004 to 2008. The most salient element here is the ample drop in citizens' trust in institutions between 2004 and 2006, which drops again in 2008 although with slight variations: between 2004 and 2006 an almost equal level of trust is maintained for both the Attorney's Office for the Defense of Human Rights and the Republic's Attorney's General Office, yet both drop in 2008. The only institution with an appreciable increase between 2006 and 2008 is the Catholic Church.



Graph VI-8. Trust in Institutions, 2004-2008.


When comparing the levels of trust among national institutions between 2004 and 2008, we do find differences. The drop is small for the Attorney’s Office for the Defense of Human Rights (1.9); later there is a decrease of 4.3 and 4.9 points, followed by a drop of 5.8, 6.8, 7.5, 10.1, 10.4, 11.4 and 12.1 points. The Legislative Assembly drops 12.2 points; the National

Government 13.7 points; the Supreme Electoral Tribunal 15.3 points; the National Civil Police 16 points, and trust in elections 16.4 points.

6.3 Political tolerance

A scale developed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University was used to analyze the levels of political tolerance in El Salvador. The questionnaire included four queries about four basic civil liberties: the right to vote, the right to engage in peaceful protests, the right to run for public office, and freedom of expression.⁴²

The codification system of these variables was originally based on a 0-10 format, but to make these results more understandable, they have been converted to a metric scale ranging from 0-100. Graph VI-9 presents the means obtained in each one of the questions of the 2008 survey: run for public office (46.8), freedom of expression (49.4), right to vote (59.9) and right protest peacefully (60.7).




Graph VI-9. Average of the questions which compose the Political Tolerance Scale, 2008.

Once again the data from the 2004 and 2006 surveys were used to determine the evolution of the political tolerance levels for the period 2004-2008. In general terms Graph VI-10 shows that for the four questions, the average rises between 2004 and 2006, yet for three of them there is


⁴² Questions D1, D2, D3 and D4 in the questionnaire.

a drop for 2008 (peaceful protests, run for office and freedom of expression) and only one, the right to vote, rises for 2008.



Graph VI-10. Average of the questions which compose the Political Tolerance Scale, 2004-2008.

A scale that measures political tolerance was built from the four questions.⁴³ This scale is an average of the four items shown previously.⁴⁴ Graph VI-11 presents the results for the surveys conducted in the period 2004-2008. As can be seen, tolerance rises from 51.3 in 2004 to 55.8 in 2006, and later drops to 54.2 in 2008.




Graph VI-11. Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2004-2008.

Analyzing the data from El Salvador in comparison with the other countries considered in this study, we find that our country is situated in an intermediate position, below Canada, Argentina, the United States, Paraguay, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela.


⁴³ In order to not lose a significant number of interviewees in the counting system, if two or more of the four items are answered by the interviewee, we obtain an average of his/her responses to those items. If the interviewee answers less than two items, we eliminate him/her from the analysis.

⁴⁴ For the 2008 survey, the reliability alpha for Political Tolerance scale is of .824.



Graph VI-12. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

As pointed out earlier, an important political variable that explains these differences is the political preferences of those interviewed. We have used the question concerning which party was voted for in the presidential election of 2004. Graph VI-13 indicates that those who voted for ARENA exhibit a lower level of political tolerance (45.8), while those who voted for other parties exhibit an intermediate level (60.4); FMLN supporters exhibit the highest level of political tolerance (69.1). These differences are statistically significant.



Graph VI-13. Political Tolerance according to Political Preference, 2008.

6.4 Support for stable democracy

In this section we will analyze the empirical relation between political tolerance and system support in El Salvador. Table VI-2 shows that 23.4% of those interviewed fall in the stable democracy cell; 29.3% in authoritarian stability cell the most populated cell; 26.9% place in the unstable democracy cell, and finally 20.5% in the democracy at risk cell.

Table VI-2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in El Salvador, 2008.


System Support	Political Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
	23%	29%
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk
	27%	21%

These results can be placed in an historic perspective using the data from the surveys taken in 2004 and 2006. Table VI-3 illustrates the evolution of the four cells. The “stable democracy” cell remains at 32% for 2004 and 2006, and drops to 23% in 2008. This is attributable to the drop in system support. An issue identified in the multiple regression analysis is that the valuation of interviewees regarding the government’s economic performance is associated with support for stable democracy. The “authoritarian stability” cell drops from 35% in 2004 to 27% in 2006 and then rises to 29% in 2008. The “unstable democracy” cell rises from 17% in 2004 to 25% in 2006 and rises to 27% in 2008. Finally, the “democracy at risk” cell remains at 16% for 2004 and 2006 and rises to 21% in 2008.

Table VI-3. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in El Salvador, 2004-2008.


Support System	Political Tolerance					
	High			Low		
High	Stable Democracy			Authoritarian Stability		
	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008
	32%	32%	23%	35%	27%	29%
Low	Unstable Democracy			Democracy at Risk		
	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008
	17%	25%	27%	16%	16%	21%

When analyzing the data from El Salvador in the stable democracy cell (high system support and high tolerance) compared to other countries studied, we find that El Salvador is in an intermediate position below Canada, Costa Rica, the United States, Uruguay, Jamaica, Mexico, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Venezuela and Panama.




Graph VI-14. Support for Stable Democracy Regression, 2008.

Graph VI-15 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the predictors of stable democracy (high support and high tolerance) when each one of the other variables remain constant. Appendix VI-1 (at the end of the chapter) presents the coefficients. There are three statistically significant predictors which are presented here in their bivariate relationship: satisfaction with democracy, gender, and valuation of the government's economic performance.




Graph VI-15. Support for Stable Democracy Regression, 2008.

The relationship between support for stable democracy and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy can be seen in Graph IV-16.. As satisfaction with democracy’s functioning rises, support for stable democracy increases as well.




Graph VI-16. Relationship between Support for Stable Democracy and Satisfaction with Democracy, 2008.

The relationship between support for stable democracy and valuation on government's economic performance is shown in Graph VI-17. As the valuation on government's economic performance rises, so does support for a stable democracy.¹



Graph VI-17. Relationship between Support for Stable Democracy and Government's Economic Performance, 2008.

Graph VI-18 shows that men exhibit a higher level of support for stable democracy than women.



Graph VI-18. Relationship between Support for Stable Democracy and Gender, 2008.

6.5 Satisfaction with democracy


The survey asked citizens how satisfied they were with the way in which democracy functions in the country. The question was posed in the following manner: “PN4. In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form in which democracy functions in El Salvador? (1) Very satisfied, (2) Satisfied, (3) Dissatisfied, (4) Very dissatisfied, (8) Doesn’t know/Did not respond.”

The results reveal that only 3.8% of the population said that they felt very satisfied with the performance of democracy, while 39% said that they were satisfied; 45.2% dissatisfied with democracy, and 12 very dissatisfied. This is indicative of an important level of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy.

Table VI-4. In general, Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the manner in which Democracy functions in El Salvador?, 2008.

	Frequency	Percentage
Muy satisfecho	58	3.8
Satisfecho	592	39.0
Insatisfecho	686	45.2
Muy insatisfecho	182	12.0
Total	1,518	100.00

To facilitate the comparison of the results with the surveys of 2004 and 2006, beginning with the response options, a scale in a format 0-100 was created. A comparison with the results of 2004 and 2006 show that levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy have grown. The average of satisfaction with democracy for 2004 was 54.5, dropping to 46.4 in 2006, and to 44.5 in 2008.



Graph VI-19. Satisfaction with Democracy, 2004 – 2008.


Salvadoran citizens were also asked about how democratic they consider the country to be. The question was posed as follows: “PN5. In your opinion, is El Salvador a very democratic country, somewhat democratic country, not very democratic country or not at all democratic? (1) Very democratic, (2) Somewhat democratic, (3) Not very democratic, (4) Not at all democratic, (8) Doesn’t know/Did not respond.”

The results reveal that 10.5% believe that El Salvador is very democratic; 39.3% somewhat democratic, an equal percentage not very democratic; and finally. 10.8% said the country is not at all democratic.

Table VI-5. In your opinion, El Salvador is a very democratic country, somewhat democratic, little democratic or not democratic at all?, 2008.

	Frecuencia	Porcentaje
Muy democrático	160	10.5
Algo democrático	599	39.3
Poco democrático	599	39.3
Nada democrático	165	10.8
Total	1,523	100

To facilitate a comparison of the results with the surveys of 2004 and 2006 a scale in a format 0-100 was created beginning with the options response. The comparison shows that the opinion of the democratic character of the country has diminished. The averages concerning the country’s democratic character for 2004 was 56.8, dropping to 51.2 in 2006, and to 49.4 in 2008.




Graph VI-20. Opinion about the Level of Democracy in El Salvador, 2004 – 2008.

6.6 Support for democracy as political regime

The survey also explored Salvadorans' opinions concerning types of political regimes. For this, two questions were posed. The first was formulated as follows: "DEM2. With which of the following phrases do you agree most. (1) For people like me, a democratic regime is the same as a non-democratic one, (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, (8) Doesn't know/Did not respond." The second question was: "AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who shouldn't have to be elected through voting. Others say that although things don't work, electoral democracy, or popular vote, is always best. What do you think? (1) We need a strong leader who doesn't have to be elected, or (2) Electoral democracy is the best, (8) Doesn't know/Did not say."


The results of the first question reveal that Salvadorans decidedly prefer democracy: 78.4% of those interviewed responded in this manner, while only 9.7% said that an authoritarian government would be preferable and 12% expressed indifference, indicating that for them an authoritarian government is the same as a democratic one.

These results are even more interesting when compared to the measurements of 2004 and 2006. Graph VI-21 shows the majority's support towards a democratic regime: it diminishes from 75.4% in 2004 to 72.7% in 2006 but then increases to 78.4% in 2008. support for authoritarianism and those of indifference receive relatively low percentages. Support for an authoritarian government was 13.5% in 2004, 12.4% in 2006 and 9.7% in 2008; the level of indifference moves from 11% in 2004 to 14.9% in 2006, and diminishes to 12% in 2008.




Graph VI-21. Type of Regime Preferred according to Survey Year, 2004-2008.

The second question asked interviewees to express their preference either for a strong unelected leader or electoral democracy. Results show that the majority of Salvadorans continue to support electoral democracy: 84.5% opine that electoral democracy is best versus 15.5% who think a non-elected strong leader is needed. Between 2004 and 2008 levels of support for an electoral democracy drop from 94.5% in 2004 to 87.6% in 2006 to 84.5% in 2008.



Graph VI-22. Preference for a Strong Leader or Electoral Democracy, 2004-2008.

Finally, the survey included the question: “ING4. It is possible that democracy has some problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what point do you agree or disagree with this phrase?,” using a system of 1-7 points. To facilitate comparison of the results with the surveys conducted in 2004, 2006 and 2008, a scale with a 0-100 format was created. Support for electoral democracy was found to have diminished from 68.8 in 2004 to 61.3 in 2006, but rose to 68.4% in 2008. These differences are statistically significant.



Graph VI-23. Support for Democracy, 2004 – 2008.

6.7. Conclusions

This chapter has shown that system support, a fundamental component of political culture tied to political stability, dropped in El Salvador between 2004 and 2008 (from 59.5 in 2004, to 55.4 in 2006 and to 51.8 in 2008), while political tolerance, another democratic culture element, rose between 2004 and 2006 (from 51.3 in 2004 to 55.8 in 2006) and then dropped in 2008 to 54.2).

A widespread decrease of civic trust among various institutions between 2004 and 2006 was reported, a trend that continues to drop in 2008. When comparing trust levels in institutions between 2004 and 2008, we do find differences. The decrease is small for the Attorney’s Office for the Defense of Human Rights (1.9 points) but higher for the Legislative Assembly (12.2 points), the national government (13.7 points), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (15.3 points), the National Civil Police (16 points) and also for trust in the elections (16.4 points).

In accordance with the theoretical framework, we have sought to explore the interrelation between system support and political tolerance, for which both variables were dichotomized creating four possible combinations. The distribution of those surveyed in 2008 in these four cells is as follows: 23% places in the stable democracy cell, 29% in the authoritarian stability cell, 27% in unstable democracy and 21% in the democracy at risk cell.

This chapter has reported that in general terms, Salvadorans exhibit a high level of support for democracy as political regime: 84.5% prefer electoral democracy versus 15.5% who would support a non-elected strong leader; 78.4% prefer democracy as form of government over an authoritarian one. More specifically, support for democracy as the preferred regime, just as the preference of electoral democracy versus a non-elected strong leader has increased compared to the 2006 measurement.

Paradoxically, this survey found important levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy: 3.8% feels very satisfied, 39% feels satisfied, 45.2% feels dissatisfied and 12% feels very dissatisfied with functioning of democracy. A comparison with the 2004 data shows that the levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy have grown.

Appendixes

Appendix VI-1. Predictors of High Political Support Support and High Tolerance, 2008.

	Coef.	t
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la Corruption	0.036	(1.27)
Victimization por crimen	-0.014	(-0.50)
Desempeño económico del gobierno	0.153*	(5.72)
Educación	0.005	(0.15)
Mujer	-0.083*	(-3.18)
Edad	0.122	(0.88)
Riqueza	-0.001	(-0.04)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.011	(-0.36)
Interés en la política	0.053	(1.81)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.112	(-0.84)
Satisfaction con la Democracy	0.089*	(4.09)
Situación económica nacional	0.009	(0.36)
Constante	0.002	(0.07)
R-cuadrado	0.052	
N. de casos	1476	
* p<0.05		

Capítulo VII . Voting Behavior and Political Parties

This chapter examines the issues of voting behavior and the valuations that Salvadorans place on political parties. The first section examines a vote's deciding factors, the second analyzes the valuations of political parties. The third section explores interest in politics, the fourth examines the valuation on the representation of interests. The fifth looks at gender and politics, the sixth analyzes trust in the elections, the seventh examines political orientations. The eighth section presents conclusions.

7.1 Deciding factors of a vote

Within the framework of restoring peace and initiating democratization processes in the Central American region⁴⁵, free and competitive elections have become institutionalized,⁴⁶ carried out regularly on preestablished dates. During elections that have taken place in the last decade in Central America, no one has raised the issue of electoral fraud, and the losers have accepted their defeat, and cooperated in peaceful transfers of **government/power**, although some technical problems still persist which need to be addressed and overcome.

Since the Peace Agreements were signed in El Salvador, an intense electoral calendar has developed. Three presidential elections have been carried out (1994, 1999 and 2004) as well five legislative and municipal elections (1994, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006).⁴⁷ Elections have taken place almost every two years, and we are at the threshold of more electoral events in 2009: both legislative and municipal elections will take place in January and presidential elections in March.

In the 2004 presidential elections, a total of 2,317,981 votes were cast out of an electoral roll of 3,442,393 registered voters, an electoral participation rate of 67.3%,⁴⁸ while in the legislative

⁴⁵ For a general vision regarding the democratization process in the Central American region, see:

Günther Maihold y Ricardo Córdova Macías (2001). Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica. En: Ricardo Córdova Macías, Günther Maihold y Sabine Kunterbach (compiladores). Pasos hacia una nueva convivencia: Democracia y Participación en Centroamérica. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos de Hamburgo e Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlín.

Mitchell A. Seligson y John A. Booth (1995). Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Dinorah Azpuru, et al (2007). Construyendo la Democracia en sociedades posconflicto. Guatemala y El Salvador, un enfoque comparado. Guatemala: F&G editores-IDRC.


⁴⁶ See the Índice de Democracia Electoral produced by PNUD. Regarding this, see: PNUD (2004). La Democracia en América Latina. Hacia una Democracia de ciudadanos y ciudadanas.

⁴⁷ For an analysis of the postwar electoral system, see: Álvaro Artiga-González (2008). El sistema electoral salvadoreño de posguerra (1994-2007). San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, Temas de Actualidad No. 6.

⁴⁸ Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Memoria Especial Elección Presidencial 2004. San Salvador, TSE, junio de 2004.

elections of 2006 a total of 2,060,889 votes were cast out of 3,801,040 registered voters, an electoral participation rate of 54.2%.⁴⁹

In the following pages we will analyze voting behavior in relation to the presidential elections of March 2004 or the legislative elections of 2006. According to the survey, 96.3% of those polled said that they had a DUI, a Unique Identity Document. In addition, 68.5% of those surveyed said that they had voted in the 2004 presidential elections, which is highly congruent with the officially tabulated vote (67.3%). Moreover, 60.1% said that they had voted in the 2006 legislative elections, slightly higher than the official count (54.2%).




Graph VII-1. Intention of voting reported for the last Presidential Elections (2004), 2008.

Due to the fact that our dependent variable (whether voters cast votes or not- question VB2) is dichotomous, a logistical regression was done to examine the deciding factors of a vote. Graph VII-2 presents the results of the logistical regression analysis with a vote's intention predictors when each one of the other variables remain constant. Appendix VII-1 at the end of the chapter presents the coefficients. There are six statistically significant predictors, which are presented here in their bivariate relationship: whether an individual was involved in the 2004 presidential campaign, sympathy for some political party, the size of residence, interest in politics, age, and educational level.


⁴⁹ Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Memoria Especial Elecciones 2006. San Salvador, TSE, 2006.

Of these six variables, three correspond to strictly political factors (interest in politics, sympathy for some political party, and having been involved in an electoral campaign); three are socio-demographic (age, size of place of residence, and educational level).



Graph VII-2. Regression showing Factors which affected Electoral Participation in the Presidential Elections of 2004.

In Graph VII-3 one can observe the relationship between intention to vote and involvement in the presidential campaign of 2004⁵⁰. Those involved in the election campaign exhibit a higher intention to vote than those who were not involved.




Graph VII-3. Vote according to involvement with Electoral Campaign, 2008.

In Graph VII-4 one can observe the relation between voting intention and sympathy with a political party.⁵¹ Those who sympathize with a political party exhibit a higher intention to vote than those who do not.


⁵⁰ Question PP2 in the questionnaire. “There are people who work for a party or candidate during the election campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the past presidential elections of 2004? (1) Yes, I worked, (2) No, I did not work, (8) Doesn’t know/Did not respond.”

⁵¹ Question VB10 in the questionnaire. “In this moment, do you sympathize with any political party? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Doesn’t know/Did not respond.”




Graph VII-4. Vote according to sympathy with a Political Party, 2008.

In Graph VII-5 one can observe the relationship between voting intention and size of place of residence of those surveyed. In the first part of the graph, using the capital city as reference, as population size of the place of residence diminishes (large city and medium city), voting intention increases slightly; but later diminishes slightly in small cities and rural areas.




Graph VII-5. Vote according to Population Size of Place of Residence, 2008.

In Graph VII-6 one can observe the relationship between voting intention and interest in politics. As interest in politics diminishes (from much to none), voting intention also decreases.




Graph VII-6. Vote according to Interest in Politics, 2008.

In Graph VII-7 presents the relationship between voting intention and age. The 18-25 age group exhibits the lowest voting intention. Voting intention then increases until it reaches the 36-45 age group and decreases slightly in the 46-55, 56-65 and over 66 cohorts



Graph VII-7. Vote according to Age, 2008.

In Graph VII-8 shows the relation between voting intention and educational level. Using persons who do not have any schooling as a reference, we found that voting intention increases among those who completed primary education, decreases for those who have high school education, and then increases among college graduates or non-collegiate tertiary education.




Graph VII-8. Vote according to Educational Level, 2008.

7.2 Valuations on political parties

The questionnaire included a battery of queries in order to explore various aspects related to political parties. In this section we examine first the relation with political parties, then trust in political parties, and finally valuations on the parties' operation.


7.2.1 Relationship with political parties

The questionnaire included a query to measure the degree to which citizens sympathize with some/any political party: "VB10. In this moment, do you sympathize with any political party?." Graph VII-9 indicates that 40.9% said that they sympathized with some political party. The 2006 survey reported that 31.2% sympathized with one political party; this percentage then increased in 2008.



Graph VII-9. Sympathy with Political Parties, 2008.

To determine the intensity of this bond between supporters and their party, we included the following question: “VB12. And would you say that your support for this party is (...) very weak, weak, neither weak nor strong, strong, or very strong?”. In Graph VII-10 one can observe that 25.1% expressed that the intensity of their bond is very strong, 42.3% strong, 25.1% neither weak, nor strong, 6.5% weak, and 1% very weak.




Graph VII-10. Level of Sympathy with Political Parties, 2008.

To study the relation between the political party preferred by those surveyed and the level of sympathy towards that party, we have prepared the following table. In it we can observe that the level of sympathy is stronger for the supporters of FMLN, followed by PCN, and then by ARENA.

Table VII-1. Relationship between Political Party one sympathizes with and the Level of Sympathy towards that Party, 2008.

Level of Sympathy for that Party	With which Party do You Sympathize?							TOTAL
	Otro	ARENA	FMLN	PCN	PDC	CD	FDR	
Muy débil %	(0) 0%	(4) 2.1%	(2) 0.6%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(6) 1.0%
Débil %	(0) 0%	(20) 10.3%	(12) 3.3%	(3) 23.1%	(2) 33.3%	(1) 25%	(0) 0%	(38) 6.5%
Ni débil ni fuerte %	(1) 100%	(60) 30.8%	(79) 21.6%	(2) 15.4%	(3) 50%	(1) 25%	(1) 100%	(47) 25.1%
Fuerte %	(0) 0%	(72) 36.9%	(169) 46.2%	(6) 46.2%	(1) 16.7%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(248) 42.3%
Muy fuerte %	(0) 0%	(39) 20%	(104) 28.4%	(2) 15.4%	(0) 0%	(2) 50%	(0) 0%	(147) 25.1%
Total %	(1) 100%	(195) 100%	(366) 100%	(13) 100%	(6) 100%	(4) 100%	(1) 100%	(586) 100%

For those who do not support any political party, we asked a question designed to measure whether they have a party or not and whether they vote or not. Graph VII-11 shows that 53.4% said that they do not have a party but they vote; 22% do not have a party and do not vote, 9.4% have a party but now votes for another; 8.5% had a party but now do not vote; and 6.7% gave other answers.



Graph VII-11. Political Party Membership and Suffrage for those who do not sympathize with a political party, 2008.


One last aspect to posit in this section is the exploration of voting consistency for the same party in different elections. Table VII-2 presents the cross between the candidate voted for president in 2004 and the party voted for in terms of the Legislative Assembly candidate in 2006.

Table VII-2. Relationship between the last Presidential Voting and the last Deputy Voting, 2008.

¿Por cual partido político votó para diputado en las últimas elecciones?	¿Por quién votó para Presidente?						Total
	Ninguno	Otro	Antonio Saca	Schafick Handal	Héctor Silva	Rafael Machuca	
Ninguno %	(9) 60%	(0) 0%	(1) 0.3%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(10) 1.5%
ARENA %	(1) 6.7%	(0) 0%	(244) 77.5%	(4) 1.4%	(1) 5.6%	(1) 5.3%	(251) 38.1%
FMLN %	(2) 13.3%	(5) 62.5%	(37) 11.8%	(269) 94.7%	(4) 22.2%	(2) 10.5%	(319) 48.4%
PCN %	(2) 13.3%	(0) 0%	(21) 6.7%	(4) 1.4%	(3) 16.7%	(15) 79.0%	(45) 6.8%
PDC %	(1) 6.7%	(2) 25%	(8) 2.5%	(2) 0.7%	(9) 50%	(1) 5.3%	(23) 3.5%
CD %	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(4) 1.3%	(5) 1.8%	(1) 5.6%	(0) 0%	(10) 1.5%
PLN %	(0) 0%	(1) 12.5%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(0) 0%	(1) 0.2%
Total %	(15) 100%	(8) 100%	(315) 100%	(284) 100%	(18) 100%	(19) 100%	(659) 100%


7.2.2 Trust in political parties

The questionnaire included a query to measure trust in political parties in a 1-7 point which has previously been explained. To simplify the analysis, we transformed the original question (B21) into a 0-100 format (B21R). Due to the fact that the 2004 and 2006 surveys included the same question, in Graph VI-12, it is possible to observe the low levels of trust in political parties. The difference between 2006 and 2008 is not statistically significant.




Graph VII-12. Trust in Political Parties, 2004-2008.

Graph VII-13 shows trust levels in political parties for 2008 according to ideology, the latter measured on a self-positioning left-right scale (question L1).



Graph VII-13. Relationship between Trust in Political Parties according to Ideology, 2008.

The questionnaire included three closely related queries: If one had voted in the Legislative Assembly member elections in 2006 (VB6), for which party (ELSVB7), and to what degree did those polled believe that the party represented their interests (ELSVB13). Graph VII-14 shows the average for the sympathizers of the political parties (Legislative Assembly member's party voted for in 2006). Regarding the degree to which those polled considered that the party represented their interests, it is possible to observe some differences. To simplify the analysis, the response options to the question ELSVB13 were recodified to a 0-100 range. Those who voted for FMLN averaged 74.2 of trust that this party represents their interests, followed by CD with 68.7, ARENA with 56.3, PDC with 54.1 and PCN with 41.6.



Graph VII-14. Relationship between the Party for which one voted for Legislative Assembly Member in the last Elections (2006) and Representativeness of One's Interests, 2008.


Since the 2006 survey included a question about the representativeness of interests, it is possible to compare the results in Table VII-3. In general terms one can appreciate a decrease in the valuation of representation of interests by the parties.

Table VII-3. How much do you think that this party represents your interests?, 2006 -2008.

	2006	2008
Mucho	(216)	(299)
%	43.0	33.9
Algo	(144)	(214)
%	28.7	24.3
Poco	(122)	(272)
%	24.3	30.9
Nada	(20)	(96)
%	4.0	10.9
Total	(502)	(881)
%	100	100


7.2.3 Valuations on the parties' operation

The questionnaire included a query designed to measure the citizens' valuation on how democratic political parties' internal operations are.. Graph VII-15 indicates that 9.1% consider them very democratic, 36.8% somewhat democratic, 42.8% parties not very democratic and 11.3% not democratic at all. This valuation is similar to that reported in the 2006 survey: 9.2% very democratic, 34% somewhat democratic, 43.7% not very democratic and 13.1% not democratic at all.



Graph VII-15. How democratic are Political Parties in their Internal Management?, 2008.


The following graph reports opinions about how democratic political parties are according to the average of their distribution on a left-right scale. The ideology average decreases as opinion shifts from very democratic to not democratic at all.



Graph VII-16. Relationship between Ideology and Perception of Internal Democracy in Political Parties, 2008.

7.3 Interest in politics

The questionnaire included a query to measure citizens' interest in politics (question POL1). In Graph VII-17 one can observe that 15.7% responded very interested, 13.9% somewhat interested, 39.3% not very interested and 31.1% not interested at all.




Graph VII-17. How interested are you in Politics?, 2008.

Because the 2006 survey included this question, we are able to compare the results shown in Table VII-4. Overall, there has been an increase in the interest in politics, which can be explained partially because of the proximity of the elections at the beginning of next year and the interest that this generates.

Table VII-4. How interested are you in Politics?, 2006-2008.

	¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política?	
	2006	2008
Mucho	10.8	15.7
Algo	16.3	13.9
Poco	36.9	39.3
Nada	36.0	31.1
Total	100	100

The questionnaire included a query to measure citizens' involvement in political activity: "PP1. During the elections some people try to convince others to vote for some party or candidate. With what frequency have you tried to convince others to vote for some party or candidate? (1) Frequently, (2) From time to time, (3) Rarely, (4) Never, (8) Doesn't know/Did not respond." In Graph VII-18 one can observe that 74.5% had never done so, 10.1% rarely, 9.4% every once in a while and 6% frequently.



Graph VII-18. Persuading People to Vote for a Certain Candidate, 2008.

7.4. Representation of interests


The questionnaire included a battery of three queries to measure citizens' perceptions concerning the representation of their interests by three political authorities elected by popular vote: the national government⁵², the legislative assembly,⁵³ and local governments.⁵⁴

To simplify the analysis, the response options were recodified into a scale with a 0-100 format. Graph VII-19 shows that for all three political authorities there is a drop in the perception that they represent civic interests. Moreover, it shows that, the authority evaluated as the highest is the mayoralty, followed by the national government, and lowest the Legislative Assembly members.

⁵² ELSP3A. How much do you think the national government represents your interests and benefits you as a citizen? (1) Much, (2) Somewhat (3) Not at all, (8) Doesn't know/Did not respond."


⁵³ ELSP3A. How much do you think the Legislative Assembly members represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen? (1) Much, (2) Somewhat (3) Not at all, (8) Doesn't know/Did not respond."

⁵⁴ ELSP3A. How much do you think the mayoralty of your town and the municipal council represent your interests and benefits you as a citizen? (1) Much, (2) Somewhat (3) Not at all, (8) Doesn't know/Did not respond."



Graph VII-19. Degree of Representativeness within the various Political Actors, 2004-2008.


Graph VII-20 presents citizens' perception concerning the representation of their interests by the national government. We asked the following: "ELSPN3A. How much do you find the national government represents your interests and benefits you as a citizen? (1) much, (2) somewhat (3) little, (4) not at all (8) doesn't know/Did not respond." Of those interviewed, 7.9% opined much, 18.4% somewhat, 44.8% little, and 29% not at all.



Graph VII-20. Gobierno nacional representa intereses, 2008.


7.5. Gender and politics

With the purpose of examining the valuations of those surveyed concerning the relation between gender and politics, we present the results of two questions. First: “VB50. In general men are better political leaders than women. Do you agree very much, agree, disagree or disagree very much? (1) Very much agree, (2) Agree, (3) Disagree, (4) Disagree very much, (8) Doesn’t know/Did not reply.” In Graph VII-21 one can observe that 25.2% disagrees very much, 40.3% disagrees, 18.8% agrees and 15.7% agrees very much.



Graph VII-21. Valuation about Gender Leadership, 2008.


Second: “W10. Regarding the political participation of women. With which of these opinions do you agree most: (1) It is not convenient for women to participate in politics, (2) Women should only participate in politics if family obligations allow it, (3) Women should participate in politics as much as men do, (8) Doesn’t know/Did not answer.” In Graph VII-22 one can observe that an overwhelming 83.8% think that women should participate in politics as much as men do, 10% that women should only participate when family obligations allow them to, and 6.2% that it is not convenient for women to participate in politics.



Graph VII-22. Women Participation in Politics, 2008.


7.6. Trust in the elections

The questionnaire included a query to measure trust in the elections on a 1-7 point scale which has been previously explained. To simplify the analysis, the original question (B47) was converted to a 0-100 format. Due to the fact that the surveys of 2004 and 2006 included the same question, in the Graph VII-23 one can observe trust in the elections for the 2004-2008 period. The tendency is the decrease of trust in the elections (65.1 in 2004, 51.3 in 2006 and 48.7 in 2008). The difference between 2004 and 2006 is statistically significant.



Graph VII-23. Trust in the Elections, 2004-2008.


Graph VII-24 presents trust in the elections based on political preferences expressed in the presidential elections of 2004. Those who voted for ARENA exhibit the highest level of trust in the elections (58.6), followed by other parties (45.6); the lowest level (38.1) came from ARENA supporters. The difference between the followers of ARENA and FMLN is statistically significant.



Graph VII-24. Trust in the Elections by Political Preference, 2008.


7.7 Political Orientation

Graph VII-25 shows the self-placement of those surveyed on the left (1) – right (10) scale, for an average of 5.3.




Graph VII-25. Ideology, 2008.

Because this question was asked in the 2004 and 2006 surveys, it is possible to present in Graph VII-26 the results for the three measurements. As can be observed, the left-right scale was more concentrated towards the right in 2004, with an average of 6.9; this average later dropped to 5.7 in 2005 and dropped again in 2008 to 5.3.



Graph VII-26. Ideology, 2004-2008.

In Graph VII-27 one can observe visually the cross between the party/candidate for which the surveyed voted for in the last presidential election (2004) and their ideology in 2008, and both the average and the standard deviation for each party/candidate. The supporters of Schafick Handal/FMLN show a mean of 2.7; Rafael Machuca/PCN, 4.8; Héctor Silva/CDU-PDC, 4.9; and Antonio Saca/ARENA 7.2.



Graph VII-27. Relationship between Preference in the last Presidential Election (2004) and Ideology in 2008.

7.8. Conclusions

This chapter has shown that there are six deciding factors of voting intention: involvement in the 2004 presidential campaign, sympathy with some/any political party, size of the place of residence, interest in politics, age, and educational level.

Of those surveyed, 40.9% sympathized with some political party, and of these 2.5% expressed that the intensity of this bond with their preferred party is very strong, 42.3% strong, 25.1% neither weak nor strong, 6.5% weak and 1% very weak.

Data from the survey also show a low level of trust in political parties which has diminished between 2004 and 2008 (dropping from 39.9 in 2004 to 35.6 in 2008).

Furthermore, the chapter presented the valuations of those surveyed on the operation of the parties. Of those polled, 9.2% consider the parties are very democratic, 34% somewhat democratic, 43.7% not very democratic, 13.1% not democratic at all.

Appendixes

Appendix VII-1. Vote Predictors in the Presidential Elections of 2004, of 2008

	Coefficientes	(t)
Educación	0.290*	(2.83)
Edad	5.383*	(12.23)
Edad al cuadrado	-4.469*	(-11.45)
Mujer	0.091	(1.06)
Riqueza	0.186	(1.91)
Interés en la política	0.277*	(4.28)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.033	(-0.40)
Satisfacción con la Democracy	0.061	(0.85)
Tamaño del lugar	0.183*	(2.02)
Simpatiza con algún partido político	0.410*	(6.45)
Trataron de convencerme para votar por algún partido	0.032	(0.39)
Trabaja por algún partido durante la campaña electoral	0.193*	(2.20)
Constante	1.112*	(12.24)
F	18.58	
N. de casos	1463	
* p<0.05		

Appendixes

Appendix A. Methodological Description of El Salvador Study

Sample Design

Population Universe

This study's universe comprised the country's geographic totality, which is composed of 14 departments and 262 municipalities, including both their urban and rural areas.

According to the Population Projection of El Salvador 1995-2025 of the Economics Ministry Statistics and Census General Office (DIGESTYC)*, the country had in 2007 a total population of 7,104,999, of which 60.28% was concentrated in the urban areas of the country and the remaining 39.72% corresponds to the inhabitants of the rural areas.

Population

The units which were object of the study correspond to the population older than 18 years of age, home residents.

Sampling method

The first criterion to design the sampling procedure is that the final sample would reflect as faithfully as possible the totality of the Salvadorean population, taking as a base the Population Projection of the Economics Ministry Statistics and Census General Office (DIGESTYC).

The sampling system utilized was probalistic, stratified, multi-stage, in groups, and random in the selection of the units each stage the sample comprises.

The sample was stratified according to the 262 municipalities that correspond to the 14 departments of the country; and had several unit selection stages: at first the Primary Sample Units (PSU) were selected which correspond precisely to the municipalities, later the Secondary Units that correspond to censal segments in the urban area and rural area cantons, after that the Third Stage Units were elected. These were comprised by blocks and finally 6,7, and 8 housing groups in the urban case—depending of the stratum—and 12 housing groups in the rural area. Within each stratum the PSU's were selected according to proportional probability of each municipal government's population size.

* This data has been elaborated by the Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC), of the Ministerio de Economía, based on the Population Census carried in 1992. See: Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC), Fondo de población de las Naciones Unidas (FNUAP) y Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE). (1996). *Proyección de la población de El Salvador 1995-2025*. San Salvador: Ministerio de Economía. The calculations corresponding to this sampling were computed from this census, using also as a base the population projection mentioned above. The last population and home census was conducted in 2007; however, DIGESTYC's official data were not available at the time the study was carried out.

One home was selected from each housing group. Within each home only one person older than 18 years of age, who met the gender and age requisites, was interviewed to complete the sample.

Sampling frame

This frame is composed by a census cartography obtained from the Statistics and Census General Office (DIGESTYC), which includes both the country's urban area cities and the rural area's cantons.

Most of the census cartography is up to date until 1996 and the other until 2000, as part of the efforts carried out by DIGESTYC to update its database for the Multiple Purpose Home Surveys. It must be mentioned that a part of the cartography which will be used in the survey corresponds to the one lifted during the 1992 census execution, and which has not been subsequently updated, but it is the only one currently at our disposal, especially for some rural area maps.

Sample size

It was established beforehand to conduct a total of 1.500 interviews. Taking this into account and considering a 95% confidence level (Z), a 50% variance (p), the estimated sampling error is of +/- 2.5%. To establish this error, we used the following formula designed for infinite populations:

$$E = \sqrt{Z^2 pq / n}$$

where,

$$E = \sqrt{(1.96)^2 (0.5) (0.5) / 1,500} = 2.5$$

The sample's selection method was multi-stage, performing within the sampling process a series of stratifications which allowed to select a random sample.

Sample Size by stratum and urban/rural areas

Due to lack of information about the urban and rural population quantity of the municipal government, we proceeded to estimate this population using annual growth rates, both of the urban area and the rural, as well at a national level. For this estimate, we used existing population growth data both urban and rural for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010* and to be able to estimate the municipal data of interest for 2007. Taking the 1992 National Census data of the Economics Ministry and the Statistics & Census Office, we obtained the population information per municipal government for 1992. We applied the estimated annual population growth rate for the period from 1992 to 1995 to obtain urban and rural population for 1995.

For example, the annual growth rate of the urban area between 1992 and 1995 was of 8.2%. To estimate the urban population for 1995 we used the following formula:

* This data correspond to the Population Projection of El Salvador, 1995-2025, produced by the Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC) based on the Population Census conducted in 1992.

Municipal Urban Population for 1995 = $[(8.2/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 1992} \times 3] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 1992}$

In the case of the rural area, the annual growth rate was of -1.1%. To estimate the rural population per municipal government for 1995 we used the following formula:

Municipal Rural Population for 1995 = $[(-1.1/100) \times \text{Municipal Rural Population in 1992} \times 3] + \text{Municipal Rural Population in 1992}$

To obtain the urban – rural population by municipal government datum for 1995, we applied the same procedure from before to calculate this population for 2000, 2004, 2006 and later for 2008 based on the data previously obtained. The formulas we used to calculate the urban and rural population for 2000, 2004, 2006 and subsequently for 2008 are the following;

Municipal Urban Population for 2000 = $[(2.6/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 1995} \times 5] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 1995}$

Municipal Rural Population for 2000 = $[(1.3/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 1995} \times 5] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 1995}$

Municipal Urban Population for 2004 = $[(2.3/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2000} \times 3] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2000}$

Municipal Rural Population for 2004 = $[(1.2/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2000} \times 3] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2000}$

Municipal Urban Population for 2006 = $[(2.3/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2004} \times 2] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2004}$

Municipal Rural Population for 2006 = $[(1.2/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2004} \times 2] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2004}$

Municipal Urban Population for 2008 = $[(0.8/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2006} \times 2] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2006}$

Municipal Rural Population for 2008 = $[(0.36/100) \times \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2006} \times 2] + \text{Municipal Urban Population in 2006}$

Taking into account the population quantity for the urban and rural area in each municipal government and thus, the total quantity in each one of them, we proceeded first to stratify the population with a base in the quantity of inhabitants by municipal government, these last ones are in this case the Primary Unit Samples. The first stratum was conformed by those municipalities with more than 100.000 inhabitants

(these municipalities have a selection probability of 1; that is, they remain self-selected within the sample); the second stratum contains the municipalities with 50.000 to 100.000 inhabitants; the third stratum included the municipalites with less than 20.000 inhabitants.

In a subsequent step, we determined the number of surveys to be applied per stratum according to the population quantity which each one agglutinated. The stratum then, comprises the 39.40% of the country’s total population, due to which 591 surveys fo the total 1500 established for the sample would have to filled out. Stratum number two comprises 16.93% of the total population, for which 254 interviews would have to be applied. Strata three and four agglutinate 20.80% and 22.87% respectively of the total population, and we would have to conduct 312 and 343 surveys in each one of them respectively.

According to the urban and rural population quantity that each stratum gathers, we proceeded to distribute the surveys previously assigned to each stratum, according to the urban and rural population quantity in each of them. For example in stratum 1 we estimated we had to conduct 591 surveys, of which 531 would be conducted in the urban area and 60 in the rural. And so on, per each stratum. Following we present the distribution detail of the sample per stratum and area:

Table 1 Sample Distribution by Stratum and Area

Strata	Size of the Sample		Urban Sample		Rural Sample	
	%	n	%	n	%	n
Estrato 1	39.40	591	57.97	531	10.27	60
Estrato 2	16.93	254	15.39	141	19.35	113
Estrato 3	20.80	312	13.86	127	31.68	185
Estrato 4	22.87	343	12.77	117	38.70	226
Total	100.00	1500	100.00	916	100.00	584

Sample adjustment for “no coverage”

This sample did not admit the substitution and replacement of sample units in order to eliminate the bias that this substitution and replacement could generate; due to this and to guarantee the sample development with the minimum expected sizes, in a subsequent step we performed an “adjustment for no coverage” of each area’s sample size (urban – rural) of each one of the stratum, taking into account the “no coverage” factor. This factor, used for each stratum and in urban and rural areas, is the estimate with base in the experience of IUDOP from previous studies. For example, in the case of the municipalities of stratum 1, the rate of “no coverage” is of 0.15 in the urban area and 0.2 in the rural area. Based on the previous, the new sample size for the urban area of stratum 1 is as follows:

$$n^* = (1 + t) \times n$$

$$n^* = (1 + 0.15) \times 531$$

$$n^* = 611$$

and in the case of the rural area:

$$n^* = (1 + t) \times n$$

$$n^* = (1 + 0.2) \times 60$$

$$n^* = 72$$

Table 2 Sample Distribution adjusted according to the “no coverage rate” according to stratum and are

Stratum	Adjusted Urban Sample	Adjusted Rural Sample	Sample Size Adjusted
Estrato 1	611	72	683
Estrato 2	162	136	298
Estrato 3	146	222	368
Estrato 4	135	271	406
Total	1054	701	1755

Selection of the different sample units

To continue the process we chose the municipalities that would be included in the sample (within each stratum), afterwards we selected the cantons in the rural areas and the segments in the urban areas. This last process of segment selection was carried out once we had all the censal maps of the municipalities’ urban areas that compose the sample, after performing the segmentation process of the same –which will be explained in detail further ahead--.

For the selection of the municipalities, we took into account the number of groups that would be necessary to choose in order to complete the urban sample in each one of the stratum. For this we defined beforehand that in stratum 1 we would choose conglomerates of 6 housing groups each, in the stratum 2 and 3, it would be of 7 housing groups, and in stratum 4 each conglomerate would have 8 housing groups. In the case of stratum 1 we calculated that we would conduct 611 interviews in the urban area, this was divided among six to obtain the number of necessary conglomerates, which gave as a result a total of 102 conglomerates. Since in this stratum all municipalities were self-selected, we proceeded to distribute all conglomerates in each municipal government in proportion to the size of each one of them. For the previous we used the procedure described in the next paragraph.

We gathered a list of municipalities by strata ordering them from largest to smallest according to the population quantity in each one of them. Besides, the list contained a column with a cumulative sum of each municipal government’s population. Then, we elected within the cumulative list a random starting point and we established an interval to carry out, from that random starting point, a systematic selection of the municipalities within each department. To select the random starting point, we generated a random number in each stratum by using the RAND function of Excel (normalized random number between 0 and 1). This number was multiplied by the total population that each stratum agglutinated. The municipal government where the resulting quantity within the cumulative list was situated, was the first selected municipal government. For example, in the case of stratum 1 the random number generated by Excel was 0.37812, when multiplying it by the total of the agglutinated population in this stratum (0.37812 x 2,688,878) it gave 1,016,718.5 as a result, this number is located within the accumulated quantity which corresponds to the municipal government of

Soyapango, consequently this municipal government was the first where the first conglomerate was placed within stratum 1.

Afterwards to continue with the placement of the totality of conglomerates corresponding to the stratum, we used an interval which was determined by dividing the total population of the stratum by the number of necessary conglomerates to complete the sample. We added this interval to the initial quantity that the first municipal government determined, and in this manner, the municipal government where the following conglomerate would be placed was that in which this summation was completed, and so on, until placing the totality of conglomerates of the stratum. In the case of stratum 1, all the municipalities contain more than one conglomerate, due to the fact that these agglutinate a considerable population quantity. Continuing with stratum 1, the interval we obtained by dividing the total population of the stratum by the number of necessary conglomerates (2,688,878 / 102) was of 26,362, this interval was added to the initial quantity (1,016,718.5 + 26,362) and we obtained the value of 1,043,080 which indicated the second municipal government where the following conglomerate would be placed, which in this case turned out to be the same municipal government of Soyapango. This is how we proceeded until we found the stratum's totality of conglomerates. When the application of the summation exceeded the stratum's total population, we accumulated it to continue with the procedure from the beginning of the this stratum's list. The procedure just described was used in each one of the strata in order to select the municipalities to be included in the sample and place within them the necessary conglomerates to comply with the sample of each stratum.

Table 3 List of Municipalities of Stratum 2 used for selection of the same

Municipality	Population	Accumulated Population	Selection Order in Urban Areas
Usulután	90,020	90,020	4, 5
San Marcos	86,298	176,318	6,7
Chalchuapa	83,135	259,453	8,
Cuscatancingo	79,735	339,189	9, 10
Zacatecoluca	78,294	417,483	11
San Martín	76,781	494,264	12, 13
Cojutepeque	68,241	562,505	14
Ilobasco	67,182	629,687	15,16
Izalco	66,965	696,652	17
San Vicente	63,967	760,619	18
Quezaltepeque	62,028	822,647	19
Metapán	61,871	884,518	20,21
Acajutla	60,767	945,284	22
Opico	59,203	1,004,487	23
Colón	54,865	1,059,352	1
La Unión	50,480	1,109,832	2
Sensuntepeque	50,463	1,160,295	3
Total	1,160,295		

Generated Random Number: 0.883199

Initial Quantity of Selection: 1, 160,295 x 0.883199 = 1, 024,771

Obtained Interval: 1, 160,295 / 23 = 50, 448

Table 3 specifies how municipalities were selected in stratum 2. The first column lists the municipalities which comprise stratum 2 from the largest to the smallest in population, the second

column shows the population of each municipal government; the third column details the accumulated population and the last specifies the order in which the municipalities were selected. As one can observe, when the application of the interval's summation exceeds the total population of the stratum, it accumulates to continue with the procedure at the beginning of the list.

Once the municipalities in each stratum are selected and the urban sample in each of these distributed, we proceeded to distribute the rural sample in each stratum. For this, we applied the same procedure used to distribute the urban sample, only in this occasion the selected municipalities in the previous step were listed from major to minor to distribute in these same municipalities the rural sample. For the case of the rural sample we selected conglomerates of 12 housing units, which for this case each conglomerate of 12 housing units will correspond to a canton to be selected.

It must be pointed out that in the case of some municipalities, which according to the 1992 census do not have a rural population and which were selected within the sample through the distribution process of the urban sample, were eliminated from the list used to distribute the necessary conglomerates to cover the rural sample in each stratum. In these municipalities we only carried out the totality of conglomerates that corresponds to the urban sample.

Afterwards, we chose different sampling points within each municipal government that should be included in the sample. For this we carried out two different procedures based on the nature of the municipal government's area. In urban areas we proceeded to divide each municipal government in population segments based on the Statistics and Census General Office (DIGESTYC) maps; while for the rural areas, we took the cantons as population units and these were listed to be chosen randomly.

In the specific case of rural areas, we chose according to selected municipal governments, selecting as many cantons and conglomerates as were necessary to cover the sample, which was done in a totally random manner because in most cases it was necessary to choose only one canton per municipality and only in some of those was it necessary to select two cantons. The cantons were ordered in alphabetical order within each selected municipal government, afterwards we chose a random number between 0 and 1, we multiplied this number by the total number of cantons belonging to the municipal government and the canton that was situated in the resulting number was the selected one; when two cantons were required, we carried out this same procedure to select the second canton.

In urban areas, the selection process of the segments where the surveys were applied, was systematic with a random starting point using the DIGESTYC maps. For each municipal government we selected as many segments as conglomerates that corresponded to each municipal government; that is, in each segment we carried out only the quantity of surveys that corresponded to one conglomerate, which varies depending on the stratum to which each municipal government belongs to, as we had mentioned before.

Each map of the municipalities shows an urban area of two thousand to fifteen thousand homes and these were divided in segments correlatively numbered following a spiral sequence. Each segment includes around 100 homes in those municipalities with low population concentrations, and around 300 homes in those which are densely populated. Once the maps are divided, we proceeded to calculate a

constant that would allow us to select the segments in a systematic way, according to the quantity of conglomerates that correspond to each municipal government, and to complete the urban sample.

Afterwards, for each urban map we divided the number of segments of the municipal government's map between the number of segments that should be included within the sample, which corresponds to the number of necessary conglomerates to cover the sample. This gave as a result a figure that turned into an interval of fixed ratio according to which we chose the segments depending on a random starting point. For example, if the division of the total number of segments based on a random starting point results in 8, we will choose a random number between 1 and 8, and parting from that number we will choose segments in an interval of 8 segments. More specifically, if the randomly chosen number is 6, we will choose the segment with that number, then we will add 8 more segments and in this way, the next chosen number will be 14, and so on until we have the number of stipulated segments for that municipal government.

The sample comprised a total of 222 points of different samples, taking into account urban and rural area –59 points in the rural area and 163 in the urban area--.

The application of the questionnaire was done by systematic approximation to the homes situated in the segments and cantons. In the case of the urban area we divided each segment into a set number of blocks, each of them containing a constant number of homes. Afterwards, we randomly chose one block within each segment. Subsequently, within each selected block we chose a conglomerate of 6, 7, or 8 homes –depending on the stratum to which the municipal government belongs--. These homes were chosen starting from the home situated at the southernmost part of the selected block –that was the first home of the conglomerate—and the following 5 homes (or 6 or 7) correspond to the homes situated contiguously to the first selected, corresponding to the block in clockwise direction.

In the cantons we found the southernmost home and we took 11 contiguous homes; and to choose them we did the same as in the urban area; that is, we covered the canton following a clockwise direction.

In each of the homes which comprised the conglomerate we found the person who fulfilled the required requisites for the sample. The interviewers explained the objectives and general theme of the survey to those they approached and only interviewed persons who wished to collaborate, interviewing only one person per home who would fulfill the gender and age characteristics required to complete the sample.

In the last sampling stage, we considered these gender and age quotas of persons to be surveyed. This was done with the purpose of ensuring a sample distribution that would correspond to the country's total population distribution depending on these two variables: just as also, to eliminate the polltaker's personal selection criterion as he chose the person to interview in each home. The quotas by gender and age are distributed as Table 4 shows.

Table 4 Distribution of quotas by gender and age**
(Sample adjusted for no coverage)

AGE	GENDER								
	Masculine			Femenine			Total		
	Quantity			Quantity			Quantity		
	Population*	%	n	Population *	%	n	Population *	%	n
18 a 34 años	1,091,648	25.30	444	1,084,495	25.14	441	2,176,143	50.44	885
35 años y más	981,155	22.75	399	1,156,789	26.81	471	2,137,944	49.56	870
Total	2,072,803	48.05	843	2,241,284	51.95	912	4,314,087	100	1,755

*According to population projections for 2006. See: DIGESTYC, FNUAP y CELADE (1996).

Randomness is allowed within all the previous procedures and the distribution in the sample selection, which ensures the study's population representativeness.

Processing of information

It is necessary to point out that for the development of this survey, the data collected were gathered with PDA equipment (Personal Digital Assistant) commonly known in the market as Palm.

The use of the Palm or PDA in this investigation had as an objective to improve the processing and collection of information. One of the advantages of the use of this technology is that it reduces the general work time, allowing to obtain additional time for data analysis since the information collected by the pollsters in the field is downloaded daily, which allows to verify the quantity and quality of the conducted surveys.

The information processing was performed automatically. First, the Palm's synchronization process was performed with the computer to later execute the information download. Afterwards, the compiled information was transferred automatically to the "Statistical Package for Social Science" (SPSS).

Statistical Analysis

We used relatively simple methods of statistical analysis. To establish the association between two numerical variables we used the correlation coefficient of Pearson. This has values of 0 to 1. When there is perfect correlation between two values the coefficient is equal to the unit. While in order to establish association between a continuous variable and another category we used the analysis of variance. To establish if there is a significant statistical relationship between two nominal variables, we utilized the chi square test. To integrate the information of various questions about one same issue we constructed scales and utilized the Alfa de Cronbach coefficient. Coefficients of 0.70 or more are considered reliable and consistent, but in some cases we used scales whose coefficients were below

** The data in this Table about population quantity according to gender and age ranges have been extracted from "La Proyección de la población de EL Salvador 1995-2025" elaborated by the Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC) del Ministerio de Economía (1996), together with CELADE and FNUAP.

these values. Also we performed factorial analysis to determine the number of dimensions or implicit factors in a series of questions about the same issue.

We estimated on repeated occasions linear models of multiple regression for ordinary square minimums. Usually the dependent variable in these models is some index built with various reactives. The regression coefficients of these models (and their significance) allow to value in a concise manner the co-factors which “explain” these indexes. Although at times we refer to these co-factors as “determinants,” in reality, with the available information it is not possible to establish causality relationships. We only have “associations.” The regression models also present the standardized regression coefficients “Beta.” These are useful to value the relative importance of the various explanatory factors in the model because they measure the effects of standard units. As an indicator of goodness of fit of the model in its group the determination coefficient “square R” was used. This coefficient informs the proportion of explained variance of the model in comparison with the explanation which would be obtained by a “null” model (dependent variable estimated simply by its average). Additionally, we utilized binary logistic regression models when the dependent variable was dichotomous in its values. In these cases, we utilized the “R square” of Nagelkerke as a indicator of the variance explained by the model.

Precision of the results

All surveys by sampling are affected by two types of errors: non-sampling and sampling errors. The non-sampling errors are those incurred during the collection and gathering of information, these can be controlled by building an adequate measuring instrument, training the polltakers in the correct application of the instrument, supervising the fieldwork, creating an efficient data capture program, questionnaire revision, and adequate codification, just as a file cleaning, among others. These errors can be controlled but cannot be quantified. However, the comparison of the results that stem from the sample with those of the population provides an idea on whether these errors have generated biases that reduce sample representativeness.

Sampling errors, on the other hand, are a product of chance and result from interviewing a sample and not the total population. When we select a sample this is one of many possible means to select a sample from the population. The variability which exists among all these possible samples is the sampling error, which could be measured if all these samples were available, an obviously unreal situation. In practice, what is done is to estimate this error over the obtained variation parting from the sample. To estimate the sampling error from a statistic (average, percentages, differences, and totals), we calculate the standard error that is the square root of the population variance under the same conditions. For the calculation of this error it is very important to consider the design from which the sample was selected.

The effect of the design indicates the efficiency of the used design in relation to a design of an unrestricted random sample. A value of 1 indicates that the obtained variance by both designs (complex and unrestricted random sample) is equal; that is, the complex sampling is as efficient as an unrestricted random sampling with the same sample size. If the value is less than 1, this indicates that the obtained variance with complex sampling is less than the one obtained with the unrestricted random sample .

Appendix B. Informed Consent Letter.



Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas
Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública

Apartado postal (01) 168, Boulevard Los Próceres, San Salvador, El Salvador, C.A.
Tel. (503) 2210-6600 ext. 415. Telefax: (503) 2210-6672. email: jaguilar@iudop.uca.edu.sv

6 de febrero de 2008

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo del Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) para solicitarle una entrevista que durará alrededor de 45 minutos. El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de El Salvador.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse al Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), a los teléfonos 2210-6672 ó 2210-6600, ext. 415, con la Licda. Jeannette Aguilar o el señor Mauricio Gavidía.

¿Desea participar?

Atentamente,

Jeannette Aguilar
Instituto Universitario
de Opinión Pública

Directora

Appendix C. Questionnaire.

El Salvador Versión # 18Q IRB Approval: #071086



LA CULTURA POLITICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: El Salvador, 2008

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá	PAIS	3
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	
ESTRATOPRI: (301) Mayores de 100 mil habitantes (302) Entre 50 y 100 mil habitantes (303) Entre 20 y 50 mil habitantes (304) Menos de 20 mil habitantes	ESTRATOPRI	3 □□
UPM (Unidad primaria de Muestreo): _____	UPM	□□□
Departamento: _____	PROV	3 □□
Municipio: _____	MUNICIPIO	3 □□
Zona: _____	ELSZONA	□□
SEGMENTO CENSAL _____	ELSSEGMENTO	□□□
Sector _____	ELSSEC	□□□
CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo) (Punto Sample) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	□□
UR (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	UR	□□
Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural	TAMANO	□
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	IDIOMAQ	□
Hora de inicio: _____ : _____ [no digitar]		-----
Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2008	FECHA	□□□□
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR		

Cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2008: El impacto de la gobernabilidad

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer			Q1
A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SOLO UNA OPCIÓN]			A4 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corruption	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

Ahora, cambiando de tema...**[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días,” “una o dos veces por semana,” “rara vez,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días [Acepte también casi todos los días]	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país ? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	SOCT1
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	SOCT2
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	IDIO1

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	IDIO2
--	--------------

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	Sí	No	NS/NR	
CP2. ¿A algún diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa?	1	2	8	CP2
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad)?	1	2	8	CP4A
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8	CP4

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...				
ELSMUNI20. ¿Conoce usted el nombre del Alcalde del municipio donde usted vive? Nombre: _____ (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe	ELSMUNI20			
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR				NP1
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR				NP1B
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR				NP2
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR				SGL1
LGL1. En su opinión, ¿entre el gobierno nacional, los diputados o la municipalidad, quién ha respondido mejor para ayudar a resolver los problemas de su comunidad o barrio? ¿El gobierno nacional, los diputados o la municipalidad? (1) El gobierno nacional (2) Los diputados (3) La municipalidad (4) Ninguno [NO LEER] (5) Todos [NO LEER] (8) NS/NR				
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR				SGL2
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) NS/NR				LGL2

<p>LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más al gobierno central (2) Algo más al gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad (4) Algo más a la municipalidad (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>LGL2A</p>
<p>LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más el gobierno central (2) Algo más el gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad (4) Algo más la municipalidad (5) Mucho más la municipalidad (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>LGL2B</p>
<p>MUNI5. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio? (1) Sí ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>MUNI5</p>
<p>MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte de la municipalidad? [Leer alternativas] 3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Nada de confianza (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>MUNI6</p>
<p>MUNI15. ¿Qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la Participación de la gente en el trabajo de la municipalidad? [Leer alternativas] (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>MUNI15</p>

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
<p>CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.</p>	1	2	3	4	8	CP5

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR		
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8		CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		CP8
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		CP9
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		CP10
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		CP13
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	9 (HOMBRE)	CP20

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	LS3
IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	IT1

IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: [Leer alternativas] (1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada (8) NS/NR	IT1A
IT1B. Hablando en general, ¿Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? (1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas (2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás (8) NS/NR	IT1B

[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1]

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1	
Izquierda										Derecha	(NS/NR=88)

[RECOGER TARJETA # 1]

<p>IMMIG1. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno salvadoreño ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted...[Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NS/NR</p>	IMMIG1
<p>IMMIG2. En general, ¿usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los salvadoreños no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los salvadoreños? [Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]</p> <p>(1) Hacen los trabajos que los salvadoreños no quieren (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los salvadoreños (8) NS/NR</p>	IMMIG2

<p>PROT2. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?</p>	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	9 Inap	PROT2
<p>Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias [Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:</p>						
<p>JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.</p>	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC1		
<p>JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.</p>	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC4		

JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC10
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC12
JC13. Frente a mucha Corruption.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC13

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre la Asamblea Legislativa, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC15
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC16

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [sigua] (2) No [pasar a VIC20] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]		VIC1
VIC10. [SOLO SI FUE VICTIMA DE ALGUN DELITO] ¿El delincuente o los delincuentes usaron violencia en contra de usted? (1) Sí (2) No (9) Inap		VIC10
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar a VIC20] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a VIC20]		AOJ1
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar (6) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) INAP		AOJ1B

<p>[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]: Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas [Si contesta “Sí,” preguntar ¿Cuántas veces? y anotar el número de veces; si contesta “No” anotar “0” cero]</p>	<p>¿Cuántas veces? NO = 0, NS/NR=88</p>	
<p>VIC20. Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC20</p>
<p>VIC21. ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC21</p>
<p>VIC22. ¿Ha sido víctima de daños o actos de vandalismo en contra de su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC22</p>
<p>VIC23. ¿Tiene usted vehículo o motocicleta? No → Marcar 99 [PASAR A VIC24] Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha sido víctima de un robo total de vehículo o motocicleta en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC23</p>
<p>VIC23A. [Solo si tiene vehículo o motocicleta] ¿Ha sido víctima de daños o de un robo de una parte o partes de vehículo o motocicleta? ¿Cuántas veces? 99. Inap</p>		<p>VIC23A</p>
<p>[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]. VIC24. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de alguna estafa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC24</p>
<p>VIC25. ¿Alguien le amenazó de/a muerte, por cualquier motivo, en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC25</p>
<p>VIC26 ¿Fue usted golpeado por alguien en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC26</p>
<p>VIC27. ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC27</p>
<p>VIC28. ¿Fue usted herido con un <i>arma de fuego</i> en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC28</p>
<p>VIC29. ¿Fue usted herido con un <i>arma blanca</i> en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC29</p>
<p>VIC30. ¿Ha sido víctima de algún delito de tipo sexual en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC30</p>
<p>VIC31. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha sido usted víctima de un chantaje, extorsión o renta? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC31</p>
<p></p>		
<p>VIC32. ¿Fue usted o algún pariente que vive en su hogar víctima de un secuestro en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas personas y cuántas veces? [Considerare total de veces y total de personas para escribir el total]</p>		<p>VIC32</p>
<p>VIC33. ¿Algún pariente o persona que vivía en la casa con usted fue asesinada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas personas?</p>		<p>VIC33</p>
<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ8</p>	

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR	AOJ11
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<i>Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1)	(0)	8	VIC40
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1)	(0)	8	VIC41
VIC42. ¿Ha cerrado su negocio a causa de la delincuencia? [Si no tiene negocio marque 9]	(1)	(0)	8	9 VIC42
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “comunidad”]	(1)	(0)	8	VIC43
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1)	(0)	8	VIC44
VIC45. ¿Ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia? [Si está desempleado marque 9]	(1)	(0)	8	9 VIC45

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ11A
VIC11. ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o hecho de violencia, donde lo denunciaría? [No leer] [Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?] (0) No denunciaría (1) Alcaldía (municipalidad) (2) Policía (3) Justicia (Fiscalía, Procuraduría etc.) (4) Iglesia (5) Medio de comunicación (7) Derechos Humanos (6) Otros (8) NS/NR	VIC11
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12
AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12a
AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	AOJ16A
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ17

<p>AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) La policía protege, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [No leer] No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ18</p>
<p>VIC50. Hablando de la ciudad o el pueblo en donde usted vive, ¿cree que los niveles de violencia son en general altos, medios o bajos?</p> <p>(1) Altos (2) Medios (3) Bajos (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC50</p>

<p>VIC51. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha tomado usted en su vivienda alguna medida de seguridad para protegerse de la delincuencia?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a VIC53] (8) NS/NR [Pase a VIC53]</p>	<p>VIC51</p>
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<p>¿Qué medida de seguridad ha tomado usted en su vivienda para protegerse de la delincuencia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera respuesta preguntar, “Algo más?”]. Aceptar hasta dos respuestas.</p>		
	<p>1ª Respuesta VIC52A</p>	<p>2ª Respuesta VIC52B</p>
<p>Ha construido muros, rejas o paredes exteriores adicionales en su casa</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>1</p>
<p>Ha puesto alambre de púas, “razor,” malla electrificada o vidrio roto alrededor de su casa</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Ha instalado alarmas en su casa</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>3</p>
<p>Le ha puesto más candados o chapas a las puertas de su casa</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Ha adquirido o ha comprado un arma</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>5</p>
<p>Ha contratado un servicio de seguridad privada o a un vigilante privado</p>	<p>6</p>	<p>6</p>
<p>Otras medidas</p>	<p>7</p>	<p>7</p>
<p>NS/NR</p>	<p>8</p>	<p>8</p>
<p>INAP</p>	<p>9</p>	<p>9</p>

<p>VIC53. ¿Hasta cuánto estaría dispuesto a pagar al año por un seguro que le compense o le reembolse las pérdidas o los daños causados por delitos contra usted o algún miembro de su hogar? Me podría decir la cantidad de dinero que estaría dispuesto a pagar? [Coloque la cantidad] _____ [No leer] (0) No pagaría nada, no tiene dinero, no le interesa (8888) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC53</p>
<p>VIC54. Si existiera un mecanismo efectivo, hasta cuánto estaría dispuesto a pagar al año por un servicio que le garantizara que usted NO será víctima de ningún acto violento o robo? Me podría decir la cantidad de dinero que estaría dispuesto a pagar? [Coloque la cantidad] _____ [No leer] (0) No pagaría nada, no tiene dinero, no le interesa (8888) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC54</p>

<p>VIC55. De las siguientes opciones, ¿cuál considera usted que es la principal causa de la inseguridad en su lugar de residencia? [Leer opciones]:</p> <p>(1) Falta de policía (2) Falta de justicia (3) Pobreza (4) Falta de programas para los jóvenes (8) [No leer] NS/NR (9) [No leer] No hay inseguridad en mi lugar de residencia</p>	VIC55
<p>VIC56. ¿Y qué tanto cree usted que los políticos se preocupan por mejorar la seguridad de su ciudad o comunidad: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	VIC56

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST1. La Policía Nacional Civil	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3
ST4. La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	NS/NR

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de El Salvador garantizan un juicio justo? (<i>Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i>)		B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de El Salvador?		B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político salvadoreño?		B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político salvadoreño?		B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político salvadoreño?		B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?		B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fuerza Armada?		B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Legislativa?		B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la República?		B15
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional Civil?		B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?		B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?		B21
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?		B21A
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?		B32
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser salvadoreño?		B43
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la República?		B16
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos?		B17

B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte de Cuentas de la República?		B19
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		B48

Usando la misma escala...	NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?		N1
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?		N3
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la Corruptión en el gobierno?		N9
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.		N10
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?		N11
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?		N12

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de El Salvador y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR	
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos salvadoreños representan bien a sus votantes?		EPP1
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay Corruption en los partidos políticos salvadoreños?		EPP2
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?		EPP3
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en la Asamblea Legislativa. ¿Hasta qué punto la Asamblea Legislativa estorba la labor del presidente?		EC1
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa discutiendo y debatiendo?		EC2
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba la Asamblea Legislativa?		EC3
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto la Asamblea Legislativa cumple con lo que usted espera de ella?		EC4

[RECOGER TARJETA A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Antonio Saca es...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1
M2. Hablando de la Asamblea Legislativa y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (8) NSNR	M2

[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		NS/NR
							Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR	

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<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones..</p> <p>POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP101</p>	
<p>POP102. Cuando la Asamblea Legislativa estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin la Asamblea Legislativa. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP102</p>	
<p>POP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP103</p>	
<p>POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP106</p>	
<p>POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p>POP107</p>	
<p>POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal?</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p>POP109</p>	
<p>POP110. Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p> <p>8) NS/NR</p>	<p>POP110</p>	
<p>POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP112</p>	
<p>POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p>POP113</p>	
<p>EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p>	<p>EFF1</p>	
<p>EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p>	<p>EFF2</p>	
<p>ING4. Puede que la Democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	<p>ING4</p>	

PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los salvadoreños tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	PN2
DEM23. Puede haber Democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	DEM23

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7. **NS/NR = 8**

ROS1. El Estado salvadoreño, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS1
ROS2. El Estado salvadoreño, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS2
ROS3. El Estado salvadoreño, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS3
ROS4. El Estado salvadoreño debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS4

[RECOGER TARJETA B]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la Democracia funciona en El Salvador? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4
PN5. En su opinión, ¿El Salvador es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	PN5

[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				NS/NR

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	1-10, 88
	E5

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E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E8
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E11
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E15
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E14
E2. Que las personas ocupen (invadan) fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E2
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E3
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E16

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en El Salvador. Siempre usaremos la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			NS/NR

	1-10, 88
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de El Salvador, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]	D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	D2
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de El Salvador ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	D4

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D5
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[RECOGER TARJETA C]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La Democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR	DEM2
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<p>DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la Participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DEM11</p>	
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la Democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La Democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AUT1</p>	
<p>AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] (1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o (2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AUT2</p>	
<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP1</p>	
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales del 2004? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP2</p>	
<p>Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones (1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; (2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o (3) no corruptas.</p>		
<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 5 dólares de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada (2) Es corrupto pero se justifica (3) No es corrupto (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DC10</p>	
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado (2) Es corrupto pero justificado (3) No es corrupto (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DC13</p>	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC2
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC6
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/delegación en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	EXC11
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC13
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (o soborno) en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC14
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8	EXC15
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8	EXC17
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)?		0	1	8	EXC18

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la Corruptión de los funcionarios públicos está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR	EXC7
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Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...	
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI1
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa de El Salvador? [NO LEER: Rubén Orellana] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI2
GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene El Salvador? [NO LEER: 14] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI3
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en El Salvador? [NO LEER: 5 años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI4
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI5

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS/NR	
					DER1
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	8	DER2
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	DER3
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	DER4

VB1. ¿Está empadronando para votar? ¿Tiene usted Documento Único de Identidad (DUI)? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR	VB1
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales del 2004? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB50] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB50]	VB2

<p>VB3. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) (301) Antonio Saca (ARENA) (302) Schafik Handal (FMLN) (303) Héctor Silva (Coalición CDU-PDC) (304) Rafael Machuca (PCN) (77) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (No votó)</p>	<p>VB3</p>
<p>VB50. [Preguntar a todos] En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, muy en desacuerdo? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NSNR</p>	<p>VB50</p>
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a CHI6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1]</p>	<p>VB10</p>
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]. (301) ARENA (302) FMLN (303) PCN (304) PDC (305) CD (306) FDR (77) OTRO (88) NS/NR (99) INAP [Pase A POL1]</p>	<p>VB11</p>
<p>VB12 ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? (1) Muy débil (2) Débil (3) Ni débil ni fuerte (4) Fuerte (5) Muy fuerte (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>VB12</p>
<p>CHI6. [Solo para los que no simpatizan hoy con un partido político] ¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está más cerca de su situación? [Leer. Acepte sólo una respuesta] (1) Tuve un partido pero ahora voto por otro (2) Tuve un partido pero ahora ya no voto más (3) No tengo partido, pero voto (4) No tengo partido y no voto (7) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>CHI6</p>

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	POL1
POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas] (1) A diario (2) Algunas veces por semana (3) Algunas veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR	POL2

VB20. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? [No leer] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno. (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría en blanco o anularía (8) NS/NR	VB20
VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? [Leer alternativas] (1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente (3) Influir de otras maneras (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga (8) NS/NR	VB21

[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]
LS6. Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted. ...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible						Mejor vida posible				NS/NR	

[RECOGER TARJETA D]

En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con... **[Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Satisfecho(a)	Insatisfecho(a)	NS/NR o No Utiliza	
SD1. El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8	SD1
SD2. Las vías, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8	SD2
SD3. El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8	SD3
SD4. La calidad del aire	1	2	8	SD4
SD5. La calidad del agua	1	2	8	SD5
SD6. La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8	SD6

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SD7. La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8	SD7
SD8. La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8	SD8
SD9. El flujo del tráfico	1	2	8	SD9
SD10. Las aceras o vías peatonales	1	2	8	SD10
SD11. La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8	SD11
SD12. La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes	1	2	8	SD12

LS4. Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive? (1) Satisfecho (2) insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	LS4
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VB6. ¿Votó usted para diputado en las últimas elecciones? (1) Sí [<i>Siga</i>] (2) No. [<i>pasa a ELSVB17</i>] (8) NS [<i>pasa a ELSVB17</i>]	VB6
ELSVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado en las últimas elecciones? (0) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) (1) ARENA (2) FMLN (3) PCN (4) PDC (5) CD (6) PLN (88) No sabe (99) INAP (no votó)	ELSVB7
ELSVB13. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que ese partido representa sus intereses? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (9) INAP	ELSVB13

ELSVB17. En su opinión, ¿qué tan democráticos son los partidos políticos en su funcionamiento interno? [Leer alternativas], (1) Muy democráticos (2) Algo democráticos (3) Poco democráticos, (4) Nada democráticos (8) No sabe, no responde	ELSVB17
ELSPN3A. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que el gobierno nacional representa sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano?(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde	ELSPN3A
ELSPN3B. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que los diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa representan sus intereses y le benefician como ciudadano? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde	ELSPN3B
ELSPN3C. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que la alcaldía de su localidad y el concejo municipal representan sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde	ELSPN3C
PAZ1. ¿Considera Ud. que los Acuerdos de Paz han sido muy buenos, buenos, malos o muy malos para el país? (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Malos (4) Muy malos (8) NS	PAZ1
PAZ4. ¿Cuánto cree Ud. que ha mejorado la situación política del país luego de la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	PAZ4

<p>PAZ5. ¿Cuánto cree Ud. que ha mejorado la situación socioeconómica del país luego de la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS] Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PAZ5</p>
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A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de las reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería.

	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	No responde	
VOL201. Suponga que una persona agrade a alguien que le quitó el/la esposo/a. Usted...	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)	VOL201
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a un /a hija/o	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)	VOL202
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata, usted...	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)	VOL203
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienzan a hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente indeseable. Usted...	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)	VOL204

<p>W8. Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer? (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) LE DA IGUAL (NO LEER) (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>W8</p>
<p>W10. Sobre la Participación política de la mujer, ¿Con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo: [Leer] 1) No es conveniente que las mujeres participen en política (2) Las mujeres sólo deben participar en política cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permiten (3) Las mujeres deben participar en política igual que los hombres (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>W10</p>

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar Table abajo para código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0						ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16			
NS/NR/	88						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR)

Q2

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? **[No leer alternativas]**

Q3

- (1) Católica
- (2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).
- (3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas)
- (5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).
- (6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día
- (7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).
- (4) Ninguna
- (8) NS/NR

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**

Q5

- (1) Más de una vez por semana
- (2) Una vez por semana
- (3) Una vez al mes
- (4) Una o dos veces al año
- (5) Nunca o casi nunca (8) NS/NR

[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]

Q10

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]

[10 déciles basados en la moneda y Distribution del país]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$45
- (02) Entre \$46- \$90
- (03) \$91-\$144
- (04) \$145-\$288
- (05) \$289-\$432
- (06) \$433-\$576

(07) \$577-\$720		
(08) \$721-1008		
(09) \$1009-\$1440		
(10) \$1441 y más		
[RECOGER TARJETA E]		
Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No [Pase a Q10c] (8) NS [Pase a Q10c]	Q10A	
Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer] (1) Consumo (alimento, vestido) (2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación) (3) Gastos en educación (4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias) (5) Gastos médicos (6) Ahorro/Inversión (7) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	Q10a1	
Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	Q10B	
Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí,” preguntar ¿dónde?] [No leer alternativas] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No [Pase a Q14] (8) NS/NR [Pase a Q14]	Q10C	
Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con que frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	Q16	
Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	Q14	
Q10D. [Preguntar a todos] El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades (8) [No leer] NS/NR	Q10D	

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	Q11	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) NS/NR (88)	Q12	____ ____
Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)	Q12A	____ ____

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-salvadoreña, mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-salvadoreña (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	ETID	
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WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días o casi todos los días (2) Por lo menos una vez por semana (3) Por lo menos una vez al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR [No leer]	WWW1	
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	R1
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R3
R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4A
R5. Vehículo. Cuántos?	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R6
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	R8
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas] (1) Trabajando? [Siga] (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [TERMINA] (4) Es estudiante? [TERMINA] (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [TERMINA] (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [TERMINA] (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [TERMINA] (8) NS/NR	OCUP4	
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<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)</p> <p>(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)</p> <p>(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)</p> <p>(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)</p> <p>(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)</p> <p>(6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)</p> <p>(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)</p> <p>(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados</p> <p>(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)</p> <p>(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)</p> <p>(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)</p> <p>(12) Artesano</p> <p>(13) Servicio doméstico</p> <p>(14) Obrero</p> <p>(15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1 </p>
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<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado del gobierno?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1A</p>
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<p>OCUP 12A ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal?</p> <p>_____ [Anotar número de horas] (88) NS/NR (99) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP 12A</p>
<p>OCUP12. ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas?</p> <p>(1) Menos (2) Igual (3) Más (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP12</p>

<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene seguro de salud (seguro social) a través de su empresa o su empleador?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1C</p>
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Ahora nos gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situación laboral en diciembre de 2006		
OCUP27. –En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora? (1) Sí [TERMINA] (2) No [Siga] (8) NS/NR [Siga] (9) INAP		OCUP27
OCUP28. En esa fecha estaba usted:[Leer alternativas] (1) Desempleado? [Siga] (2) Trabajando? [TERMINA] (3) Estudiando? [TERMINA] (4) Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar? [TERMINA] (5) Otros (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) [TERMINA] (8) NS/NR [TERMINA] (9) INAP		OCUP28
OCUP29. ¿Cuál era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? [No leer alternativas] (1) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [Pase a OCUP31] (2) Fin de empleo temporal [Pase a OCUP31] (3) Buscaba empleo por primera vez [Pase a OCUP31] (4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [Siga] (5) Despido o cese [Siga] (8) NS/NR [Pase a OCUP31] (9) INAP		OCUP29
OCUP30. ¿Recibió algún pago en concepto de cesantía o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba? (1) Sí [TERMINA] (2) No [TERMINA] (8) NS/NR [TERMINA] (9) INAP		OCUP30
OCUP31. ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [TERMINA] (8) NS/NR [TERMINA] (9) INAP		OCUP31
OCUP31A ¿En esa fecha, cuánto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo? (1) Menos de un mes (2) Entre un mes y tres meses (3) Entre tres meses y seis meses (4) Más de seis meses (8) NS/NR (9) INAP		OCUP31A

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____		

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____


Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta #1




Tarjeta A




Tarjeta B

Muy de Acuerdo




Muy en Desacuerdo

Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D

Mejor vida posible



Peor vida posible

Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$45
- (02) Entre \$46- \$90
- (03) \$91-\$144
- (04) \$145-\$288
- (05) \$289-\$432
- (06) \$433-\$576
- (07) \$577-\$720
- (08) \$721-1008
- (09) \$1009-\$1440
- (10)\$1441-y más

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